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In the current Internet, senders are not accountable for the packets they send.
As a result, malicious users send unwanted traffic that wastes shared resources
and degrades network performance. Stopping such attacks requires identifying the
responsible principal and filtering any unwanted traffic it sends. However, senders
can obscure their identity: a packet identifies its sender only by the source address,
but the Internet Protocol does not enforce that this address be correct. Additionally,
affected destinations have no way to prevent the sender from continuing to cause
harm.
An accountable network binds sender identities to packets they send for the
purpose of holding senders responsible for their traffic. In this dissertation, I present
an accountable network-level architecture that strongly binds senders to packets
and gives receivers control over who can send traffic to them. Holding senders
accountable for their actions would prevent many of the attacks that disrupt the
Internet today.
Previous work in attack prevention proposes methods of binding packets to
senders, giving receivers control over who sends what to them, or both. However,
they all require trusted elements on the forwarding path, to either assist in identify-
ing the sender or to filter unwanted packets. These elements are often not under the
control of the receiver and may become corrupt. This dissertation shows that the
Internet architecture can be extended to allow receivers to block traffic from unwanted
senders, even in the presence of malicious devices in the forwarding path.
This dissertation validates this thesis with three contributions. The first con-
tribution is DNA, a network architecture that strongly binds packets to their sender,
allowing routers to reject unaccountable traffic and recipients to block traffic from
unwanted senders. Unlike prior work, which trusts on-path devices to behave cor-
rectly, the only trusted component in DNA is an identity certification authority. All
other entities may misbehave and are either blocked or evicted from the network.
The second contribution is NeighborhoodWatch, a secure, distributed, scalable
object store that is capable of withstanding misbehavior by its constituent nodes.
DNA uses NeighborhoodWatch to store receiver-specific requests block individual
senders.
The third contribution is VanGuard, an accountable capability architecture.
Capabilities are small, receiver-generated tokens that grant the sender permission
to send traffic to receiver. Existing capability architectures are not accountable,
assume a protected channel for obtaining capabilities, and allow on-path devices
to steal capabilities. VanGuard builds a capability architecture on top of DNA,
preventing capability theft and protecting the capability request channel by allowing
receivers to block senders that flood the channel. Once a sender obtains capabilities,
it no longer needs to sign traffic, thus allowing greater efficiency than DNA alone.
The DNA architecture demonstrates that it is possible to create an accountable
network architecture in which none of the devices on the forwarding path must be
trusted. DNA holds senders responsible for their traffic by allowing receivers to block
senders; to store this blocking state, DNA relies on the NeighborhoodWatch DHT.
VanGuard extends DNA and reduces its overhead by incorporating capabilities,
which gives destinations further control over the traffic that sources send to them.
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In the early 1970’s, computer networks were limited to isolated instances at aca-
demic and government sites. The Internet, as it is known today, began as an effort
to connect these networks with a single protocol [50]. At the time, threats to com-
munication were external to the network: protocols were designed provide a reliable
communication medium even in the case of gateway or network failure [26].
In the forty years since its creation, the Internet has grown exponentially.
Commercial networks, as opposed to academic, dominate. There are nearly two
billion users worldwide [42]. One of the reasons for this growth is the design decision
to make the Internet open: the Internet architecture provides a protocol, TCP/IP,
that connects endhosts, and any device or network that can speak that protocol
can join the Internet. Communication does not require prior approval; anyone may
communicate with anyone.
An open communication model suits the original Internet architecture’s goal
of providing efficient connectivity, assuming that hosts do not maliciously deviate
from protocol. This assumption may have been true when the Internet was designed,
but is not true today. As a result, the Internet is susceptible to internal attacks
by malicious hosts. Furthermore, hosts can send packets without divulging their
identity, allowing them to abuse the network with little consequence.
In this dissertation, I present protocols for an accountable network, DNA,
which prevents such abuse. An accountable network layer binds sender identities to
packets so that the receiver (or some other device) can take action based on the true
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identity of the sender. Strongly binding senders to packets supports many classes
of possible actions. The original impetus for providing accountability, according
to the designers of the Internet protocols, was to account for resource usage [26].
Accountability facilitates network auditing, by allowing administrators to determine
what principal was responsible for causing a certain action (such as causing a device
to fail). In this proposal, I examine the use of accountability to selectively filter
repeated unwanted, abusive, or non-compliant traffic from malicious sources on a
per-destination basis, while permitting traffic from others to proceed. The result is
that receivers can control who can send packets to them, and thus who can consume
their resources.
1.1 Lack of accountability facilitates abuse
The current Internet is not accountable. The Internet protocols were designed to
be resilient to external disruptions—faulty hardware and unreliable links—rather
than internal misbehavior. As such, they lack means to both identify senders and
hold them responsible. There is no strong identification mechanism built into the
Internet protocols. Senders can be identified by their IP address, yet there are no
requirements that this address be correct. Similarly, there are no rules that designate
what actions a sender can be held accountable for, or who should hold senders
responsible. The situation would improve if ISPs were to police their customers,
but often they do not have incentive to do so.
As a result, attacks on the Internet infrastructure—the hosts, links, and routers
that compose the network—are not only possible but common. Such attacks are
called denial of service (DoS) attacks. One example of a DoS attack is a bandwidth
flooding attack, in which the attacker (or, more commonly, attackers) sends packets
as quickly as it can towards the victim, without regard to how or if the victim re-
sponds. The goal is to consume all of the available bandwidth on the victim’s access
link, so that other, legitimate traffic cannot be delivered. However, even a small
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amount of attack traffic is sufficient to disrupt communication: TCP’s exponential
backoff mechanism will reduce throughput drastically when the packet loss rate is
above 5% [79].
Adding to the difficulty in preventing DoS attacks is the tendency of attackers
to spoof their source address. A victim that can identify an attacker by its IP
address could filter traffic from that address with a firewall. Attackers adapted by
spoofing their source address to avoid such filters. The result is that attackers are
unidentifiable to the destination and therefore cannot be held accountable for their
actions.
1.2 Accountability as a solution to DoS attacks
My approach to preventing DoS attacks is motivated by the belief that the victim
of the attack, and receivers in general, should have control over the packets they
receive. If a victim were able to stop unwanted packets before they arrived, it could
recover from the attack. Blocking unwanted packets while permitting desired traffic
requires distinguishing between the two, but it is possible that the only difference
between wanted and unwanted packets is their source. Currently, the only means to
identify senders are by temporal properties, such as IP address or network location.
Even if a mechanism to block senders did exist, attacker could evade blocks by
changing these properties.
Incorporating accountability into the network solves this problem. An account-
able architecture strongly identifies senders with persistent attributes and binds a
sender’s identity to its packets. Blocking attackers is more effective, as the attackers
cannot bypass blocks. Building a mechanism to block senders based on accountable
identities satisfies our goal of giving receivers control over the packets they receive,
thus mitigating DoS attacks.
3
Trusted components
Existing proposals to extend the Internet to allow receivers control over the traffic
the receive share a common characteristic: they trust some component on the for-
warding path to not misbehave. This is undesirable, as these elements are often not
under the control of the receiver and may become corrupted. An ideal accountability
architecture would not place trust assumptions on any elements of the forwarding
path to achieve either identification or filtering. This dissertation proposes the fol-
lowing thesis: the Internet architecture can be extended to allow receivers to block
traffic from unwanted senders, even in the presence of malicious devices on the for-
warding path. I demonstrate this hypothesis by presenting the DNA and VanGuard
accountable architectures, showing how they maintains correctness if in-network de-
vices are corrupt, and evaluating their performance with an implementation and
simulations.
1.3 Goals of an accountability architecture
Incorporating accountability into the Internet is an immense task. All aspects of
the design need to be chosen properly so that the resulting architecture provides the
desired properties while incurring minimal overhead and change. Here I discuss the
goals we have for an accountability architecture and the reasons they are important.
Trust lies outside the forwarding path
Components of the Internet are operated and maintained by diverse organizations,
often with no mutual trust of each other. An accountable Internet architecture
should reflect this by trusting as few of the components as possible. DNA minimizes
this trust by depending upon only a trusted third party to issue identities and, when
necessary, resolve disputes.
If any part of the network deviates from the protocol, DNA defines measures
to filter, disconnect, or expunge the offending component. This is in stark contrast
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to even the most recent DoS prevention techniques and accountability protocols [81,
53, 52, 3], which all rely on some component of the network to correctly enforce the
protocol.
Receivers can block senders
Receivers should have control over who sends to them. Accepting a packet from
the network consumes resources, and receivers should be able to control allocation
of their resources. To give receivers this control, an accountable architecture must
allow receivers to block senders. Blocking a sender should prevent any packets from
that sender from reaching the destination. By allowing receivers to express this
control, DNA gives them control over who consumes their network resources and
allows them to protect their networks from attack.
Senders may remain anonymous
Traditionally, accountability and anonymity have been mutually exclusive. Binding
senders to strong, persistent identifiers can compromise privacy, by making it easier
to track users across multiple connections. An accountable Internet architecture
should not provide privacy-compromising adversaries with more abilities than they
have today.
DNA uses temporary blinding keys to prevent traffic analysis; this comes at
the cost of requiring extra communication to map the temporary key to a permanent
key before placing a block. Existing techniques such as onion routing [36] can be
used to further mask communication patterns.
Sender identity is unforgeable
In order for blocks to be effective, they must unambiguously identify the entity to be
blocked. A sender must not be able to avoid a block because of an imprecise match.
Similarly, identities must be long-lived: blocks are ineffective if a principal can mint
a new, unblocked identify. DNA uses the strongest identification methods available,
namely cryptographic signatures, to provide unforgeable, long-lived identities to
5
senders.
Every destination is protected
Currently, only high-profile sites are able to employ any form of DoS protection,
while many others are vulnerable. Some DoS-mitigation proposals also offer pro-
tection only to individual sites [23, 48, 4]. Our goal is to provide protection for
every host in the network. This motivates building accountability into the network.
Changing the fundamental nature of the Internet to provide accountability requires
changes at the underlying protocol levels.
Traffic is blocked near the source
There are three places in the network where unwanted traffic can be blocked: near
the destination, in the core, or near the sender. By the time the traffic has reached
the destination, it is too late: bottleneck links may already be congested.
Filtering traffic in the core is infeasible for several reasons. High-speed routers
can only perform cursory checks, router state is limited, and undesired traffic may
take many paths through the network, each requiring its own filter.
The only choice left is to block traffic near the source. Doing so not only
avoids the above problems, but by dropping packets early, does not waste network
resources on transmitting packets that will only be discarded later.
Incremental deployment
The growth of the Internet has led to an ossification of its core protocols. It is
no longer possible to coordinate global shifts from one protocol to the next; change
must occur gradually. The difficulties and delays encountered in the current attempt
to upgrade from IPv4 to IPv6 are an example of this phenomenon. Therefore, new
designs must be able to coexist with current protocols. DNA is designed to allow for
incremental deployment. Most changes happen at endhosts and in edge networks,
allowing for sites to upgrade at their own pace. Networks in the core of the Internet
do not have to upgrade simultaneously; accountable packets can be tunneled through
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non-accountable networks.
As the guarantees DNA offers (specifically, minimal trust assumptions and
strong sender identification) are very strong, it is not surprising that DNA incurs
costs (in terms of packet size, signature checking and verification, and additional
components in the network) greater than those in today’s Internet. However, DNA
makes design choices (such as using elliptic curve cryptography and the use of
waivers) to reduce these costs.
1.4 Thesis outline
In Chapter 2 I give a detailed survey of work related to DNA and VanGuard. I
describe previous attempts at preventing and mitigating DoS attacks and to what
extent they provide accountability of senders. I focuses on three approaches: capa-
bilities, which routers can use to prioritize packets that the destination has expressed
desire in; filters, which, like DNA, allow receivers to block packets from unwanted
senders; and alternate designs of an accountable architecture for the Internet. It
also discusses work that proposes uses of accountability in networking for purposes
other than preventing DoS attacks.
In Chapter 3 I present the design and evaluation of the DNA architecture. It
describes the protocol in detail and shows how DNA continues to be effective even
when devices on the forwarding path, including senders, routers, and the components
of DNA, are corrupted. DNA uses strong cryptography, rather than network-based
properties such as point of attachment, to identify senders. The result is that once
a sender is blocked, it cannot move or change properties of its network to bypass
a filter. DNA includes provisions for allowing senders to remain anonymous, yet
still be blockable. This chapter also proposes extensions to decrease the packet-
transmission overhead (waivers) and prevent replay attacks at the cost of router
state (Bloom filters in routers).
DNA provides the ability for destinations to block senders. These filters must
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be stored for as long as the destination desires and be readily available in order to
determine if a sender is attempting to contact a destination that has blocked it.
DNA stores filters in a globally-available distributed hash table (DHT). A DHT is a
structured overlay network with a put/get interface that scales efficiently with the
size of the network. As such, it is a natural design choice for storing such a large
amount of state. However, DHTs are vulnerable a variety of attacks. Chapter 4
presents the design of the NeighborhoodWatch DHT, which prevents known attacks
by relying on a trusted authority.
An accountable Internet architecture provides an accountable channel that can
be used as a building block for other systems. In Chapter 5 I present one such appli-
cation. VanGuard is a network architecture that incorporates both accountability
and capabilities, which are an efficient way of allowing destinations to tell routers
whether traffic is desired. VanGuard is built on DNA and uses it to hold senders
accountable for their traffic and allow receivers to block senders. VanGuard ties
capabilities to accountability information and treats them as secret values, meaning
senders (once they obtain capabilities) do not need to sign packets in order to be
held accountable. This allows VanGuard to provide the same benefits as DNA with
less overhead.
I conclude my dissertation in Chapter 6, in which I summarize my contribu-




This chapter presents a survey of work related to my thesis, with a focus on network-
based DoS protection mechanisms give some amount of control to the receiver. It be-
gins with early proposals based on overlay networks (Section 2.1) and router-placed
filters (Section 2.2). Passport, a building block for many later systems, follows (Sec-
tion 2.3). Capabilities, the approach which has been most-heavily explored in the
research literature, is presented in Section 2.4. Filtering systems, the family in which
DNA falls, are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 describes AIP, which shares many
of the same goals as DNA, and derivative work. Section 2.7 briefly presents other
related systems. I follow with a description of existing DoS-prevention techniques,
both Internet practices (Section 2.8) and commercial services (Section 2.9). Finally,
Section 2.10 presents other uses of accountability in networking.
Table 2.1 presents a comparison of the pieces of work discussed in this chapter
with DNA and VanGuard.
2.1 Overlay-based services
Overlay-based DoS-prevention services leverage a dedicated infrastructure that uses
a combination of tunneling and filtering to protect against DoS attacks. They do
not aim to solve the general DoS problem, but rather protect individual hosts or
services, such as emergency services. The two proposed systems discussed below,
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DoS protection. First, they require a large, dedicated infrastructure that can au-
thenticate and route a large number of packets on its own. Second, the participants
are limited to senders and receivers that exchange secret information before using
the overlay.
2.1.1 SOS
The Secure Overlay Service, or SOS, is the first overlay-based DoS-prevention ser-
vice [48]. SOS protects a single target from attack. Surrounded the target is a set of
filters, such a firewalls, that create a “filtered region” around the target consisting
only of authorized traffic. In order to pass through a filter, traffic must first be
routed through an overlay; SOS uses the Chord [75] overlay network.
There are three types of special nodes in the overlay:
1. SOAPs, which will verify senders with an authentication protocol such as IPsec
or TLS.
2. Secret servlets, which route traffic directly to the target through the filter.
Filters only allow traffic with an IP source address that is one of the secret
servlets. By keeping the secret servlets addresses secret, SOS limits the ability
of an attacker to spoof a source address that allows his traffic to traverse the
filter.
3. Beacons know the identity of secret servlets and route (authenticated) packets
towards them.
If any overlay node is attacked or otherwise fails, it simply leaves the overlay.
The Chord protocols ensure the overlay recovers. If a secret servlet is attacked or




Mayday [4] generalizes SOS by allowing for alternative overlay routing and client
authentication methods. The author presents a variety of probing and scanning
attacks that can be used to determine the secret values (such as secret servlet IP
addresses) used to protect the target. To protect against these attacks, Mayday
allows filters to authenticate secret servlets (egress nodes in Mayday parlance) by
one or more lightweight authenticators, such as a secret value for the destination
port or address. While it does solve some deployment issues and formalize the
design-space of overlay-based protection, Mayday does not (aim to) offer a service
that could be used to protect every end host.
2.2 Pushback
Pushback [58, 43] is a technique in which routers recognize that one of their out-
bound links are congested and take measures to reduce this congestion. Rather
than dropping packets randomly, Pushback attempts to discover an aggregate, or
well-defined subset of traffic, that is causing congestion. Pushback consists of two
mechanisms: a local mechanism, employed by the congested router to identify and
control the aggregates, and a pushback mechanism in which that router asks up-
stream routers to help control the aggregate. Pushback can be though of as a means
of aggregate-based congestion control, an intermediate between fine-grained per-flow
control and coarse per-packet control.
When a router begins to drop packets due to congestion, it passes relevant in-
formation from the dropped traffic to an aggregate congestion control (ACC) agent,
which uses clustering to find a small number of aggregates that are responsible for
the most congestion. Aggregates can be based on any available fields, such as desti-
nation address, source prefix, or port number. Once the router identifies the larger
aggregates, it determines the minimum number that must be rate-limited, and to
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what extent, in order for the over-all drop rate (not including rate limiting of select
aggregates) to fall below a threshold.
In order to further reduce congestion at the router, and to limit collateral
damage caused by benign traffic that matches the rate-limited aggregate, Pushback
propagates aggregates through the network. A router R that drops excessive traffic
due to rate limiting will request that its upstream neighbors limit the amount of
aggregate-matching traffic sent to R. These requests contain the aggregate and
the desired arrival rate for that aggregate. The original router only sends these
requests to routers that are responsible for a large amount of the traffic matching
the aggregate. Routers that receive pushback messages occasionally send a status
message back to the requesting router, so that the latter may decide whether to
let the pushback requests expire. Pushback has the advantage that, when high-
bandwidth traffic originates from a localized source, only nearby routers need to use
rate-limiting.
While Pushback can control flooding attacks in certain situations, it has sev-
eral drawbacks that prevent it from being an effective, general solution to the DoS
problem. First, while aggregation means that routers need to store fewer rules in
order to block traffic, this comes at the cost of accuracy. The greater the degree of
aggregation, the more benign packets are lost due to collateral damage. Second, as
the authors acknowledge, it may not be possible to always find an aggregate that
describes the high-bandwidth traffic. In this case, Pushback is no more effective
than randomly dropping packets, which is what occurs on congested links anyways.
Third, routers decide on their own when to start rate-limiting. Without an ex-
plicit (authenticated) notification mechanism, Pushback does not allow destination
to block unwanted but non-overwhelming traffic.
13
2.3 Passport
In Passport [56, 55], ASes use shared secret keys to enable on-path ASes to determine
a packet’s source AS. Each AS uses routing announcements to share a secret key with
each other AS. When a packet is sent, the source AS uses these keys to create a series
of secure tokens, one for each AS through which a packet will be forwarded, and
places them in outgoing packets. The token created for AS A identifies the source
AS to A. Passport is used as a spoofing-prevention mechanism in several other
DoS-prevention architectures, including NetFence [53] (discussed in Section 2.4.6),
StopIt [52] (discussed in Section 2.5.3), and IPa+ [80] (discussed in Section 2.6.2).
Key exchange in Passport is accomplished via Diffie-Hellman key exchange [30],
piggybacked on top of BGP announcements. Passport assumes global parameters p,
a prime, and g, a generator mod p. Each ASi generates a random ri and computes
bi = g
ri mod p. ASi then includes bi in its BGP announcements. The shared secret
key between ASi and ASj is Ki,j = b
ri
j mod p = b
rj
i mod p. The security of Passport
key distribution is therefore tied to the security of the routing system.
When a packet P leaves its source AS AS1, a border router in that AS deter-
mines the sequence, or path, of ASes that P will pass through, using BGP routing
tables. For each ASj on this path, the border router finds (or computes) the secret
key K1,j and uses that key to create a token. The format of a token is:
t1,j = MACK1,j (src, dst, len, IP ID, payload[0..7], ASk)
where src is the source address, dst is the destination address, len is the packet
length, IP ID is P ’s IP identifier, payload[0..7] is the first 8 bytes of P ’s pay-
load, and ASk is the AS preceding ASj in the AS path. The border router places
these tokens into the Passport header, a shim header between IP and the transport
protocol.
When P arrives at ASj along the path, a border router in ASj verifies the
corresponding MAC. It determines the source AS, and hence which shared key to
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use, by examining the source address of the packet and mapping that to an AS via
its routing tables. Having obtained the key, the border router computes the MAC
over the same fields. If the MACs are equal, the border router forwards the packet.
If the comparison fails, however, the source AS is possibly spoofed and the border
router performs one of two actions, depending on if ASj is the destination AS or
not. If ASj is the destination AS, it drops P . Otherwise, the router “demotes” P ,
that is, it gives a lower priority to forwarding P and sets a bit in P that tells other
ASes to do the same. The reason for not dropping P in the middle of the network
is that a (temporary) routing variation may have occurred, sending P along a valid
path that ASi did not correctly predict.
Security of key exchange
While relying on existing mechanisms to distribute keys may be efficient, the poten-
tial damage caused by routing system failures increases. Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack [45]. An attacker that can replace the public value
of one participant in the key exchange protocol can later impersonate that party.
This implies that an AS can impersonate any of the ASes for which it provides con-
nectivity. Additionally, an attacker that hijacks a victim’s prefix can impersonate
the victim, by issuing a new DH value for that AS. This can increase the damage
caused by a prefix hijacking attack, which frequently occur today [14]. The only
known methods of securing Diffie-Hellman key exchange require either a PKI, which
Passport deliberately does not assume.
Trust assumptions
Passport trusts the routing system (in this case, BGP) to securely distribute Diffie-
Hellman key exchange values. Passport trusts ASes to police their networks to
prevent internal address spoofing. Passport places minimal trust in intermediate
routers as they have only a small role: they can forward traffic as normal or demote
traffic before forwarding it.
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Sender identification
Contrary to the authors’ claims that Passport allows routers to validate the source
address of packets, there are no provisions to prevent address spoofing inside an
AS, nor mechanisms to prove that an address is not spoofed. Therefore, Passport
allows the validation of only the source autonomous system. Because senders are
not identified, Passport does not provide a mechanism for receivers to control who
can send to them.
2.4 Capabilities
Capability-based architectures split traffic into multiple classes; in general, the two
predominant classes are traffic from senders whom the receiver has consented to
receive traffic from and traffic from senders whom the receiver has not consented to
receive traffic from. Consent is given in the form of a capability : a difficult-to-forge
token that is granted to a sender when the receiver responds to an initial request to
send traffic. Capabilities are usually created and checked by an in-network device.
2.4.1 Initial proposal
Anderson, Roscoe, and Wetherall [5] were the first to propose using capabilities
as a means of DoS prevention. They add two types of entities to the Internet
architecture: Request-To-Send (RTS) servers and verification points (VPs). RTS
servers help senders obtain capabilities and are co-located with BGP speakers. VPs
are deployed near RTSes at network choke points. BGP announcements are extended
to include a list of RTS servers along the path to a destination network. A sender
obtains tokens by sending a request to the first RTS server on the list, where it
is relayed along the list of RTS servers until it reaches the destination. The RTS
server overlay is used to prevent flooding: each RTS server rate limits the requests
it forward to any prefix.
Once a request arrives at the destination, it must decide whether to grant a
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capability. Capabilities allow a sender to send n packets in t seconds; these values are
system-wide parameters. The destination creates a capability (in fact, a sequence of
capabilities) using a reverse hash chain (see Section 2.4.5 for a description of reverse
hash chains). The last hash chain value is the first capability, and the destination
sends it to the sender through the RTS server overlay. Each RTS server observes
the capability and transmits it to its nearby VP, which stores it. The VP ensures
that each packet has a capability, that the capability has not been used for more
than n packets, or is older than t seconds; this requires that each VP store each
capability, its age, and the number of packets send with it. Destinations can issue
new capabilities by including the latest unreleased hash value in a response packet,
where it can be observed and verified by RTS servers/VPs.
2.4.2 SIFF
SIFF [79] shows how to use capabilities without requiring per-flow state on routers
and provides the basis for subsequent work in capabilities [81, 64, 23]. SIFF par-
titions traffic into two classes: privileged and unprivileged. Endhosts can establish
a channel of privileged traffic, which takes precedence over non-privileged packets
at routers. Privileged packets carry capabilities that are verified by routers en-
route. Routers drop packets that fail verification. Routers also prefer privileged
packets over unprivileged, so that floods of unprivileged packets do not affect priv-
ileged channels. SIFF gives receivers a simple mechanism to stop packets from an
unwanted sender: ceasing to forwarding packets to the sender, which causes the
privileged channel to eventually close.
To establish a privileged channel, a sender must obtain a capability from the
recipient through a handshake. The sender sends an explorer packet to the destina-
tion, and each (SIFF-enabled) router on the path inserts a marking. Each marking
is a keyed hash of the router’s incoming interface, the last-hop router’s outgoing
interface, and the source and destination IP addresses. The key is known only to
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the router.
When the sender’s explorer packet arrives at the destination, the receiver sends
its own explorer packet that includes the routers’ markings. When the original
sender receives this response packet, these markings serve as the capabilities that
allow the sender to establish a privileged channel. The TCP handshake can be
carried on top of the channel-establishment handshake.
Routers check privileged packets with the same computation used when creat-
ing markings: each router that forwards a (purportedly) privileged packet computes
the marking it would insert into the packet if it was an unprivileged, explorer packet.
The router forwards the packet if this marking matches the marking already present
in the packet; otherwise, the router drops the packet.
To prevent an attacker from obtaining a capability and using it to flood a re-
ceiver, routers change their private keys (and thus computed capabilities) frequently.
This does not affect normal communication, as these new capabilities are reflected
to the sender by the receiver. However, a receiver that wishes to no longer receive
traffic from a sender can stop relaying capabilities to the sender. The sender’s capa-
bilities will eventually expire and it will no longer be able to send privileged traffic
to the destination.
Trust assumptions
SIFF trusts that (SIFF-enabled) routers check the validity of capabilities in packets
and drop packets with invalid capabilities. Tacitly, SIFF also assumes that there is
at least one SIFF-enabled router near every source, so that valid capabilities cannot
be shared by many hosts behind their collective first-hop SIFF router.
In addition, SIFF makes the assumption that an explorer packet will eventually




SIFF capabilities identify the sender as someone able to receive traffic at the source
address included in its packets. While this limits the number of spoofable addresses
that are available to an attacker, it does not prevent source spoofing nor uniquely
identify a sender. Namely, it does not offer protection against an attacker that
has a large network at their disposal, as they can obtain valid capabilities for many
senders. SIFF and other capability-based architectures define identification in terms
of network location [72]; VanGuard, presented in Chapter 5, is the first exception
to my knowledge.
2.4.3 TVA
TVA [81, 82] builds upon SIFF to allow destinations to express basic policies over
how senders can use capabilities and to protect the capability request channel. TVA
also makes minor improvements on SIFF, such as using larger, harder-to-forge capa-
bilities and allowing senders to replace a capability with a nonce if that capability’s
router caches the capability.
As in SIFF, senders request a capability by sending an unprivileged capability
request to the destination. TVA routers insert a pre-capability into capability-
request packets. The format of a pre-capability is:
timestamp || H(source IP, destination IP, timestamp, secret)
where timestamp is the router’s local time and secret is a value either known only
to the router or shared across the router’s trust domain.
Expressing policy in capabilities
To turn a pre-capability into a capability, a destination first selects values for T , the
lifetime of the capability, and N , the amount of bytes the source can send in that
time. The destination constructs the capability as:
timestamp || H(pre-capability, N, T )
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To verify a capability, a router re-constructs the capability (requiring two
hashes) and compares against the value in the packet. A router must also check
that its current time does not exceed timestamp + T .
Ensuring that a sender does not use a capability to send more than N bytes
requires storing state at the router. However, TVA makes assumptions that bound
this state. Routers only keep state for senders that send at a rate faster than N/T ,
and this state is kept only for LT
N
seconds, where L is the size of the packet. Thus,
when a sender’s rate drops below N/T , meaning it cannot send more than N bytes
over the lifetime of the capability, its state is eventually reclaimed. TVA imposes
a minimum value on N/T , (N/T )min. Thus each flow consuming state at a router




a link of capacity C. Thus TVA allows destinations to include rate limiting policies
in capabilities, at the cost of (bounded) router state.
Fair-queuing capability requests
To prevent attackers’ capability requests from overwhelming legitimate requests,
TVA approximates per-sender fair-queuing at each trust domain, e.g., AS. However,
because sender addresses may be spoofed (on the capability-request channel), TVA
routers use a path identifier similar to Pi [78] to tag packets according to their
incoming interface, which provides an approximate source identifier. Each network
places packets that share an identifier into a queue and uses fair-queuing across all
queues.
One consequence of this is that senders with the same path identifier share
fate. While this limits the rate at which an attacker’s capability requests reach the
destination, it also allows a malicious sender to starve other senders whose packets
map to the same queue. The authors of Portcullis [64] point out that, due to
“mixing” of legitimate traffic with attack traffic, the probability of successful packet
delivery drops exponentially in the number of hops along the path.
Because TVA does not allow receivers to block capability requests from un-
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wanted senders, it does not prevent attackers from overwhelming portions of the
capability request channel. Similarly, a large group of attackers (such as a botnet)
can cooperate to fill most or all queues at a given router.
2.4.4 Denial of Capability Attacks
While SIFF and TVA can protect established, privileged channels, their weakness is
that they cannot afford the same level of protection to channel establishment with
unprivileged packets. Argyraki and Cheriton [9] claim that the capability distri-
bution mechanism is the main deficiency of capability-based architectures. They
describe a “denial-of-capability” attack, in which attackers flood the capability re-
quest channel, preventing legitimate capability requests from succeeding. TVA’s
fair-queuing is not an effective solution because it restricts all interfaces to equal
connection rates, regardless of whether that rate is appropriate for (different) re-
ceivers. The underlying cause of this problem is that SIFF and TVA rely on the
ability to partition traffic into two classes: “wanted”, privileged traffic and “un-
wanted”, unprivileged traffic, whereas connection-setup requests cannot be correctly
classified as either wanted or unwanted.
More recent capability architectures take Argyraki and Cheriton’s arguments
into account. Portcullis (Section 2.4.5) responds to these observations by requiring
clients to solve a puzzle in order to request a capability. Flow-cookies (Section 2.4.7)
aims to protect only high-value targets and makes the assumption that all traffic
sent to and from this target passes through a middlebox.
2.4.5 Portcullis
Portcullis [64] uses computational proofs of work, i.e., puzzles, to enforce fair sharing
of the capability request channel. The authors of Portcullis take this approach
because they observe that sender identifiers are either spoofable (IP addresses) or too
course-grained (path identifiers) to provide adequate fairness. By tying a capability
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to an amount of work, Portcullis aims to improve sender fairness.
When a sender wishes to send a capability request, it generates a puzzle based
on a seed and solves it. Each solution has an associated puzzle level. The sender
includes the puzzle and solution in the capability request. Routers verify that the
puzzle was created with the latest seed and that the solution is correct, and give
priority to higher-level puzzles.
The trusted seed generator periodically releases a new seed to ensure that
puzzle solutions expire. Seeds need to be unpredictable yet easily verifiable. The
Portcullis seed generator uses a reverse hash chain by picking a random value h0
and computing hi+1 = H(hi||i). The seed generator signs the final hn value and
releases it. Every t minutes, the seed generator releases a new seed, which is the
predecessor of the previous seed in the hash chain; if the current seed is hi, the next
seed to be released will be hi−1. Thus seeds are easily verifiable: one can easily check
that hi == H(hi−1||i). Routers learn of new seeds by observing the seed value in
capability requests; if a router observes and verifies a new value, it assumes that is
the current seed.
A Portcullis puzzle has the form:
p = H(x||r||hi||destination IP||`)
where r is a random nonce, hi is the current seed, and x is the solution such that
the last ` bits of p are 0. ` is the level of the puzzle; solutions with a greater value
of ` receive priority over those with lesser values. The sender includes r, hi, `, and
x in the packet so that routers can verify the solution.
The authors of Portcullis prove that the best strategy for an attacker who
wishes to flood the capability-request channel is to solve puzzles at the highest
level at which it can keep the channel saturated. Solving puzzles of a greater level
means the attacker is not able to consume the entire bandwidth of the capability-
request channel. Solving puzzles of a lesser level means it is easier for requests
from legitimate senders to be given a higher priority at routers. Given this optimal
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attacker behavior, the authors show that a legitimate sender need only solve a puzzle
at a level slightly greater than the attacker’s chosen level to successfully transmit
a capability request with high probability. However, there is no guarantee that an
under-powered (compared to the attacker) sender will be able to solve a puzzle at
this level during the lifetime of a seed.
In order to prevent puzzle re-use and puzzle sharing, routers must store previously-
seen puzzles. Portcullis stores puzzles in Bloom filters [21]. This requires routers to
maintain a (bounded) amount of state. When the router encounters a new puzzle
with a valid solution, it adds the puzzle to the Bloom filter and inserts the request
into a priority queue based on its puzzle level.
Trust assumptions
Portcullis trusts the underlying capability architecture to correctly prevent (or limit)
unwanted communication. Portcullis requires a trusted seed distribution service, for
which they use DNS. The signing of the DNSSEC root [40] suggests that distribut-
ing seeds can be secured. However, Portcullis implicitly assumes that the seeds
themselves, implemented with a reverse hash chain, are secure. Determining an
“early” value in the hash chain would reveal all following values as well. An at-
tacker capable of finding such a value could solve puzzles using unreleased seeds
to trick routers into believing a new seed had been released. This would prevent
legitimate senders from being able to use valid puzzle solutions. Additionally, the
attacker could pre-compute and solve puzzles with a very high level, allowing him
to flood the capability-request channel with requests that always take priority over
legitimate requests. Even if H is preimage-resistant, the authors suggest that a hash
chain should be valid for one year, which gives attackers a long time to mount a
(massively parallel) attack.
Sender identification mechanism
Senders are differentiated based on what puzzles they solve, rather than by any
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identifier or network-based property.
2.4.6 NetFence
In NetFence [53], routers encode congestion information into packets using a variant
of capabilities, allowing congested routers to signal to first-hop routers that a sender
should be rate limited. The aim of NetFence is to guarantee each sender at least
an equal share of each bottleneck link. To do so, it moves the task of congestion
control from the the endhost, which NetFence does not trust, to the first-hop router,
which NetFence does (although it details provisions for handling malicious routers).
NetFence uses Passport [55] to establish shared keys between ASes and to prevent
source spoofing.
Like SIFF [79] and TVA [81], NetFence splits traffic into three categories:
request packets, regular packets, and legacy packets. Request and regular packets
carry “secure congestion policing feedback”, which first-hop routers use to rate limit
senders if necessary. There are three types of congestion feedback: nop, indicating
no rate limiting is required, L↓, indicating that link L is congested and the first-hop
router should rate limit traffic traversing L, and L↑, indicating that (so far) the
path is free of congested links. Each type of feedback is expressed as an unforge-
able marking in the packet. The capability-request channel is limited to 5% of the
bandwidth on any link. NetFence adopts a mechanism similar to Portcullis [64] to
protect the capability-request channel, although it is enforced only at the first-hop
router. In NetFence, senders assign a priority level to their packets. Packets at level
k are given priority over packets at level k − 1, but a rate limiter at the first-hop
router accepts level k packets at half the rate of level k − 1.
To initiate communication with a destination, a sender sends a request packet
to the destination. The sender’s first-hop router inserts the nop feedback into this
packet. The destination returns the feedback to the sender in its response. The
sender must include the returned feedback in its regular packets. In this sense,
24
NetFence is a generalization of capabilities: if a destination does not want the sender
to be able to send regular packets, it does not return the congestion feedback.
A congested router, R, may update feedback in order to throttle a sender S
(similar to TCP explicit congestion notification [68]). If R detects a high loss rate on
one of its outgoing links L, which may be a symptom of an ongoing attack, it starts a
monitoring cycle. During a monitoring cycle, R stamps L↓ feedback into S’s packets
(unless a router preceding R has already stamped such feedback). R may modify
both request and regular packets. Congestion feedback includes a timestamp to
ensure freshness. R’s feedback will eventually reach S’s first-hop router, RS, which
creates a rate limiter for (S, L) if one does not already exist. So long as S’s feedback
is L↓, RS will decrease the rate at which S can send through L. To detect when
congestion is alleviated, RS resets the feedback on outgoing packets, changing L
↓
to L↑. R updates this feedback only when it is experiencing congestion; if an L↑
feedback is returned, then RS increases the rate at which S can send through L. If
S’s packets do not cross a congested link, the returned feedback will be nop, RS will
not rate limit S, and RS will continue to stamp nop feedback in S’s packets.
A first-hop routers’ (S, L) rate limiter throttles S with an additive increase,
multiplicative decrease (AIMD) algorithm. Each rate limiter includes two variables:
one to track whether S has received L↑ feedback and the other to record start
time of the current control interval. S’s rate is adjusted only at the end of each
control interval. The default length of control intervals is two seconds. The only
way for a sender’s rate limit to increase is if it presents the first-hop router with
fresh L↑ feedback. Otherwise, if the sender presents L↓ feedback, presents feedback
from before the start of the control interval, or sends no packets, its rate limit will
decrease. This prevents S from hiding L↓ feedback or sending at a slow rate to
increase its rate limit. The first-hop router will terminate a rate limiter if it has not
received L↓ feedback, or discarded a packet, for “a few hours”. This rate limiting




bandwidth of the congested link when there are N senders using the link.
To be effective, congestion feedback must be unforgeable; neither endhosts
nor routers should be able to modify existing feedback other than to replace nop
or L↑ with L↓. A congestion feedback has six fields: a mode (either nop or mon),
a link identifier (containing an IP address if mode is mon and invalid otherwise),
an action (↑ or ↓; valid if mode is mon), a timestamp indicating the time at the
first-hop router, and a token, which is a MAC of various fields. The format of the
MAC for a nop feedback, stamped by a first-hop router, is:
tokennop = MACK(src, dst, ts, null, nop)
where K is a key known only to the router, ts is a timestamp, and null is a link
identifier. A tokenL↑ contains the ↑ action but it otherwise similar to a tokennop. A
tokenL↓ , however, is created by a remote router. Its format is:
tokennop = MACK′(src, dst, ts, L,mon, ↓, tokennop)
where K ′ is the key shared between the source AS and the congested router’s AS,
as established by Passport [55].
When a first-hop router receives a regular packet from a local sender, the router
verifies the packet by re-computing the MAC and comparing it to the token in the
packet. If the MAC is incorrect, or the timestamp in the feedback is older than the
“feedback expiration time”, which defaults to four seconds, the router demotes the
packet to a request packet and applies the appropriate rate limiting.
The authors propose several possible remedies for handling a compromised
first-hop router, including per-AS queuing at each router, per-AS rate limiting at
each router, and heavy-hitter detection. Each approach relies on routers being
able to map a source address to an AS; NetFence uses Passport to prevent source
spoofing.
NetFence does permit at least one attack, though it is difficult to execute. If a
sender can collude with an on-path attacker, such as an upstream router, the router
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can observe the sender’s request packets with nop feedback and tunnel this feedback
to the sender. The sender can then successfully ignore L↓ feedback, which it can
replace with fresh, valid nop feedback. This attack also undermines NetFence’s
ability to allow destinations control over who sends to them: even if the destination
does not return any feedback, the sender will still obtain it. This attack does not
work in TVA [81] unless the colluding attacker is located in the destination’s network;
otherwise the sender will not be able to obtain the capabilities necessary to traverse
all routers along the path. The crucial difference is that in TVA, a router anywhere
on the path verifies the markings it places in a packet, whereas in NetFence, only
the first-hop router does so.
Sender identification
The majority of NetFence’s mechanisms do not require identification of a sender
by any entity other than the sender’s first-hop router; therefore identification is
a matter of securing the local network. Remote identification of senders occurs
only when a first-hop router is suspected of misbehavior. In this case, senders are
identified at the granularity of their AS; Passport enables this identification. Neither
routers nor destinations are able to identify the first-hop router that inserted initial
feedback into a packet; this is surprising given that this router is trusted to ensure
protocol compliance. While the authors suggest that a destination may refuse to
return feedback to a sender, presumably based on identifying the sender by their IP
address, Passport only identifies the AS from which a packet originated—it is not
guaranteed to prevent source spoofing.
Trust assumptions
NetFence trusts first-hop routers to correctly police their attached senders. If they
do not, NetFence must resort to secondary mechanisms that require thousands of
queues per router in the core and may harm legitimate senders.
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2.4.7 Flow-cookies and CAT
Flow-cookies [23] is a capability-based system that provides protection by routing all
traffic between senders and a target server through a third-party middlebox called
a cookie box. The cookie box has a high-speed connection to the Internet. Senders
wishing to initiate a TCP flow with the server first contact the cookie box. This is
accomplished by having the cookie box announce the routes to the protected server
and then communicating with the server through a private tunnel. The cookie box
uses SYN cookies [19] to ensure that the sender is not spoofing its address. Once
the connection is established, the cookie box hands the connection off to the server.
As in TVA [81], the sever consents to receiving traffic from the sender by sending a
response, which is routed through the cookie box.
Return packets from the server are routed through the cookie box, which adds
a flow-cookie. A flow-cookie is a MAC of a counter value and the connection 4-tuple,
keyed with a secret known only to the cookie box. The counter is used so that flow-
cookies expire. The cookies box places the flow-cookie in the TCP timestamp option
field; most TCP implementations copy timestamped values from received packets
into return packets. The cookie box then inspects non-SYN packets to ensure they
contain a valid flow-cookie. The server can tell the cookie box to block certain IP
addresses, which are stored in a blacklist at the cookie box. Flow-cookies cannot
be used to protect links on the path to the cookie box, which is why is must be
well-provisioned.
Because flow-cookies does not require modification of any existing protocols or
client applications, it is simple to deploy. It does not use heavy-weight cryptography,
and the authors’ implementation is able to process packets at a rate of 2.38 Gb/s
under idealized conditions.
CAT [22] extends flow-cookies to allow for a destination to employ multiple
cookie boxes in separate networks. Multiple cookie boxes, placed on high-bandwidth
links, are better able to handle high-volume flooding. By placing cookie boxes in
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or near Tier-1 networks, CAT reduces both the potential for bottlenecks and the
possibility that the destination can be reached through an unprotected link.
CAT places cookie boxes in networks on the trust boundary around the des-
tination’s network. The trust boundary is the (transitive closure of) networks that
have a commercial relationship with the destination’s network. CAT assumes that
these commercial relationships can be bootstrapped into trust relationships, which
can be used to determine which cookie box is responsible for establishing connec-
tions and filtering traffic. CAT includes modifications to BGP and routing tables
to allow networks to make these decisions.
Because CAT is a bolt-on solution, it can only provide protection for sites that
can route their traffic through a cookie box (notably, cookie boxes themselves can
not protected by CAT).
Trust assumptions
Flow-cookies trusts cookie boxes to not fail, maliciously or otherwise. If a cookie
box suffers a simple fail-stop failure, the destination is unreachable. CAT solves this
problem by incorporating multiple cookie boxes; however, a compromised cookie box
may still fail to block unwanted traffic. In addition, CAT trusts remote networks to
correctly determine whether or not they are responsible for filtering traffic.
Sender identification mechanism
A cookie box identifies senders at two different times. When a sender first establishes
a connection, the cookie box uses SYN cookies, and when a sender uses a previously-
established connection, the cookie box uses flow-cookies. Both types of cookie ensure
that the sender is able to receive traffic at the source address included in its packets.
Because cookies are hard to forge without knowing the MAC key, an attacker cannot
spoof an arbitrary address and flood the protected server using flow cookies that
are valid for that address.
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2.5 Filtering
Filter-based systems a complementary approach to that of capability-based systems.
In capability-based systems, routers by default provide a low level of service and a
receiver must explicitly allow traffic for it to receive a higher level of service, while
in filter-based systems, routers provide a high default level of service and a receiver
must explicitly block senders from whom it does not want to receive traffic.
Filter-based designs have their own set of trade-offs. By design, filter-based
systems require devices other than the receiver to store filter state. Unlike capability
systems, there is no capability-request channel to protect; however, there must be a
mechanism to identify senders to block and ensure that blocks are enforced.
2.5.1 AITF
In capability-based architectures like TVA [81], decisions on whether to grant capa-
bilities or not are made at the destination. In Pushback [58], rate-limiting aggregates
are created and stored at congested routers near the destination. Active Internet
Traffic Filtering, or AITF [8], pushes filtering decisions even further away from the
destination by placing them at the gateway of the blocked sender. Placing filters
near the sender increases the filtering capacity of the network as a whole, distribut-
ing the task of storing filters among the greatest number of devices. It also drops
unwanted traffic before it has had a chance to mix with other traffic or consume
excessive forwarding resources bandwidth.
In order to allows destinations to place filters at the source’s gateway, AITF
must first provide a way to identify the gateway in question and then dictate how a
destination can establish a filter at a remote device. To identify the source of packets,
AITF uses a variant of the IP Record Route option. Routers that participate in
AITF stamp their IP address and a keyed MAC (created with a key known only
to itself) of the packet’s destination into the packet, using a shim protocol between
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IP and the transport protocol. The destination thus receives an ordered (but likely
incomplete) list of routers through which the packet traversed. This path has the
form {S, Sgw, ..., Dgw, D} where S is the source, D is the destination, and Xgw is
X’s gateway.
When a destination D receives unwanted packets stamped with a path P , it
asks its gateway Dgw to filter packets with this path. Dgw then installs a short-lived
filter that blocks traffic with path P from arriving at D and sends a request to Sgw
to block traffic from S to D. This request takes the form of a three-way handshake,
to prevent an off-path attacker from installing a bogus filter at Sgw. However, the
handshake packets traverse the same links as the attack traffic, so they may be lost.
AITF does not offer protection against this possibility [52].
If the handshake is successful, Sgw installs a short-lived filter to block S to D
traffic and requests that S no longer send traffic to D for a fixed length of time.
If this fails to staunch the flow of traffic, e.g., if Sgw misbehaves, then the local
gateway can escalate the filtering request to the next router on the path (that is,
the router two hops away from S). This request is the same as the original request
to Sgw, only now Dgw asks that all traffic from Sgw to D be blocked. Escalation can
have negative side effects for both Sgw and Dgw; as such it can serve as a powerful
motivation for Sgw to behave, but may not always be a credible threat. Escalation
continues until either the traffic stops or Dgw installs a filter locally that blocks all
traffic from Sgw to D. As there on the order of tens of thousands of edge networks,
and assuming there is a unique border router per customer-provider connection, Dgw
can block arbitrarily many unwanted senders with only tens of thousands of filters.
If AITF is only partially deployed, it may be the case that there are no AITF-
enabled devices unique to the path from an attacker A to a destination D, i.e.,
devices that are not also on the path from a distinct sender S to D. This means
that A can spoof the path in its packets, essentially framing S and Sgw. The keyed
MAC is used to prevent this attack: when Sgw receives a request to block traffic
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that it did not forward, it responds with the correct MAC for packets destined to
D. However, a malicious Sgw could always respond in this way (as the key used
to create the MAC is known only to itself) and never be blamed for forwarding
malicious traffic.
Trust assumptions
AITF trusts nearly every element of the architecture. Routers must place the correct
markings in packets for blocking to be effective. While escalation protects against
certain malicious gateway behaviors, it is only possible after a sufficient number of
networks deploy AITF, and routers in the middle of the network may not have the
capacity to handle a large number of escalation requests.
Sender identification
A sender is identified by markings placed into its packets by AITF-enabled routers.
These markings do not identify a unique sender so much as a sequence of routers
that a packet traversed. Because identification is effectively at the granularity of a
subnet, senders can spoof the addresses of other hosts located behind the first-hop
AITF router.
2.5.2 AS-based Accountability
Simon et al. were the first to describe the role of accountability as a means of
DDoS defense [72]. They define accountability as the combination of accurate and
reliable source identification along with a mechanism for allowing receivers to block
traffic from any source. Their proposed system extends AITF with stronger sender
identification and hop-by-hop filtering requests, and the authors argue that imple-
menting accountability in this way is the most cost-effective method (compared to
over-provisioning and traffic scrubbing) of defending against DoS attacks.
In order for blocking to effective, identification must be in terms of a persis-
tent attribute, rather than some network-specific property. Otherwise, senders can
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simply change their network properties to evade a block. In this system, a sender
is identified as a customer of an ISP, i.e., an entity that receives an allocation of
one or more IP addresses. A customer could be either a single user, a company, or
another ISP. Participating ISPs store records of which IP addresses they allocate
to each customer and at what time; this entails, for instance, retaining DHCP and
NAT logs. To ensure that source IP addresses can be traced to the sender, these
ISPs also deploy strict ingress filtering [32].
When a destination in a participating ISP wants to block traffic from a sender,
it sends a filter request to its local filter request server, or FRS. These devices process
and forwards filter requests, and each accountable ISP must operate at least one.
The FRS determines if the requesting customer is allowed to issue a filter request,
which is a matter of local policy. If the request is allowed, the FRS forwards the
request to the FRS in the neighboring ISP through which the offending traffic arrived
(as determined by BGP tables). This process repeats until the request arrives at
the FRS in the ISP from which the traffic originated. There, the FRS examines its
records to find the customer that was using the IP address specified in the request
and places the blocks necessary to prevent that customer from sending packets to
the destination.
Not all ISPs will implement accountability. This has several implications, the
foremost of which is that a packet originating from an unaccountable ISP may have
a forged source address. To address this issue, the accountability scheme uses an
“evil bit”—a one-bit field in each packet. A packet’s evil bit is initially set to 0, and
if the packet ever crosses a border from an unaccountable ISP to an accountable
one, the accountable ISP sets the packet’s evil bit to 1. The evil bit is otherwise
preserved. If a packet arrives at a destination (in an accountable ISP) with the evil
bit set to 0, then the destination knows (1) that the source address in the packet
is not spoofed (since it originated from an accountable ISP) and (2) that there is a
path of accountable ISPs from the source to the destination, which is required for
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filter requests forwarding. If offending traffic with the evil bit set to 1 arrives at a
destination, the only option is to rate-limit such traffic.
The evil bit has additional uses. An overwhelmed router should preferentially
drop traffic with the evil bit set. If a malicious sender garners an excessive number
of filter requests, its ISP can reclaim filter state by removing these filters and setting
the evil bit in that sender’s packets. An ISP that claims to be accountable when
it is not can be detected via out-of-band mechanisms, and its neighboring ISPs can
set the evil bit on its traffic. Finally, to prevent reflection attacks, in which a sender
issues a request from a spoofed source address to cause the response to be sent to
a third-party victim, the evil bit is preserved in all responses (as spoofing is only
possible from unaccountable ISPs, these evil bits will be set to 1).
Trust assumptions
This scheme trusts ISPs to accurately map traffic to customers. There is no mech-
anism to detect a misbehaving ISP that allows its customers to evade blocks by
changing their IP address. The scheme also trusts ISPs to correctly implement
ingress filtering. While not specifically a trust assumption, the filter request mecha-
nism requires a path of neighboring, accountable ISPs between sender and receiver.
Sender identification
In this scheme, sender identification is possibly only for traffic from accountable
domains. There, ingress filtering ensures that senders can use only the addresses
allocated to them, and ISP logs map these addresses to customer records. By
identifying senders by something other than IP address, this system is able to block




StopIt is a filtering system designed to address the deficiencies of AITF [8]. Its
design incorporates a device dedicated to handling filter requests, the StopIt server,
in every AS (similar to the FRS of Simon et al. [72]). StopIt server addresses are
published via BGP, so that any StopIt server can send a filter request to the StopIt
server in a given AS. The only devices allowed to contact a remote StopIt server are
other StopIt servers; filters configured with StopIt server addresses protect StopIt
servers from potentially malicious inter-domain traffic.
StopIt relies on Passport [55] to prevent source address spoofing. However,
Section 2.3 describes how Passport is insufficient for this task. Establishing a filter
that blocks traffic from S to D for a length of time t is a five-step process:
1. A destination D sends a StopIt request to its gateway Dgw, requesting to block
the flow (S, D) for time t.
2. Dgw confirms that S is sending traffic to D by looking at a log of recent packets,
installs a temporary filter blocking S, and sends a StopIt request directly to
S.
3. If S continues to send traffic to D, Dgw sends a StopIt request to its local
StopIt server, DSIS. DSIS forwards the StopIt request to the StopIt server in
S’s AS, SSIS. StopIt servers communicate on a closed channel: routers block
traffic destined to a local StopIt server that was not sent by a remote StopIt
server.
4. DSIS forwards the request to Sgw.
5. Sgw confirms that S is sending traffic to D, installs a filter blocking S to D
traffic, and sends an additional StopIt request to S.
StopIt improves upon AITF by incorporating defenses against several attacks
that AITF is vulnerable to. AITF’s primary weakness is that filter requests share
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link capacity with attack traffic. StopIt prioritizes inter-domain filter requests by
ensuring attack traffic does not reach StopIt servers. However, the method described
in the paper to enforce this property requires that border routers maintain a whitelist
of the addresses of 30,000+ remote StopIt servers and compare packets’ source
addresses against this list.
StopIt requires that S send traffic to D before D can block S. This prevents
a type of filter-exhaustion attack at S at the cost of keeping per-flow state at every
gateway: Dgw maintains a flow cache that logs each flow passing through Dgw over
the past several seconds. When D sends a StopIt request to Dgw, Dgw checks that
it has seen traffic from S to D before forwarding the request. Likewise, Sgw will
ensure that is has seen (S,D) traffic before blocking that flow.
Trust assumptions
StopIt relies on Passport [55] to prevent source spoofing and relies on the same trust
assumption (see Section 2.3). In addition, StopIt trusts StopIt servers to honor filter
requests from remote ASes.
Sender identification
Senders are identified using Passport.
2.6 AIP and IPa+
2.6.1 AIP
The Accountable Internet Protocol [3] (AIP) takes an innovative approach to provid-
ing accountability at the network layer: hierarchical addresses derived from public
keys. While this prohibits compatibility with IPv4 and IPv6, it allows verification
of source addresses with a level of certainty that no other scheme (other than DNA)
offers. AIP uses secure hardware in each endhost to allow destinations to block
unwanted traffic.
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In the AIP architecture, an accountability domain (AD) plays the role of to-
day’s network or AS. Each host has a globally-unique endpoint identifier (EID). The
full address of a host located in AD AD has the form AD :EID . AD names and EIDs
are self-certifying : they are hashes of self-generated public keys. As such, they are
flat identifiers that cannot be aggregated, and the current practice of routing based
on prefixes would no longer be possible. In AIP, inter-network routing protocols
operate at the granularity of ADs, and routers forward a packet using only the des-
tination AD until it reaches this AD. Within the destination AD, routers forward
the packet using only the EID.
The goal of using self-certifying addresses is to prevent source spoofing. The
notion of address spoofing in AIP is different than in today’s Internet. With IP,
interfaces are assigned IP addresses (either by an administrator or via DHCP), and a
spoofed packet is any packet leaving that interface with a different source address. In
AIP, a sender may create as many valid source addresses as they wish. The concern,
therefore, is not sending with a different address but with impersonation: sending
a packet using a source EID for which the sender does not know the corresponding
private key. To prevent impersonation, source address are verified in multiple places
in the network: at first-hop routers and when crossing AD boundaries. Within the
source AD, a first-hop router R1 verifies that a connected sender S is not using a
spoofed address. When S first sends a packet through R1 after not having sent a
packet for a given amount of time, R1 drops this packet and sends a verification
packet to S. S signs this packet with the private key corresponding to its EID and
forwards the signature to R1. If the signature is correct, R1 will forward packets for
S.
When a packet crosses the boundary from AD A to AD B, there are three
possible cases. If B trusts A to have verified the source address, then B forwards
the packet. Otherwise, B uses a variant of uRPF (discussed in Section 2.8.1) to
determine if the packet arrived on the same interface that offers the best path back
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to the packet’s source AD. If so, B forwards the packet. If both tests fail, B follows
the same verification procedure as a first-hop router and sends a verification packet
to the packet’s source address AD :EID . If the sender is able to correctly sign the
packet, the router in B creates an entry in its accept cache stating that it should
forward packets from AD :EID . This last check has the potential to create a large
amount of state at routers in B, but will only be used in the case of path asymmetry.
A destination that receives unwanted traffic can block the sender by sending
a shut-off packet (SOP) to the traffic source. AIP assumes that hosts (which are
operated by well-intentioned users) are equipped with a trusted network interface
card (“smart-NIC”). The smart-NIC receives the SOP and installs a filter blocking
further packets to the destination, for an amount of time specified in the SOP. Smart-
NICs require that SOPs include the hash of a packet recently sent by the NIC to
the destination; this prevents replay attacks and the spoofing-capable attackers from
blocking traffic between innocent hosts.
While novel, AIP’s blocking mechanism has drawbacks. First, the blocking
mechanism will not work for all endhosts. Destinations can block only hosts that
have a smart-NIC (and allow the smart-NIC to receive SOP packets). Second, there
is a mismatch between the entity that appears in packets (EID) and the entity
that can be blocked (a NIC). Blocking a NIC does not prevent a malicious user
from sending traffic from the same EID on a different host. Likewise, any NIC can
(legitimately) send from a given EID; blocking a NIC prevents all EIDs from sending
from that NIC. A more appropriate mechanism would be to block an EID, rather
than a NIC, from sending to a destination.
Trust assumptions
AIP relies on trusted hardware at the sender to enforce its blocking mechanism. AIP
also trusts a source AD to verify that a sender is not sending with a spoofed address;
while an upstream AD can also verify this, the process requires the AD to store state
on behalf of a remote sender and is therefore used only as a last resort. Source ADs
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are trusted to enforce a limit on the number of addresses a sender can use; no other
AD can enforce this. The authors of IPa+ [80] note that a compromised AD can
spoof the address of any host whose traffic is forwarded through the AD, because it
can pass the uRPF test.
Sender identification
Senders are identified by a hash of a self-generated public key. Source ADs are
trusted to enforce a limit on the number of keys (addresses) a sender can use.
2.6.2 IPa+
IPa+ [80] is an attempt to provide the same accountability guarantees as AIP [3]
while staying compatible with IP. IPa+ focuses on securing the Internet’s routing
infrastructure and resorts to existing mechanisms to provide source accountability
and stop unwanted traffic.
IPa+ adopts one of the addressing conventions of AIP—AS names are the
hashes of public keys—while eschewing the other—host addresses are IP addresses,
not flat hashes. As AS names are currently flat, this does not affect the scalability
of existing interdomain routing protocols, and it preserves the ability to aggregate
host addresses. IPa+ binds an IP address prefix to an AS’s public key and uses the
hash of the key as the AS’s BGP name. These bindings are stored as signed reverse
DNSSEC records. Specifically, the root Internet registry, IANA, signs records that
certify prefix allocations to individual RIRs, RIRs certify prefix allocations to ASes,
and ASes may sign allocations to customers. Each of these records is stored in
DNSSEC.
Given these secure bindings, IPa+ uses sBGP [46] or another secure routing
protocol to announce prefixes. Validation of announcements is done by querying the
appropriate DNSSEC records, assuming IANA’s root public key is globally known.
In order to retain the ability to aggregate IP addresses, IPa+ does not adopt
AIP’s concept of self-certifying host addresses. In fact, IPa+ claims that assigned,
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rather than self-generated, addresses are more accountable, as they limit “white-
washing” attacks in which attackers mint a new address or identifier after they
have been blocked. To provide source accountability, IPa+ uses Passport [55] (Sec-
tion 2.3). In the interest of facilitating deployment, IPa+ does not adopt AIP’s
trusted smart-NIC. Instead, the authors IPa+ suggest using StopIt [52], AITF [8],
or Portcullis [64] to allow destinations to stop unwanted traffic.
Trust assumptions
IPa+ relies on the correct deployment of many systems: DNSSEC, a secure BGP,
Passport, and a capability- or filter-based architecture. While securing the Inter-
net’s routing infrastructure may mitigate the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks on
Passport (Section 2.3), IPa+ trusts ASes to prevent spoofing in their own domains.
Sender identification
IPa+ uses Passport [55] to identify the sender’s AS.
2.7 Other schemes
This section contains proposed systems that are related to DNA, but have little in
common with previously-discussed work.
2.7.1 NUTSS
NUTSS is an alternative Internet architecture that incorporates policy into con-
nection establishment. When initiating a flow, a sender first forwards a signaling
message through an off-path overlay of “P-boxes”, which authenticate the sender
and apply policies such as access control. Signaling messages are routed by name:
an extension to DNS provides the path of P-box names from the sender to the
destination’s hostname. P-boxes insert tokens into this message, and the receiver
responds with both addressing information (its address and port) and the inserted
tokens.
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The sender can now send messages directly to the destination’s address. These
address-routed messages pass through on-path “M-boxes”: each P-box has one or
more corresponding M-boxes that lie on the data path. M-boxes enforce P-box
policy, by allowing traffic only if it contains a token granted by that P-box.
Applying policy during connection establishment allows receivers and networks
to prevent unwanted connections and to explicitly negotiate the use of middleboxes.
This allows NUTSS to provide partial DoS protection, but NUTSS relies on external
mechanisms to protect P-boxes and M-boxes from attacks. NUTSS does not depend
on specific authentication protocols; it suggests using standard mechanisms such as
public-key signatures and challenge-response protocols to identify senders.
2.7.2 Default-off
Default-off [13] allows hosts to declare to the network infrastructure what traffic it
wants routed to it. It changes the Internet’s open model, in which any host may
send to any other, into a network that is “off by default”: hosts that want un-
solicited traffic, such as servers and peers in P2P networks, must proactively say
so. Other hosts that do not want unsolicited traffic need not do anything. Public
servers publish these reachability constraints to their first-hop router, who propagate
them through the network, similar to, but separately from, routing advertisements.
Routers enforce reachability constraints at forwarding time, dropping packets des-
tined to unreachable destinations (unless they are responses to traffic initiated by
that destination). The network acts as a large, distributed firewall, enforcing hosts’
policies at various points in the network.
Default-off relies on routers to store reachability information, which may prove
prohibitive, as each destination can publish a list of IP addresses which are not
allowed to contact it. To save space, routers may aggregate reachability information,
at the cost of accuracy.
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2.7.3 Traceback
Related work discussed so far combats source spoofing by either authenticating traf-
fic based on shared knowledge rather than address or network information (over-
lays [48, 4] and capability-based architectures [5, 81, 79, 84]), recording the packet’s
path in the packet (AITF [8], Passport [55]), or using cryptographically-unforgeable
addresses (AIP [3]). An alternative approach, called traceback, is to modify IP to
allow a receiver to determine the origin of a (spoofed) packet. With traceback,
on-path routers assist the destination in determining the path that a packet takes.
Most proposals require the destination to receive many packets from a source, and
perform computation on those packets, before it is able to reconstruct the path.
Traceback schemes do not allow a single packet to unambiguously identify a sender,
nor do they incorporate blocking mechanisms.
Several different types of traceback have been proposed. Bellovin et al. detail
a scheme in which routers, upon receipt of a packet, will forward a special ICMP
message to the destination with very low probability. These messages contain the
router’s address and allow the destination to re-assemble the path that a packet
flood takes [16]. Savage et al. propose probabilistic edge sampling in which routers
will randomly encode link information in the IP ID field of a packet [71]. Pi [78]
modifies Savage’s scheme to use deterministic markings, so that destinations may
filter based on path information. SPIE [74] avoids packet modification, and instead
requires routers to store hashes of packets so that the destination may query them
to determine through which routers a packet has passed.
2.7.4 Reliable routing
The architecture presented in this thesis uses signatures on packets to show prove-
nance. One of the first appearances of digital signatures in network protocols is
Perlman’s Byzantine fault tolerant routing protocol [65], which uses digital signa-




Two Internet practices are particularly relevant to this thesis: ingress filtering, which
aims to prevent source spoofing as it is used in DoS attacks, and IPsec, which, among
other things, enables mutual authentication at the network layer.
2.8.1 Ingress filtering
Network ingress filtering, as described in BCP 38 (also RFC 2827) [32], is a simple
measure that ISPs can take to ensure that they do no accept spoofed packets. If an
edge network announces a set of prefixes, then a router in that ISP that implements
ingress filtering will not accept packets that have a source address from a prefix
outside of those announced by the network. This ensures that a sender cannot
spoof arbitrary addresses, but does not prevent it from using other addresses in the
same prefix.
Unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) extends ingress filtering by requiring
routers to forward a packet only if it arrives on the interface which is the router’s
best route to the packet’s source address. BCP 38 claims that uRPF is not effective
due to route asymmetries. BCP 84 (RFC 3704) [12] describes possible relaxations
to uRPF that allow it to be effective in the presence of asymmetry and extends
ingress filtering to multihomed networks.
In order to be effective, network ingress filtering needs to be universally de-
ployed. A single ISP that does not implement ingress filtering allows hosts in that
network to spoof arbitrary addresses, rendering address-based filtering at the desti-
nation ineffective. As spoofed packets traverse networks, they mix with legitimate
packets, making ingress filtering impossible to implement in the core of the Internet.
Unfortunately, an ISP has little intrinsic incentive to deploy ingress filtering, as it
does not prevent spoofed traffic from other non-filtering ISPs from entering the ISP.
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2.8.2 IPsec
The Security Architecture for IP [47], or IPsec, defines various security services
for IP traffic, including encryption and authentication. It consists of two proto-
cols, Authenticated Header, which authenticates traffic, and Encapsulating Security
Payload, which encrypts and optionally authenticates traffic.
As one of the functions of authentication is to identify senders, IPsec could be
used to hold senders accountable. However, IPsec uses MACs, created with sym-
metric keys, to authenticate packets. In order to establish a shared key, a sender and
receiver must exchange a key out of band, or use the Internet Key Exchange pro-
tocol. To provide wide-area accountability, IPsec would require that every (sender,
receiver) pair establish a shared secret key, which is infeasible. Additionally, be-
cause the keys are symmetric, the sender is not accountable to anyone other than
the receiver.
2.9 Commercial services
Two types of commercial services are available to help servers survive DoS attacks:
traffic scrubbing and content distribution networks (CDNs).
Traffic scrubbing
An ISP that wishes to protect itself from DoS attacks can employ a traffic scrubbing
service, such as those offered by Arbor Networks [6] or Prolexic [66]. These services
typically use anomaly detection to determine when an attack is occurring and then
re-route traffic to a high-capacity network. This network “scrubs” the traffic by
removing packets that match a pattern of malicious traffic. The remaining packets
are then routed to their original destination.
Content distribution networks
CDNs such as Akamai [2], Limelight [51], and Coral [34] replicate a server’s (mostly
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static) content at multiple points throughout the Internet. Clients are directed
towards their nearest copy, usually with DNS-based routing, rather than to the
central server. CDNs protect against bottlenecks and flash crowds at the server,
but not malicious DoS attacks.
2.10 Other uses of accountability in networks
2.10.1 Accountability in distributed systems
Accountability in the Internet fits into the broader problem of accountability in
distributed systems, a topic which has been studied previously. Yumerefendi and
Chase [83] suggest accountability as a design goal of network services and propose a
framework towards that goal. They developed CATS [84], an accountable network
storage service, within this framework. PeerReview [37] provides accountability for
general distributed protocols through per-node, secure, consistent logs of (signed)
messages that node has sent and received. A detector module can detect Byzantine
faults by comparing message logs to a reference implementation of the protocol.
Each of these systems uses digital signatures to identify principals and prove au-
thenticity.
2.10.2 Service accountability
An Internet service provider that violates a service level agreement (SLA) may cause
an endhost to experience poor service, such as unacceptable levels of packet delay
or loss. The host may be unable to determine who is responsible, as a malicious
ISP can identify the sender’s diagnostic measurement probes and give them a higher
level of service, while still providing poor service to ordinary traffic. Several pieces of
work propose methods of holding ISPs accountable for providing the level of service
stipulated in their business agreements, allowing hosts to detect and react to SLA
violations.
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AudIt [10] argues that ISPs should collect statistics on traffic aggregates and
report to a separate ISP I the statistics of the traffic that originated from I. AudIt
is resilient to ISPs that produce false statistics: they are exposed to their peers.
Goldberg et al. [35] present secure sketching and secure sampling protocols
that can localize failures. The sender and receiver apply a shared psuedorandom
function to data packets to create a small set of probe packets, which the receiver
explicitly acknowledges. An adversarial ISP is unable to determine which packets




An Accountability Architecture for the Internet
Accountability in a network, defined as the ability to map packets in a network
back to the principals responsible for their transmission, coupled with the capacity
to block those principals, is vital to preventing misbehavior. Blocking malicious
traffic in routers requires filters to distinguish malicious from valid traffic far from
the victim. This architecture conflates the roles of ISPs as providers of connectivity
(the pipe) and of accountability (stopping abuse). We believe that ISPs need not
bear the responsibility for deciding the policy (whom to block) and implementing
the mechanism (filters) of network layer accountability.
Towards this end, this chapter presents DNA, an accountable Internet archi-
tecture. DNA assumes the existence of trusted identity authorities, the ability to
compute HMACs at intermediate routers and verify signatures at customer-edge
routers, and the availability of servers to act as partially-trusted storage devices
and representatives of an accountability provider.
With these features, DNA contains protocol mechanisms that allow high per-
formance verification of accountable traffic, traceback of unaccountable traffic, and
the revocation of permission to connect.
3.1 Introduction
Misbehavior in the Internet can be attributed to two major factors: first, that
attacks can be launched with relative anonymity through source spoofing or networks
This chapter is based on joint work with Rob Sherwood, Neil Spring, and Bobby Bhattacharjee.
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of compromised machines (botnets), and second, that it may not in a provider’s
interest to deny connectivity to a paying customer simply because some attack
traffic leaves the network. Packet traceback [71, 74, 78] and reverse-path filtering to
prevent spoofing [55, 72] attack the first problem, limiting the anonymity of attackers
and allowing an abused destination to reliably accuse a sender of misbehavior. In
each approach, however, the network providing connectivity to the source machine
is expected to disconnect it (perhaps completely) to protect a distant destination.
As profit-driven companies, Internet service providers are not impartial: each
has a financial interest in turning a blind eye to misbehavior by their own customers.1
Rogue ISPs such as Atrivo [11] actively prosper from hosting services that are widely
known to be malicious. for any protocol designed to find, block, and prevent network
abuse is to not rely on any ISP. Restated, providing connectivity must not imply
accepting responsibility.
DNA takes this principle one step further; that a sender’s ability to inject traffic
into the network should be decoupled from his point of attachment. The action
by a destination to block a misbehaving source should prevent that source from
obtaining a new address or spoofing a different address to send traffic to the same
destination. This suggests that identities, or more specifically blockable principals,
should be issued as public keys from a globally-known, trusted authority. This
trusted accountability provider (TAP) prevents arbitrary users from sending traffic
and, more importantly, bars blocked subscribers from sending under a pseudonym.
DNA supports the coexistence of many TAPs, each with its own set of policies and
underlying implementations, which agree on a protocol for validating packets in
transit. That is, DNA is designed for the tussle [27], not for a specific outcome.
This chapter presents the network components of DNA, a complete network
accountability system in which:
1. An accountability provider is the sole trusted entity; all other participants
1Protecting their customers from outside attack may be a separate service.
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(routers, accountability provider representatives, etc.) can be implicated if
they misbehave. The trusted entity’s services need not be implemented cen-
trally, allowing it to be made scalable and resilient to attack.
2. Endhosts can block principals from sending traffic to them. Blocked principals
cannot send traffic to the blocking destination regardless of their point of
attachment.
3. Long-term blocking filter state is not stored at any router; a combination of
Passport [55]-inspired tokens and distributed filter storage compels the source
network to check for blocks.
4. A privacy certificate authority (CA) [76] authenticates temporary keys, rather
than long-lived identifiers, for use in contacting destinations, preserving (some)
privacy. Machines near senders guard the sender’s long-lived identity, though
we do not explicitly anonymize clients or servers as in SOS [48].
5. What constitutes abuse is determined by a destination alone, it need not be
proven to an authority: if traffic is undesired, future traffic can be blocked.
The sender can continue to send to other destinations.
6. Cryptographic operations can be largely avoided along the fast path through
waivers, explicit statements that a server will not be implicated by a client,
and tokens that enable traceback.
To implement this network accountability system, we designed, implemented,
and evaluated protocol mechanisms for high-performance verification of accountable
traffic without all-pairs shared keys, traceback of unaccountable traffic (improperly
signed, but carried anyway) to a misbehaving inter-domain link, and revoking per-
mission to connect without a separate, protected control channel.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we summarize related work
in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we present the design of DNA. We discuss attacks
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on DNA in Section 3.4 and DNA partial deployment approaches in Section 3.6. We
evaluate DNA overhead in Section 3.7 and conclude in Section 3.8.
3.2 Related work
DNA allows receivers to block specific senders. Several recent proposals achieve
similar goals using different mechanisms.
In TVA [81], senders initiate a connection by sending a capability request on
a dedicated channel; this request is marked by each router along the way. If the
traffic is desired by the receiver, the marked request is returned to the sender.
The sender then includes this returned capability in subsequent packets. During
an attack, packets without capabilities are preferentially dropped. Portcullis [64],
an extension to TVA, uses sender-solved puzzles to protect the capability request
channel. Unlike DNA, TVA and Portcullis both pin the network path between the
sender and the receiver (and require a symmetric path for optimal performance).
DNA relies on the TAP to issue global identities that enable receivers to block senders
regardless of their network point of attachment; such a facility does not exist in TVA
or Portcullis. Finally, DNA requires only the TAP nodes be correct and trusted; all
other entities may be corrupt. TVA and Portcullis require a trusted and correct
transit infrastructure.
AIP [3] binds self-certifying addresses with network interfaces and assume
that all interfaces have trusted hardware that obeys a “shut-off” packet sent by a
receiver. Using these primitives, AIP builds an accountability infrastructure that
receivers can use to stop abusive senders. Like DNA, AIP provides receivers fine-
grained control over which senders are blocked; unlike DNA, the blocks in AIP are
bound to network interfaces and not to packet-sending principals. DNA relies on
a trusted authority to certify network-layer-independent identities. In comparison,
AIP relies on a pervasive trusted hardware deployment at end hosts. DNA is designed
as a shim layer between network (IP) and transport (TCP) and is agnostic of the
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network protocol, whereas AIP requires a new addressing scheme at the network
layer.
Passport [55] is a system for cryptographically identifying a packet’s source
AS. This information can be used to track abusive senders. Passport relies on a
shared key between every pair of participating ASes (whether they are neighboring
ASes or not). These keys are used to create HMACs (like the tokens of DNA) that
can eventually be used to identify the source AS of any packet. Passport requires
the predetermination of AS paths for every end-to-end route. In previous work [18],
I show how Passport can be extended to identify and block individual senders.
The requirement of shared keys between every AS pair (Passport) vs. per-
vasive trusted hardware (AIP) vs. trusted identity authorities in DNA represent
explorations in three starkly different points in the design space for network-layer
accountability. DNA minimizes the number of trusted entities in the system (only
the TAP nodes are trusted) and is the only system that can withstand malicious
transit routers and ASes.
Simon et al. [72] present a system where receivers can identify the source of
traffic and block traffic from any source. Their scheme consists of per-customer
ingress filtering at ISPs, and a trusted Filter Request Server (FRS) located in each
ISP. To block a source, a receiver contacts the local FRS, which in turn contacts
the FRS in the source’s ISP. The source’s FRS is responsible for filtering traffic
from that source to the receiver. AITF [8] uses a mechanism similar to IP Record
Route to mark the provenance of packets. When a receiver wants to block traffic
that follows a certain path, the receiver asks its gateway to contact the sender’s
gateway, similar to how FRSes contact each other. In comparison to these systems,
DNA’s notion of blocks transcend the sending principal’s network point of attach-
ment. Perhaps more significantly, these schemes hold the sender’s AS responsible
for traffic from the AS and for blocking abusive senders. In fact, AITF includes a
provision for disconnecting an entire AS if blocks are not properly administered. In
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DNA, destinations block individual sending principals; once blocked, these senders
can no longer obtain necessary tokens to send packets to the blocked destination.
The source AS is unaware of specific blocks, and instead simply verifies that only
accountable packets depart its network.
Finally, IP traceback [71, 74, 78] is a mechanism that victims invoke to (par-
tially) trace back the path an attack packet traversed. Traceback mechanisms re-
quire minimal changes to hosts and can potentially be used as a building block for an
end-to-end accountability solution. The “accusation” protocol in DNA uses tokens
to traceback unaccountable packets. The DNA traceback mechanism always isolates
the malicious entity that sourced the attack packets.
3.3 DNA: Design
The primary goal of DNA is to ensure that only accountable packets may transit
networks to destinations that have not blocked the sender. Accountable packets
are those signed by a principal authorized by a trusted authority (waivered pack-
ets require no signatures, but carry proof that the destination expressly consented
to receiving such packets). I term “unaccountable” those packets with an invalid
signature and “legacy” those packets having no accountability material at all.
In DNA, principals send packets to hosts. Each packet contains sufficient infor-
mation for a destination host to block the sending principal (for any reason). DNA
provides the following property:
Packets are forwarded to a destination only if the destination has not
blocked the sending principal, regardless of the sender’s network point
of attachment.
Lesser goals that shape the design of DNA are as follows. Verifiable functions should
be distributed away from the trusted authority, to protect it from attack or over-
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Figure 3.1: Life cycle of accountable packets. SBS is the secure block storage
mechanism.
Computation cost in transit networks is limited by avoiding asymmetric cryptogra-
phy in transit; this leads to including network-by-network tokens in packets. DNA
avoids revealing user identifiers: even though IP addresses could be used to correlate
accesses by the same user, network-layer accountability should not require revealing
identity to destinations. Return traffic should be able to be sent cheaply; this allows
servers and high-volume connections to avoid much of the DNA overhead. Finally,
DNA must support many fine-grained blocks in the system, leading to a need to
distribute the blocks across many servers.
DNA divides time into epochs on the order of minutes. All participants are
synchronized to within an epoch; all certifications of public keys have an expiry
time expressed as the expiration epoch. The DNA implementation uses seconds
since midnight UTC, January 1, 1970, as returned by gettimeofday(), divided by
128, to provide an easily computed, uniform epoch in 32 bits.
A sender may be able to continue sending packets to a destination even after
the destination has blocked the sender. However, the “period of vulnerability” is
bounded by the epoch. A blocked sender may also be able to send packets if it can




The DNA architecture consists of five components which I describe in turn.
The TAP
The TAP is the trusted accountability provider. Its role in the architecture is to
certify and renew the keys of well-behaved, but untrusted, participants (each of
which is described below). It must be able to accept proofs that a component
misbehaved (signed statements that catch the component in a lie), deny certificate
renewal to those participants, and not reissue new certificates to the same. All
entities know the TAP’s public key and can verify TAP signatures.
The TAP is the only trusted entity in the system. DNA assumes that the TAP
never divulges its private key and always discharges its protocol obligations correctly.
The TAP may be implemented in a distributed manner with arbitrarily many repli-
cas. These replicas need to synchronize only the current TAP public/private key
pair and a list of principals whose keys are not to be renewed in the current epoch.
Packet-sending Principals (Users)
A principal (or a user) P in DNA is identified by a public key, Ppk, which the
TAP certifies (by signing) through an out-of-band mechanism. Section 3.6 describes
principals that forward legacy traffic (from existing machines, bearing no signatures)
into the accountable network, likely with limitations. These legacy gateways appear
to the architecture as ordinary users that can be blocked.
Autonomous Systems (ASes)
If the entire network were under the control of the same administrator, protecting
against misbehavior would be simpler. Although no part of DNA requires that the
trust domains be split along autonomous system boundaries, I use the term AS
because the idea connotes responsibility for routers and ownership of IP address
ranges for hosts. The terms of pairwise connections between ASes are encoded in
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service level agreements, similarly, these pairwise connections may represent different
levels of trust or different ways to address misbehavior.
Administrators of ASes have speaks-for keys, signed by the TAP, to express
that the administrator is permitted to place blocks on behalf of specific destination
addresses or to grant waivers that allow return traffic to be unsigned. These keys
may be delegated, restricting sub-keys to more-specific address prefixes. The TAP
binds a speaks-for key to a prefix by including the prefix its the signature of the key.
Neighboring ASes periodically exchange a symmetric key; border routers can
create and verify message authentication codes (as realized in tokens, described
below in Section 3.3.5) using this key.
An AS may permit hosts to exchange packets within the same AS without
verification; one might allow traffic to LReps, to diagnostic services, or to boot-
strapping (DHCP or DNS) servers, for example, without signatures. However, such
legacy traffic would likely not be accepted by neighboring ASes. An AS may choose
to transit, limit, or (likely with increased deployment) outright reject legacy traffic,
but must not transit unaccountable traffic—that is, packets with invalid signatures.
Routers in an AS may be malicious or be compromised; handling attacks by
routers is discussed in Section 3.4.3.
LReps
DNA local representatives (LReps) are servers, distributed in the network, that act
as a privacy CA by certifying short-lived blinding keys for legitimate principals and
generate initial tokens after checking for a block or validating a waiver. Blinding
keys “hide” principal keys to provide a measure of unlinkability across connections.
Tokens are an optimization that allow ASes to forgo asymmetric cryptographic
operations when accepting packets from (locally) trusted neighboring networks.
Each LRep has a key signed by the TAP. Each AS2 contains at least one LRep;
like neighboring ASes, LReps periodically exchange a symmetric key with its host
2As Section 3.6 shows, it is not strictly necessary for each AS to have an LRep.
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AS.
An LRep may be malicious or compromised.
Secure storage
The list of blocks—statements of the form “10.0/16 rejects packets from Principal
A”—is maintained in a distributed, secure block storage (SBS) mechanism. DNA
uses the NeighborhoodWatch secure DHT [17] (Chapter 4), which nicely dovetails
with the assumptions of DNA. The NeighborhoodWatch DHT (NWDHT) is resilient
to malicious nodes that drop or misroute queries. NWDHT provides security via a
centralized authority, which DNA already assumes (the TAP). Conversely, DNA can
be used to protect the NWDHT central authority, weakening NWDHT’s assumption
that the central authority be protected.
SBS nodes may be co-located with LReps or be independently provisioned.
Each SBS node has a key signed by the TAP authorizing it to act in that role.
3.3.2 An Accountable Packet
Accountable packets have a valid signature chain from the TAP to the packet: the
TAP’s signature of the LRep’s public key, the LRep’s signature of the blinding key,
and the blinding key’s signature of the packet contents. This chain make the packet
accountable to the sender by providing a means to identify and block the sender.
The sender is responsible for the packet, the LRep is responsible for verifying the
sender is not blocked, and the TAP is responsible for ensuring correct behavior of the
LRep. If the sender or LRep is not behaving according to protocol, the destination
can appeal to the next-highest authority present in the signature chain.
Verifying the entire signature chain of a packet in transit would be computa-
tionally infeasible. Thus, certain routers in every AS place tokens in the packet to
signify that they have checked the signatures, or trust someone that has. An initial
token, provided by the LRep, indicates that the destination has not blocked the
sender. The source AS is responsible for checking both the token and the signature
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chain. Subsequent tokens, added by each AS, indicate that the signatures verify—or
the packet was received from another AS that claimed the signatures verify.
To further reduce the computational overhead of sending traffic, waivered traf-
fic is exempted from signatures. If a sender S trusts return traffic from an intended
destination D, S may give D permission to send return traffic without inserting any
signatures into the packet. D’s LRep verifies that S has permitted unsigned return
traffic before issuing an initial token to D.
3.3.3 Process Overview
I next briefly outline how DNA operates in normal operation, with misbehavior
possible only by the principal that sources traffic. A detailed description of each
step follows.
Assume that Alice is a principal, with public key Ppk certified by the TAP,
who wishes to send packets to a host D with address Dip; in turn, D will wish to
block Alice from sending further messages. Figure 3.1 illustrates this process and
participants at a high level.
Registering a blinding key
1. Alice commits to a blinding key that she will later use to obtain tokens from
a nearby “source” LRep (sLRep) (Section 3.3.4).
Obtaining an initial token
1. Alice contacts sLRep with a registered blinding key and an intended destination
(Dip) (Section 3.3.5).
2. sLRep examines the SBS to find any block that the administrator of Dip’s AS
may have placed on Alice.
3. If there is no block, sLRep provides a token that enables Alice to send to Dip
during the current epoch (Section 3.3.5).
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Constructing a waiver (optional)
1. Alice signs a message for the destination’s LRep that will instruct it to provide
tokens to the destination without a lookup into the SBS (Section 3.3.7).
Packet Transfer
1a. Alice signs her outgoing packets with her blinding key and includes the initial
token and the signature chain from the TAP to the LRep to her blinding key
in the packet. A router in her AS verifies all signatures and the token.
Or,
1b. For waivered packets, Alice applies a hash function to the waiver token and
the message.
2. An egress router in Alice’s AS places a token in the packet, indicating that
that AS has validated the packet. When the packet crosses a peering link to
a different AS, the ingress router checks the token and discard packets with
invalid tokens. When the packet leaves a network, the egress router inserts a
token for the next AS (Section 3.3.6). This occurs on each peering link.
Placing a block
1. D decides to block Alice. He persuades his AS administrator to place the
block and provides the packet signed by the blinding key. The administrator
signs a block request message, which includes Alice’s blinding key, with his
speaks-for key. It then sends the block request to sLRep. (Section 3.3.8).
2. sLRep places a block against Ppk (not the blinding key) into the SBS and
returns a receipt to the administrator (Section 3.3.8). sLRep places a tempo-
rary filter in its AS to block further packets from Alice until her initial token
expires.
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Tokens are valid for only a single epoch. Therefore Alice must receive new
tokens for every epoch in which she wishes to send. Once sLRep receives a request
to block Alice from sending to Dip, sLRep no longer gives new tokens to Alice
(for sending messages to Dip). Alice cannot send messages to Dip by changing her
network point-of-attachment since her (new) local LRep will find the block in the
SBS and not issue her an initial token.
In the rest of this section, I describe the messages exchanged for each of these
sub-protocols. I denote a principal A’s public and private key pair by Apk and
Ask respectively, a message m signed using key k by Signk (m) and a message m
encrypted using key k by Enck (m).
3.3.4 Registering a blinding key
Assume that Alice has generated a key pair (Ppk, Psk), that the TAP has certified
Ppk by signing it, and that Alice wants to send messages to Dip. Assume that sLRep
is within Alice’s AS (AS1) and that Alice’s host is pre-configured with sLRep’s
address. Alice generates a blinding key pair (Bpk, Bsk) and commits to it by signing
Bpk with Psk. The format of Alice’s commitment (CommitAlice) is CommitAlice =
SignPsk (Bpk, νB) where νB is the epoch until when Alice proposes to use this blinding
key. The key registration process is as follows:
Alice 7→ sLRep : CommitAlice, SignTAP (Ppk) ; registration request
; sLRep checks that the TAP signed Ppk
; sLRep stores Bpk ↔ Ppk
sLRep 7→ Alice : SignsLRep (Bpk, νB) ; signed blinding key
Alice may register as many blinding keys as sLRep will allow.
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3.3.5 Obtaining an initial token
Initial tokens are bound to a blinding key, Bpk, a destination, Dip, the current epoch,
c, and an issuing LRep. Initial tokens make the statement “a valid Ppk registered
Bpk and Dip’s administrator has not blocked Ppk.” An initial token is required to
send packets to a different domain and is checked by routers in Alice’s domain.
When Alice wishes to communicate with Dip she obtains an initial token as
follows:
Alice 7→ sLRep : SignsLRep (Bpk, νB) , Dip ; token request
; sLRep verifies its signature on Bpk
; sLRep verifies that c ≤ νB
; sLRep retrieves Ppk and checks the SBS
; to ensure Alice has not been blocked by Dip
sLRep 7→ Alice : T0 ; initial token
The format of the initial token (T0) is:
H(K
sLRep↔AS1 ,Bpk, Dip, c, sLReppk, sLRepip)
whereKA↔B is the shared symmetric key between A andB (A andB are neighboring
ASes or an LRep and the AS it is in). H(·) is a secure MAC, such as HMAC, where
the first parameter is the secret key.
A blocked sender will not be able to obtain an initial token. If Dip has blocked
Alice, then the sLRep will find such a block in the SBS, and not issue a token to
Alice.
3.3.6 Packet Transfer
With an initial token, Alice can send a packet to Dip. She signs her message with
her blinding key and includes her initial token in the packet. Figure 3.2 shows the
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T0 = H(KsLRep↔AS1 ,Bpk, Dip, c, sLReppk, sLRepip) 4
T1 = H(KAS1↔AS2 ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
T2 = H(KAS2↔AS3 ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
· · ·
Tn−1 = H(KASn−1↔ASn ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
Transport (message m) var
Figure 3.2: Accountable packet format. The rightmost column represents the num-
ber of bytes required for each field, when using cryptographic primitives described
in Section 3.7.
fields Alice embeds.
Forwarding an accountable packet consists of first verifying the material within
the packet, and second, appending the next token that the subsequent AS will verify.
These two steps may be separated, so that packets are verified when they enter a
network and given tokens just before they exit.
The first gateway to see the packet must verify the embedded signature chain




, SignsLRep (Bpk, νB),
and SignBsk (m). It then verifies the initial token T0 by checking that (1) sLReppk and
sLRepip belong to the same sLRep (which is located in the same AS as the gateway),
(2) T0 was created for Bpk, and (3) the MAC computed with the KsLRep↔AS1 that it
shares with sLRep is correct. If any check fails the packet is dropped. These steps are
unique to the first gateway because it is responsible for validating the entirety of the
packet; later gateways check only that the packet was validated by a (transitively)
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IP Header 20
Version + Flags 2
Transport protocol 1
HMACnonce(m) 4
T0 = H(H(KsLRep↔AS1 , Dip, c),m) 4
T1 = H(KAS1↔AS2 ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
T2 = H(KAS2↔AS3 ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
· · ·
Tn−1 = H(KASn−1↔ASn ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m)) 4
Transport (message m) var
Figure 3.3: Waivered return packet format.
trusted neighbor.
Before the packet leaves the network, a router stamps the next token on the
packet. This token conveys that the packet is valid: that the signatures and previous
token have been checked and that the next domain should transit it, even if the
token’s creator has not directly verified the signatures in the packet. The format of
the next (and any subsequent) token is:
T1 = H(KAS1↔AS2 ,Bpk, Dip, c,H(m))
The packet arrives at the destination with a chain of tokens that can be used to
diagnose in-network misbehavior (Section 3.4).
Tokens are significantly faster to verify than signatures, since they use only
symmetric key operations. The use of tokens does not require shared keys between
every AS pair or the predetermination of AS paths, as in Passport [55].
3.3.7 Waivers
High-volume servers and power-constrained devices may not be able to sign each
packet they transmit. DNA allows hosts to state with a waiver that unsigned return
traffic will not be blocked. Hosts must possess or have access to a valid speaks-for
keypair (SFpk, SFsk) delegated to their prefix; we expect the key to be delegated
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specifically for one address for a short duration, but a waiver may be generated by
a service, such as the LRep.
We assume that Alice can transmit a connection nonce n to Bob in secret;
perhaps by encrypting it using Bob’s well-known or stored public key, in-band in an
established secure transport protocol atop accountable packets, or by other means.
Alice then sends a waiver ω of the form:
SFpk, SignTAPpk (SFsk) , Aliceip, e, SignSFsk (H(n), Aliceip, e)
where e is the epoch until which any node possessing n may send waivered packets to
Aliceip. The waiver is only valid if SFpk is signed; if SFsk is delegated, the certificate
chain from the TAP is included in the waiver. Alice sends ω to Bob.
Bob verifies the signature of the hash of the nonce and forwards ω to its LRep.
The LRep verifies that Aliceip created a waiver allowing Bob to send to Alice and
grants a secret waiver token for sending to Aliceip without querying the SBS. The
format of a waiver token is H(K
sLRep↔AS1 , Aliceip, c). However, because this token
is not bound to a principal, only to the holder of a nonce, it could be abused if
eavesdropped. To keep this waiver token secret and prevent replay, LRep encrypts
it before transferring it to Bob. The waiver token is not included directly in the
packet, but hashed with the message.
Bob does not include any signatures in packets for Alice; instead, Bob includes
a HMAC of the packet computed using Alice’s nonce as the key. Bob’s AS allows
waivered packets from Bob to depart without alarm. The format of the waivered
packet is shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.4 presents a state transition diagram showing how a sender transitions
to and from being able to send waivered traffic. The sender traverses the path
through obtaining an initial token to being able to send accountable packets. It
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Figure 3.4: DNA sender states and transitions.
token from the LRep and then begin sending waivered packets. From either sending
state, the sender may add the ←−ω to permit unsigned incoming traffic. If a token or
waiver is not renewed, the sender reverts to a less-authorized state.
3.3.8 Placing a Block
Suppose the owner of Dip wishes to block Alice. He forwards one of Alice’s packets to
his administrator, D.admin. Given an accountable packet from Alice, D.admin can
extract sLRep’s address and Alice’s blinding key. Assume that D.admin possesses
the speaks-for key corresponding to the address block containing Dip (1.1/16).
D.admin places the block:
BlockReq1.1/16 = “1.1/16”, D.adminpk, Bpk, Dip, type,
SignTAPsk (“1.1/16”, D.adminpk) , SignD.adminsk (Bpk, Dip, type)
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where type ∈ {“new”, “republish”}, as follows:
D.admin 7→ sLRep : BlockReq1.1/16 ; block request
; sLRep retrieves Alice’s Ppk using Bpk and places a block in the SBS
; The SBS nodes return k signed storage receipts (ri).
sLRep 7→ D.admin : r1, ..., rk,EncLReppk (CommitAlice) ; block receipt
The LRep in the destination network, dLRep, may grant tokens without con-
sulting the SBS for the purpose of sending block messages to other LReps. This
permits sending block requests while overloaded. dLRep must inspect the combi-
nation of the block request and the packet headers to ensure that the request is
not spurious: for example, that Bpk followed a chain from the TAP and that the
destination for the token is sLRepip.
Depending on the implementation, the SBS may not permanently store blocks.
A D.admin that insists upon permanent blocks may republish them before they
expire. To facilitate republishing, the sLRep returns an encrypted copy of Alice’s
commitment to her blinding key Bpk. A request to republish a block request includes
this encrypted commitment, so that sLRep can decrypt it to find Alice’s commit-
ment. After Alice’s original commitment expires, sLRep may expunge it; it is the
responsibility of D.admin to keep this state so the block can be republished.
To block further waivered traffic, the victim must both block the principal
used to solicit a waiver, if applicable, and refuse to renew the waiver.
3.3.9 Multiple TAPs
The description so far has focused on a single TAP. DNA in fact allows multiple
TAPs to be simultaneously deployed and for destinations to accept packets signed
with identities issued by TAPs of their choosing. We assume that each TAP has a
globally-unique index to be carried in all accountable packets and used to identify
TAPpk.
65
Senders must know which TAPs a destination honors, and LReps issue tokens
to a sender only if the sender has a key signed by a TAP that the destination accepts.
DNA assumes DNS can be augmented to return, along with a list of IP addresses,
the indexes of one or more TAPs, in response to a lookup request. The current
effort to secure DNS with DNSSEC [40] prevents tampering with DNS requests and
responses. To avoid bootstrapping problems, DNA assumes DNS serves will accept
queries from identity keys certified by a well-known TAP, perhaps run by ICANN.
3.3.10 Discussion
This approach protocol has an additional benefit, beyond the goals at the opening
of this section. Accountable packets are locally verifiable: any entity along the path
can determine if a packet is accountable, by checking all signatures and that the
fields in the packet are consistent. Invalid packets are dropped near the source and
far from the destination. Misbehavior can be detected locally, either by neighbors
exchanging traffic, by a first hop router, or by the LRep in the source network.
Further, blocking decisions—deciding whether a source should be denied the right
to send to controlled destinations—can be made without proving harm. Because
the incremental cost of a block is small, they need no external justification.
3.4 Attacks
The previous sections have described the default operation of DNA, without failures
or node corruption. This section considers misbehavior by different components and
shows how DNA detects misbehavior and eventually evicts malicious nodes from the
system.
Attacks are classified into three categories based on how attackers are identi-
fied:




Flood destination? DNA: Victim places a block; tokens not granted
Change network point of at-
tachment
DNA: Block found in SBS from any location
Replay old tokens DNA: Tokens expire after one epoch
Use tokens to send to arbi-
trary destination
DNA: Tokens bound to destination addresses
Exhaust SBS storage by incur-
ring many blocks?
DNA: LRep rate-limits tokens to blocked senders
Falsely accuse waivered traffic
of being unaccountable
Local: Destination can prove waiver is valid and
accusation is false
LReps may
Fabricate blinding keys; issue
tokens to unregistered users?
DNA: LRep cannot produce a commitment from
a principal to that key; the SBS will not
return a receipt
Flood destination? TAP: Administrator can expose LRep to the TAP
Not place blocks; ignore block
request?
TAP: Victim LRep receives no receipt, redirects
request to the TAP
Not lookup blocks before issu-
ing tokens; issue tokens to a
blocked sender?
TAP: SBS does not return receipts, reports du-
plicate block to the TAP
Routers may
Not check signatures? Local: Tokens will lead back to this network
Flood using bogus tokens DNA: Neighbors will discard packets with invalid
tokens
Flood using bogus source Local: Cannot create accountable traffic; tokens
will lead back to this network
Replay packets? Local: Neighbors install Bloom filters
Fabricate upstream tokens? Local: Fabricator and neighbor network accuse
each other
Not check upstream tokens Local: If an invalid token is accepted, network will
not deflect blame
Table 3.1: DNA attacks and resolution. Items with a ? are explained in Section 3.4.
biguously implicate corrupt nodes.
• Local: The DNA protocol can resolve the misbehavior to two neighboring
entities, either of which may be corrupt. However, the “good” entity knows
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the corrupt neighbor and modify its trust policy accordingly.
• TAP: Some attacks require the assistance of a TAP node for resolution. Vic-
tims provide the messages that indicate a corrupt entity to the TAP, which
can verify the deceit, decide to not recertify the node for future epochs, and
communicate the decision to replica TAPs.
Table 3.1 matches the most prominent attacks DNA components may attempt
with the mechanism that would isolate the attacker. The rest of this section de-
scribes selected attack resolution mechanisms in detail.
3.4.1 Source-Generated Attacks
Source floods
DNA enables destinations to explicitly block source principals. If a source floods
a remote host with accountable traffic (i.e., packets with valid blinding and LRep
keys), the victim network can block the source. A block request message (from the
D.admin) fits into a single Internet MTU IP datagram and does not require an
acknowledgment for the block to be activated. Thus, the block protocol will be able
to block the source, even if the source can saturate the victim’s access link.
If the source sends unaccountable traffic (i.e. traffic with an invalid signature),
then the source’s domain—which is responsible for verifying each signature—will
discard the packet.
If the source sends legacy traffic (without an accountability header), then the
traffic may be forwarded or discarded as described in Section 3.6.
SBS storage exhaustion
A malicious sender may try to overload the SBS by attacking many destinations,
causing the SBS to hold a large amount of block information, generate many block
receipts, and cause its LRep to verify those DHT receipts.
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For every block than an LRep publishes, it has to verify the returned receipts.
An LRep will rate limit or stop issuing token to a sender that is blocked by multiple
senders, causing excessive work for the LRep to verify and return receipts.
Changing Network Attachment Point
After being blocked or banned, a principal may try to continue an attack by changing
their LRep or ISP (which would map the principal to a different LRep). However,
the block in the SBS would stop the source from receiving an initial token.
3.4.2 Corrupt LReps
Flooding
Like any sender, a corrupt LRep may try to flood a destination. If the LRep node
sends packets using a blinding key registered to LReppk, the blinding key would be
blocked as if it were a normal sender. If the misbehaving LRep does not honor
the block, the administrator who blocked the LRep does not receive receipts and
forwards the request to the TAP, who eventually evicts the LRep (as it would for
any LRep that did not respond to any block request). If the LRep does return
receipts, but continues to send traffic, the administrator presents the TAP with the
returned receipts and an example of the traffic that violates the receipts. This is
evidence of misbehavior and the TAP evicts the LRep.
An LRep is unable to send packets using a blinding key registered by another
user (without the corresponding secret key Bsk, it is unable to sign packets). Thus
a corrupt LRep can never implicate an honest user of misbehavior.
Ignoring block requests
If an LRep ignores block requests (or is unable to return the necessary number of
receipts), the victim administrator appeals to the TAP. The TAP challenges the
source LRep to place the blocks and return receipts, otherwise it will evict the LRep.
Skipping lookups or issuing tokens to a blocked sender
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A source and an LRep may collude. The LRep could issue a token allowing a sender
(using a different blinding key) to send packets to a destination that has previously
blocked the sender. LReps that skip SBS lookups may do the same. In this case,
the destination will presumably block the sender a second time.
The next course of action depends on whether the corrupt LRep publishes
this second block request or not. If it does publish the block requests, the SBS
will will observe that the destination has blocked Ppk twice—an indication that
the LRep misbehaved. The SBS will not return a receipt, and may alert the TAP.
If the LRep does not publish the request, the destination appeals to the TAP as
above. In addition, it also has the option of publishing a block request for the LRep
itself, which the LRep must honor as a request to not issue tokens to any sender
to contact the destination. This block request has the same format as a request to
block an sender’s Ppk, but includes the LRep’s public key (which is included in any
accountable packet that has an initial token from the offending LRep) instead of a
sender’s key. Any LRep can publish this block, as it does not require reversing a
sender’s commitment to a blinding key. Once the block is published, the LRep will
implicate himself of misbehavior if it continues to issue tokens to a destination that
has blocked the entire LRep. The destination can use this to appeal to the TAP,
without requiring the TAP to attempt to publish the block itself. Incorporating this
measure requires that an LRep make two lookups—one for the sender and one for
itself—before issuing an initial token.
It is possible that a victim administrator asks a TAP node to challenge a source
TAP because multiple principals are attacking a domain (but the source LReps are
not corrupt). That is, each block that is placed is being honored, but each attack
(with a new blinding key) corresponds to a new principal. In this case, all of the
suspected attack packets will map to different (unblocked) blinding keys, and the
source LReps will not be falsely implicated.
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3.4.3 Corrupt Routers
Corrupt routers may fabricate packets with (bogus) accountability headers, resulting
in packets with an invalid signature chain—preventing the destination from blocking
the sending principal—to arrive at a destination. Similarly, routers may not check
packet signatures, allowing unaccountable traffic to enter the network. Additionally,
a corrupt router may simply replay valid packets to flood the victim.
Generating or forwarding invalid packets (Accusation Protocol)
If a victim receives an unaccountable packet, it must rely on the tokens to isolate
the faulty node. The victim’s administrator inspects the last token in the packet
and determines which of its upstream ASes the packet came from (by determining
which shared key was used to check the token). The victim administrator then
“accuses” the upstream AS of sending an invalid packet. The upstream AS (say
AS1) verifies the last token, and tries to map the second-to-last token to one of its
upstream neighbors. If this process is successful (and the second-to-last token maps
to AS2), AS1 “accuses” AS2. This process recurses until the packet traverses the
last “good” AS (say ASg) into the AS that generated it (say ASb).
Note that all that is required to verify a token is the blinding key, destination
IP, epoch the packet was created, the hash of the packet contents, and the token it-
self. Thus accusation messages (containing the full token chain), like block requests,
fit into a single packet.
When the original packet was generated, the corrupt router in ASb may have
fabricated all upstream tokens, in which case the ASb administrator will have no
other upstream AS to blame. In the worst case, the ASb router may have been able
to add one “valid” upstream token, since it may know the secret shared with the
upstream AS.
In the first case, either the ASb administrator will locate and expunge the
corrupt router (and stop the attack), or the attacks will continue. If the attacks
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continue, each AS will continue to receive accusations from downstream routers and
ASg must apply some local policy. This policy could include technical solutions (e.g.
check signatures on incoming packets) or monetary remedies (e.g. the AS peering
SLA could state that the offending AS will pay a small sum for each unaccountable
packet that it transits).
Suppose the AS chooses to validate signatures if the accusations continue.
This will enable ASg to immediately isolate ASb (since ASg will immediately know
that ASb is transiting unaccountable packets). ASg will not forward these packets,
stopping the flow of accusations. If ASb continues to source unaccountable packets,
ASg may take further action.
If the SLA between ASg and ASb includes the monetary provision, then ASb
will have to pay for each unaccountable packet. ASg may have also had to pay its
downstream AS (after all, ASg did transit an unaccountable packet); however, in
this case, ASg recoups its cost because of the payment from ASb.
If the router in ASb added a “valid” token for a previous hop AS (since the
neighboring ASes share a secret key), ASb will be able to “blame” a good upstream
AS (say ASup). However, ASup will not be able to map the packet to any of its
upstream neighbors. If the ASup administrator can immediately assert that its
routers have not been corrupted, it can isolate ASb.
However, it is often difficult for a network administrator to certify that none
of the hosts or routers in its AS has been compromised. In this case, ASup’s ad-
ministrator can locally audit the router between itself and ASb, ensure it is not
compromised, and verify the signatures of all packets traversing the peering link.
If the accusations continue, then ASb is unambiguously implicated, and ASup may
choose to renegotiate the peering.
Verifying signatures on every packet may be prohibitively expensive on high
speed links. ASup can implicate ASb without verifying packet signatures. Once
the ASup administrator verifies that its peering router with ASb (say R) is not
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compromised, it generates a temporary symmetric key (k), and instructs R to add
two tokens on each outgoing packet. The first outgoing token is computed using k
(known only to R) and the second token is the regular token computed using the key
shared between ASup and ASb. If subsequent accusations from ASb includes a token
signed with k, then some host or router within ASup is compromised, and the ASup
administrator has to audit its internal routers. However, if ASup is not compromised,
then the accusation packets from ASb will not contain a token signed with k (since
ASb does not know k). However, all packets transited from ASup included a token
signed with k; this enables ASup to unambiguously implicate ASb.
Replaying valid packets
A router can replay a fixed packet only until the next epoch, when it will be dropped
by subsequent domains. However, this does not solve router replay in general. If
routers persist in replaying accountable packets, neighboring ASes can install Bloom
filters [21] on their routers. Passport [55] also uses Bloom filters to catch replayed
packets. Bloom filters are described in greater detail in Section 3.5.
When a router forwards a packet, it tests its Bloom filter to see if the packet
exists in the Bloom filter. Such a test is probabilistic and does not guarantee that
packet is an actual replay. Therefore, the router also stores a set of hashes of possible
duplicate packets. If a router suspects a packet is a duplicate because it appears in
the Bloom filter, it then hashes the packet and compares against the set of hashes,
and only rejects the packet if its hash appears in the set. If it does not, the router
adds the hash to the list and forwards the packet. If the packet does not match the
Bloom filter, the router forwards it and inserts a copy into the filter.
While this allows exactly two duplicate packets to be forwarded (the first,
original packet, and the second that matched the Bloom filter and whose hash was
stored), it prevents false positives when detecting duplicates and allows the router to
tune the size of its Bloom filter based on how many hashes it can store. The filters
and set of hashes can be refreshed every epoch, limiting the amount of storage
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needed.
3.4.4 Attacks using waivered packets
Assume Alice sent a waiver allowing Bob to send unsigned packets to Alice. When
Alice receives an unsigned packet, she can use the HMAC to assert that she had
explicitly permitted the sender to send unsigned packets. If the HMAC in the
packet is corrupt (or not present), Alice may use the usual “accusation” protocol to
stop/isolate the sender.
If Alice were malicious, she may try to evict Bob (who is good) by initiating
the accusation protocol on packets that include a proper HMAC. The tokens in
the packet would eventually terminate at Bob, who can produce Alice’s waiver
explicitly allowing Bob to send unsigned packets. Bob does not have to reveal his
private key to decrypt the nonce in order to prove that Alice sent a waiver; he only
has to produce the nonce and show that Alice signed a hash of the nonce. Bob now
accuses Alice (tracing the packet tokens forward) of misbehavior. Bob’s accusation
includes Alice’s waiver, her accusation message, and the nonce in cleartext:
SFpk, SignTAPpk (SFsk) , “accuse”, nonce
Each AS on the forward path can now independently check that (1) Alice did allow
Bob to send unsigned messages, (2) Alice signed the nonce, and (3) Bob had included
a proper HMAC on the return packet. This evidence is sufficient for Alice’s AS to
isolate Alice’s host (or for Alice’s upstream AS to isolate Alice’s AS).
Bob’s AS does not check signatures on waivered packets. However, this does
not allow any new attacks. If Bob sends malicious traffic to a destination that has
given a waiver to Bob, the victim domain will not renew Bob’s waiver, and the LRep
in Bob’s domain will stop issuing tokens to Bob when the waiver expires.
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3.5 Bloom filters: An alternative to tokens
When an accountable packet crosses an AS boundary, a router in the upstream
AS stamps a token into the packet. This token expresses that AS’s belief that
the packet is valid: the signatures verify and the sender is not blocked. In the
case of misbehavior, routers can use these tokens to the source of a packet. When
an unaccountable packet arrives at a destination, the destination can initiate the
accusation protocol, in which ASes use the tokens to find the principal that sent the
packet.
However, tokens consume space in the packet and require neighboring ASes to
share secret keys. This section explores an alternate method of traceback, similar to
Snoeren et al.’s Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) [74], that eliminates the need
for ASes to stamp tokens into packets. Unlike other traceback systems [78, 71],
which require the destination to collect multiple packets in order to reconstruct the
path, SPIE enables traceback of a single packet. SPIE also does not alter packet
contents. Instead, a SPIE router stores a log of packets in a Bloom filter, which
DNA already assumes exist in routers to detect replayed packets (Section 3.4.3).
In SPIE, each router maintains a log of the packets that it has recently for-
warded. The log is implemented with a Bloom filter. When a packet arrives at the
router, the router creates k different m-bit digests of the packet by hashing part of
the packet with k independent hash functions. The input to each hash is the first 24
invariant bytes of the packet (the IP TTL, checksum, and QoS can change during
transmission, so the router zeroes these fields before computing the digest). These
k values are then inserted into the Bloom filter, a bit-vector of 2m bits, by using the
m-bit results as indices and setting the bits at those indices to 1.
The SPIE log can be used for both traceback and detecting duplicate packets.
However, detecting duplicates based on a hash of only the first 24 bytes of a packet
produces false positives. To prevent this, routers hash the entire packet, which
incurs a marginally higher computing cost.
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The task of tracing a packet back to its source is handled by a SPIE Traceback
Manager (STM), a device in each AS responsible for querying routers in that net-
work and communicating with other STMs. When presented with an unaccountable
packet p, a destination D sends a request to its local STM to find the source of p.
The STM queries the routers in its AS to determine the path p took, called the attack
path. The STM starts with D’s first-hop router, then queries its neighbors to find
the preceding router in the path. One or more routers report that they forwarded
the packet; the STM then queries the upstream neighbors of these routers. The
STM continues this process of simulating reverse-path flooding until it reconstructs
the path of p, terminating at some inter-AS link. Having identified the previous AS
hop, the STM issues a request to the STM in that AS to do the same, until the
source is found.
Ideally, this process would terminate at the device that sent the packet. How-
ever, there are two ways in which (an honest) router’s answer could be incorrect.
The first is a false negative: if a router forwarded the packet in the previous epoch,
it may have refreshed its filter. To prevent this, routers archive their Bloom filters
for several epochs and examine each for p. A false positive can occur due to the
probabilistic nature of Bloom filters. This will cause a fork in the reconstructed
path. In most cases, forks are easy to detect because the false path will end quickly
(the probability a router produces a false positive is independent of the probability
of the same at other routers), while the true path will continue on to further hops.
However, this may not always occur. In order to minimize false positives and prune
the reconstructed path, the destination should forward each unaccountable packet
to the SPIE. Each additional packet reduces the probability of Bloom filter false
positives, and thus of forks in the reconstructed path, because the Bloom filter hash
functions are independent.
Using SPIE to find the source of an unaccountable packet is an alternative to
accumulating tokens in packets. The LReps in an AS would serve as the traceback
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manager, which local hosts would contact to initiate traceback of a packet. However,
the security model of SPIE is different than that of DNA. SPIE discusses how to limit
the effect of malicious routers that alter packets or duplicate packets to undetectably
amplify a flow, but not routers that attempt to subvert the traceback process. In
order to be a viable alternative to token, a SPIE-like traceback mechanism must be
resilient to such misbehavior.
A malicious router Rbad may subvert the traceback process by causing false
negatives or false positives. Fortunately, neither behavior allows the malicious router
to prevent reconstruction of the attack path. DNA handles a deliberate false posi-
tive in the same way as an accidental one: the probability that a router upstream
of Rbad also produces a false positive is low. This probability decreases for each
distinct packet provided by the destination during the traceback process. Thus, the
false branch of the reconstructed path terminates at Rbad and implicates Rbad in
misbehaving. A false negative will end the reconstructed path prematurely—but
again, immediately before Rbad. If the STM suspects a router is lying, it can query
that router’s upstream neighbors to see if any of them have the packet in their logs.
Additionally, the network operator can monitor the links between these routers for
misbehavior.
In addition to eliminating the need for tokens in packets, this method of trace-
back makes it easier to find a malicious router. The links in reconstructed SPIE
paths are between routers, whereas the DNA accusation protocol produces links be-
tween ASes. With SPIE, the source of an unaccountable packet is narrowed down
to a single device rather than a network. Network operators do not need to search
their networks for misbehaving devices. This benefit comes at the cost of requiring
all routers to store packet digest logs (to catch replays, it is sufficient that only one
router on the path between the attacker and victim detect replays).
Pretty Good Packet Authentication (PGPA) [38] uses a similar concept to
create a service that can determine whether or not a given host has sent a packet.
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In PGPA, edge ISPs deploy traffic monitors on their customer access links. Traffic
monitors store the SHA-1 hash of each packet, along with a timestamp, that is sent
by the ISPs customers and can be queried to verify whether a given packet was
recently sent by one of these customers. PGPA does not provide general traceback,
as no packets are logged outside of edge ISPs.
Performance
The size of a router’s Bloom filter determines its false positive rate. The larger the
filter, the lower this rate and greater the accuracy of the reconstructed packet paths,
but the higher the cost in terms of memory. The false-positive rate p of a Bloom
filter that uses k hash functions to store n packets in m bits is given by the equation
p ≈ (1− ekn/m)k
The authors of SPIE suggest using k = 3 hash functions and a memory effi-
ciency factor (n/m) of 0.2, which gives a false-positive rate of 0.092 when storing
n items. To achieve the above false-positive rate, a router that forwards P packets
per second must use a Bloom filter with at least 5P bits (5 = 1/0.2). Assuming an
average packet size of 1000 bits, a 40 Gbit/s link requires 200 Mbit/s of memory. If
the average packet size is 3200 bits, a more realistic value [60], the requirement is
reduced to less than 64 Mbit/s.
Given the above false-positive rate of p, how accurate is the process of con-
structing the attack path? This depends on the length L of the path and the degree
d of each router. An analytic bound on the number of extra nodes in the attack
path due to false positives, assuming d is constant, is Lpd
1−pd . This is not encouraging:
for d > 5, the reconstructed attack path will contain more than 50% false positive
edges. The authors of SPIE show that the number of false positives is much lower
in a real topology. Simulations of SPIE on a tier-one ISP topology show that the
average number of false positives is less than one, even for paths of 30 hops.
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3.6 Partial Deployment
DNA does not require global deployment. Partial deployment solutions depend
on whether the original sender is DNA-aware and whether there are legacy transit
domains between accountable domains. We assume that all senders and destinations
in an accountable domain are DNA-aware; however, DNA-aware principals may send
packets from legacy domains.
Two new entities interact with legacy ASes. An accountability gateway enables
DNA-aware senders in legacy domains to send traffic to accountable domains. A
legacy gateway forwards sanitized legacy traffic onto accountable domains.
Sending accountable traffic from legacy domains
Accountable senders in legacy domains may wish to send traffic to domains that only
accept accountable traffic. The sender’s traffic is routed through an accountability
gateway, LRepgw.
Accountability gateways have a TAP-signed LRep key that they use to issue
tokens to senders that have committed to a blinding key and have not been blocked,
much like a normal LRep. Unlike a normal LRep, accountability gateways issue
tokens to senders in legacy ASes; these senders must tunnel accountable packets to
the accountability gateway’s AS to use the token.
The blocking procedure is the same: should a receiver decide to block Alice,
it follows the standard blocking protocol by sending a block request to LRepgw, who
publishes the block in the SBS.
Transiting through legacy domains
Accountable ASes can tunnel over legacy ASes to extend the reach of deployed,
accountable “islands”, much like the MBone and 6Bone. The tunnel endpoints
exchange symmetric keys to create tokens. These tokens are bound to the tunneled
“link” between accountable ASes.
It may be the case that an egress router R in an accountable domain cannot
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forward an accountable packet to an accountable domain, for instance if it cannot
find a tunnel that reduces the distance to the packet’s destination or if R determines
that the destination is in an adjacent legacy domain. In this case, R removes the
accountability header from outgoing packets, changes the IP protocol field to the
protocol field in the accountability header, recomputes the IP header checksum, and
forwards the resultant legacy packet.
Legacy senders
Legacy gateways allow legacy senders to send packets to accountable ASes. A legacy
gateway (L) possesses a Ppk from the TAP. L accepts legacy traffic, creates and
commits to a blinding key corresponding to the source IP address, and forwards the
packets using the usual DNA protocol. In effect, L takes responsibility for the legacy
traffic by signing it. Destinations that block L no longer receive any legacy traffic
through this gateway. Like any user Ppk, if sufficient destinations block L, its key
may no longer be renewed by the TAP.
3.6.1 Distributing Keys to New Users
When a new user Alice joins an AS that implements DNA, or Alice’s AS first deploys
DNA, she may not have a valid principal key needed to commit to a blinding key.
Rather than distribute keys from the TAP out of band, new users can contact the
TAP using their local LRep as an accountability gateway. In this case, Alice must
authenticate to LRep via an out of band mechanism. Alice generates a (Bpk, Bsk)
for herself and registers Bpk with the LRep, who will let Alice contact only the TAP.
Alice uses Bpk to contact the TAP and then authenticates to the TAP with whatever
credentials are required. Alice generates her (Ppk, Psk) and gives Ppk to the TAP
to sign. This is done to prevent impersonation attacks: if the TAP generated the
key, it could send traffic as Alice. Finally, the TAP responds with a signature on the
public key, allowing Alice to send accountable packets.
If Alice uses the temporary key to abuse the TAP, the TAP will forward a
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Key Size Sign Verify
112 bits µ = 0.91, σ = 0.03 µ = 1.11, σ = 0.01
160 bits µ = 1.77, σ = 0.01 µ = 2.07, σ = 0.02
Table 3.2: Times in milliseconds to perform each operation on a 3.4 GHz Intel
Pentium 4 CPU. µ is average, σ is standard deviation.
normal block request to the LRep, who revokes Alice’s permission to authenticate.
3.7 Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of DNA, based on an implementation of the
TAP and a DNA router, and wide-area simulations using ns-2.
3.7.1 Implementation and analysis
Here, I present microbenchmarks for each type of overhead from our implementation.
The TAP is implemented in Ruby, using SWIG wrappers to OpenSSL [63]. I have
augmented the Click router [49] to perform DNA token manipulations and signature
verification.
The implementation uses the OpenSSL implementation of ECDSA [54] for
signatures and SHA-1 HMAC for tokens. ECDSA affords short public keys and
signatures without expensive bi-linear pairing operations. DNA uses 160-bit keys
(“long” keys) for TAPpk, Ppk, and speaks-for keys, and 112-bit keys for LReppk and
Bpk keys (“short” keys). As LReppk and Bpk keys are refreshed relatively often; their
keylength can be shorter.
DNA overheads can be partitioned into five broad categories:
• Accountable traffic: Accountable traffic incurs processing overheads for sig-
natures and verifications, latency overheads for block lookups, storage over-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Overhead of DNA sub-protocols. Header size reflects packets with five
tokens. but y in the worst case. All signatures and verifications for the same
operation can be performed in parallel.
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• Traffic with waivers: Once waivers are issued, DNA operations require no
asymmetric cryptography. The primary overhead is in constructing and check-
ing HMACs.
• LRep and gateway: LReps and legacy gateways must store blinding key
mappings, publish blocks to the SBS, and verify SBS receipts.
• Administrator: Administrators sign block requests, create waivers, and store
and verify SBS receipts.
• TAP node: TAP nodes sign keys for principals and LReps. They resolve
disputes and evict misbehaving LReps.
The primary computational overhead in DNA comes from signature creation,
signature verification and HMAC operations. The time required for the signature
computations on a typical workstation is shown in Table 3.2. The HMAC operations
require less than 0.02 ms for 1500 byte packets.
Table 3.3 shows the number of different cryptographic operations required
for DNA component protocols, the number of local and remote round trips each
protocol incurs, and the sizes of the protocol messages. Of note from Table 3.3 is
the following:
Line 2 One router in the source AS must verify two short signatures and one long
signature for accountable packets. These verifications can be parallelized and
two of them may be cached.
Line 3 Principals can pre-commit to blinding keys and use them as necessary.
There is no need to commit to a blinding key for each new connection.
Line 7 Creating a waiver requires two signature operations, only one of which must
be performed at connection setup time. The nonces can be generated and
signed offline.
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Line 11 Once a waiver is verified and a token obtained, no more asymmetric oper-
ations are required.
Line 12 If a packet can be verified (three verification operations) and the desti-
nation wishes to block the sender, it needs to create one signature with its
speaks-for key. Block requests fit in a single datagram.
Line 13-14 If a destination receives a packet with an invalid signature or an invalid
nonce, it invokes the accusation protocol. The accusation packets also fit
into a single datagram, and require no signatures beyond the accountability
header. Each successive upstream AS must check their token (one HMAC)
and then compare the previous token against all keys shared with their other
AS neighbors (one HMAC operation per neighbor).
The compilation of overheads in Table 3.3 suggests that DNA can be deployed
in the wide-area using current hardware. I now use the analysis in Table 3.3 the
microbenchmarks from our implementation to extrapolate the performance of a
hypothetical DNA deployment.
Generating a blinding key
For new connections, the sending principal must generate a blinding key. The over-
head of generating a blinding key is low. Blinding keys can be generated offline on
an as-needed basis. The sender implementation, when running on a 1.5 GHz CPU,
can generate a 112-bit ECDSA blinding key in 1.2 ms.
LRep initial connection processing
An LRep must verify commitments to blinding keys and generate initial tokens. Not
every connection requires commitment verification: a sender may elect to reuse a
blinding key to multiple destinations. Registering a blinding key requires verifying
one long and one short key, which takes approximately 3 ms (Table 3.2). Issuing
an initial token requires only one verification (of the SBS response) and one HMAC
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operation.
The LRep also stores the mapping between blinding keys and users. A blinding
key commitment consists of an Ppk (20 bytes), a Bpk (14 bytes), the expiration epoch
νB (4 bytes), and SignPsk (Bpk, νB) (40 bytes—ECDSA signatures are twice as long
as the public key). This requires 78 bytes of storage per blinding key. An LRep can
store 13.7 million keys in 1 GB of storage.
Sending an accountable packet
Though three signatures are included in outgoing packets, senders need to create
only one per packet: the signature of m with Bsk. Our sender, running on a single-
threaded 1.5 GHz AMD XP CPU, is able to create 259 accountable packets, each
containing 1000 bytes of payload, per second.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the accountability header consists of 145 bytes plus 4
for every token. Assuming the average AS path length is four [57], for most packets
the tokens consume 20 bytes. Thus, the accountability header consumes 165 bytes.
Router processing
The first-hop router, implemented in Click and running on a 1.5 GHz CPU, is able
to verify an entire signature chain at a rate of 79 per second.
Each border router either checks a token or creates one in every packet it
forwards. The storage requirements on border routers are minimal: HMAC keys
are 16 bytes long. The above-mentioned host can create (or check) tokens for 1024-
byte packets at a rate of 80,000 per second. This corresponds to approximately 640
Mbps of throughput. Using dedicated hardware, such as the Intel IXP2855 network
processing chip [41], routers can achieve through-puts up to 10 Gbps.
Block request creation
Block requests include the blocked blinding key, the IP of the blocker, and a signature
of both. If the block request is treated as a packet, with the message consisting of









Figure 3.5: Simulation topology
speaks-for key and use that as the message signature in the accountable packet
header. This limits the additional overhead at the administrator to verifying the
signatures in the packet that it was requested to block.
The network administration at the University of Maryland Computer Science
Department manually blacklists IP addresses by installing a firewall rule for persis-
tent attackers. A trace collected between August 2007 and December 2007 shows
2,736 hosts were blacklisted (approximately 15 per day). The overhead of this level
of blacklisting is negligible.
3.7.2 Simulation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of a wide-scale deployment of DNA.
This deployment is simulated using ns-2. We first evaluate DNA’s basic functionality
to confirm that it performs as expected. We then show that performance is not sig-
nificantly affected when certain components become compromised. For comparison,
we consider TVA under the same scenario, and compare performance.
Topology
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We use a simple dumbbell topology, shown in Figure 3.5, in our simulations. The
sender networks are on the left-hand side of the dumbbell. Each network contains
one LRep, a number of senders, and a first-hop router that connects them. Each
network then feeds into a single node, whose outgoing link is the bottleneck. The
destination is connected to this link.
The bottleneck link capacity varies, depending on the experiment, from 1 to
10 Mbit/s. The capacity of all other links is 100 Mbit/s. The latency on all links is
10 ms, except as noted in Section 3.7.2.3.
There are two types of senders: attackers that flood the destination and honest
senders that attempt to transmit files to the destination over TCP. Attackers send
traffic at 1 Mbyte/s.
3.7.2.1 Blocking senders in honest networks
When a destination sends a block request to an LRep, the LRep publishes the block
in the DHT. It also places a temporary filter at the gateway, which drops packets
that contain the initial token that the LRep issued to the blocked sender. This filter
expires when the token expires. This simulation evaluates quickly a destination’s
block requests take effect if the sender’s network is honest, i.e., its gateway honors
these filters.
For these experiments, the bandwidth of the bottleneck link is set to 10 Mbit/s.
Each sender is an attacker and begins by first obtaining a token from the LRep. It
then sends at a constant bitrate until it is blocked. As soon as the destination
receives a packet from an attacker, it creates a block request and sends it to the
attacker’s LRep.
We ran two experiments with sender networks of different sizes. In the first
experiment, each LRep serves a single sender, that is, each network has one sender.
In the second, each sender network has 10 senders. In each experiment and the










































(b) Ten attackers per network
Figure 3.6: Average time required to block each attacker in a dumbbell topology
network consisting solely of attackers. Each LRep installs a local filter that blocks
the source once it receives a block request.
Figures 3.6(a) (1 sender per network) and 3.6(b) (10 senders per network)
show the average time from when an attacker first sends a packet until when it is
blocked by the destination.
3.7.2.2 Multi-stage attacks
A second experiment models a more powerful adversary that can coordinate multiple
attacks against a destination using disjoint groups of nodes. This scenario models
a botnet, where a single adversary in control of many bots can command different
sets of bots to attack at different time.
TCP transfers
To measure the effect of such compromise, we emulate an experiment from the
evaluation of TVA [82]. Honest senders attempt to transfer files to the destination
using TCP. The files are 20 KBytes each, as in the evaluation of TVA. Senders
serially transmit a fixed number of files, but this number is set so that file transfers
are started throughout the series of attacks. In this experiment, there are 10 honest
senders and each transfers 20 files. We then observe how file transfer completion



























Transfer start time (s)
Figure 3.7: Time to complete a 20 Kbyte file transfer in the presence of multi-
stage attack. Ten honest senders send ten files each. An attack stage starts every 20
seconds, indicated by the vertical bars. In each attack, 150 users flood at 1 Mbyte/s.
In all experiments that simulate file transfer via TCP, excessive packet loss
may cause the transfer to abort. Specifically, the sender will abort the transfer if
it does not receive a response to 8 SYN packets or if its retransmission timeout is
greater than 64 seconds. In this particular experiment, no transfers were aborted.
A transfer that times out due to excessive packet loss will be aborted; no
timeouts occurred in this experiment.
In this experiment, there are 750 adversaries, each sending at 1 Mbyte/s. They
are split into five waves of 150 attackers each. The first wave starts sending at time
20 seconds, and subsequent waves begin every 20 seconds after that.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 3.7. The x-coordinate of
each point is the time when the 20 Kbyte transfer started and the y-coordinate is the
time required to complete the transfer. The results show that while transfer times
increase when each wave begins, DNA recovers quickly and overall performance
is restored. The effects of each wave of attacks is not cumulative: the effect of
























Figure 3.8: Bandwidth received at the destination from a single source sending at a
constant bit rate equal to half of the bottleneck link. Every 20 seconds, attacks of
increasing intensity begin.
Effect on bitrate
To measure the available bandwidth on a link during an attack, we performed a
similar experimet as the previous one. Instead of 10 TCP senders, we used a single
source sending at a constant rate, equal to the half of the capacity of the bottleneck
link. Also, the attacks increased in severity. At 20 seconds, one attacker begins
flooding the destination at a bandwidth equal to the bottleneck link. 20 seconds
later, two attackers begin; then four, and so on, up to attacks of 128 senders.
The results, shown in Figure 3.8, highlight the importance of blocking attackers
quickly. While smaller attacks have limited effect, the magnitude of larger attack
overwhelms the bottleneck link, forcing throughput close to zero, until all senders
are blocked.
3.7.2.3 Handling compromised routers
We performed a third experiment to determine how well the accusation protocol
allows DNA to recover from a compromised router in the middle of the network.
When compromised, the router begins sending unsigned, unaccountable packets to
the destination. It places correct tokens in its packets, and no downstream routers
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(f) Attacking at 20 Mbyte/s
Figure 3.9: This figure shows the effect that a compromised router that allows
unaccountable packets into the network has on the time required for senders to
transfer a 20 Kbyte file. The y-axis is the ratio of time required to complete a
transfer compared to the time of the first transfer. The attack starts at 10 seconds,
indicated by the vertical line. Each LRep installs a local filter that blocks the source
once it receives a block request. The bottleneck link capacity is 1 Mbit/s.
This experiment uses a setting similar to the previous one: 10 senders send
10 copies of a 20 Kbyte file to the destination and we measure the effect of the
compromised router in terms of how it affects file transfer completion time.
The topology in this experiment is changed slightly from the previous one.
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The senders are attached as before (in this case, all senders are honest). However,
the compromised router is connected through a series of three additional routers.
Each of these represents a network that participates in the accusation protocol. As
the compromised router can drop arbitrary packets, we did not place any honest
senders behind that router. The bottleneck bandwidth in this experiment is set to
1 Mbit/s.
Because packets from the compromised router do not contain a valid LRep
signature, a block request will likely be ineffective. The destination instead immedi-
ately starts the accusation protocol. In an actual deployment of DNA, the execution
of the accusation protocol can vary depending on local policy. If the compromised
router is still active, honest networks can use NetFlow [25] or similar tools to detect
it. However, this may take some time. To emulate this, the simulation waits two
seconds before forwarding the accusation message to an upstream network. We be-
lieve this to be a middle ground between an actively-policed network that ensures
its routers are correct and a network that applies a more lax policy that may take
longer to detect malicious behavior.
Figure 3.9 shows the results of this simulation. The x-axis shows time, and the
y-axis shows the duration of transfers that started at that time. The router becomes
compromised at 10 seconds and begins flooding, resulting in a spike in transfer time.
However, as the accusation protocol executes, transfer time quickly returns to its
prior levels, regardless of the rate at which the attacker sends.
Comparison to TVA
We now examine TVA in the same scenario, in order to compare how TVA and
DNA perform under this type of attack. We used the TVA implementation made
available by the authors [1].
As before, this experiment consisted of honest senders transmitting a 20 Kbyte
file and a compromised router acting as an attacker. Each sender transfers files
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(d) Sending with 20 capabilities. 36 of 100 transfers are aborted.
Figure 3.10: This figure shows the effect that a compromised router that steals and
uses TVA capabilities has on the time required for senders to transfer a 20 Kbyte
file. The y-axis is the ratio of time required to complete a transfer compared to the
time of the first transfer. The attack starts at 10 seconds, indicated by the vertical
line. The bottleneck link capacity is 1 Mbit/s.
A separate set of senders lies behind the compromised router. These senders
obtain valid capabilities, which the router observes. The router then uses the ca-
pabilities to flood the destination with forged traffic. (Because of limitations in
ns-2, the senders were actually co-located on the same node, which acted as the
compromised router.)
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Each capability allows the router to send at 100 Kbytes per second. We varied
the number of capabilities the router obtains between 10 and 20. After 10 seconds,
the router begins its attack.
Figure 3.10 shows the results of the experiment. Unlike in the previous ex-
periment, the compromised router has a significant effect on file transfer completion
time. Once the router obtains 13 capabilities, allowing it to send at 1.3 Mbyte/s,
it is able to congest the network to the point that file transfers time out before
completion.
We can compare how well DNA and TVA withstand a compromised router
along two separate axes: (1) performance immediately after the attack vs. steady-
state performance, and (2) how performance changes with the intensity of the attack.
For lower-intensity attacks, i.e. attacks that just manage to saturate the bot-
tleneck link, TVA outperforms DNA immediately after the attack: transfer times in
Figure 3.10(a) are less than 35% above pre-attack levels, whereas transfers in DNA
(Figure 3.9(a)) take several times longer. However, once the compromised router is
discovered, transfer times in DNA return to pre-attack levels. In TVA, they remain
higher than before the attack.
As the power of the attack increases, the performance of TVA quickly deterio-
rates. Once the router is able to obtain 15 capabilities (Figure 3.10(c)), it is able to
congest the bottleneck link to a point where some transfers are aborted and those
that do finish take significantly longer. In comparison, Figure 3.9(b) shows how
DNA performs under an attack of equivalent bandwidth: transfer times are affected
nearly the same as in attacks at lesser bandwidths and no transfers are aborted.
Figures 3.10(d) and 3.9(c) show a similar comparison between the systems when
the attacker can flood at 20 Mbyte/s; 36% of file transfers are aborted with TVA,
compared to none for DNA.
These results show that DNA is able to recover from a router compromise,
while TVA is not. They also suggest that DNA performs similarly regardless of the
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power of the attacker, while increasingly powerful attacks have a drastic effect on
TVA’s performance.
3.8 Conclusion
DNA is a network-layer accountability architecture that explicitly decouples connec-
tivity from responsibility. DNA’s security is grounded in trusted identity certification
authorities (TAPs). DNA allows destinations to specify per-source principal blocks,
which apply regardless of the principal’s network attachment point. DNA does not
mandate local policy, e.g., each AS is free to choose how it classifies misbehavior,
and can withstand the corruption of all non-TAP components.
Extrapolated numbers from our implementation of DNA show that computa-
tionally, it is feasible to implement DNA with current hardware. We have strived to
make the trade-offs in DNA explicit and we expect the point in design space that




In this chapter, I present the NeighborhoodWatch DHT, which DNA uses as its
scalable block storage service.
4.1 Introduction
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a decentralized, distributed system that exports
a put/get interface. Both of these functions are built on a lookup operation that
scales logarithmicly with the size of the system. A DHT thus is a natural choice
for DNA’s SBS. However, the sensitive nature of the SBS’s contents (namely, block
requests) invite malicious users to attack the SBS.
Traditional DHTs can withstand fail-stop failures, but malicious nodes may
provide incorrect routing information, refuse to return published items, or simply
ignore certain queries. Efforts to protect DHTs from these attacks hurt their scala-
bility. Specifically, the DHT of Castro et al. [24] relies on redundant routing, which
floods messages along multiple paths, while S-Chord [33] requires occasional flooding
of O(log2N) messages.
This chapter presents NeighborhoodWatch, a DHT that is resilient to malicious
nodes and does not require flooding. NeighborhoodWatch maintains the O(logN)
bounds on routing table size and expected lookup time. NeighborhoodWatch de-
pends on an on-line trusted authority that periodically contacts and issues signed
This chapter is based on the paper [17], which is joint work with Rob Sherwood, Derek Monner,
Nate Goergen, Neil Spring, and Bobby Bhattacharjee.
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certificates to each node. Nodes need a certificate to participate; honest nodes in
NeighborhoodWatch can detect malicious behavior and expel the responsible nodes
from the DHT. The DNA TAP fills the role of the on-line trusted authority, admin-
istering a large set of untrusted nodes that provide secure content delivery. This
design greatly increases the availability and capacity of the service without requiring
that every node be trusted.
NeighborhoodWatch makes one additional assumption: in the flat identifier-
space of the DHT, there is no sequence of k+1 consecutive nodes that are malicious,
where k is a system parameter chosen by the blacklist administrator. That is, at
least one in k + 1 consecutive nodes is alive and honest. A larger value of k means
that this assumption is more likely to hold, but also that load on the trusted nodes
increases (Section 4.4.1). NeighborhoodWatch maintains the logarithmic complexity
of original DHTs and is secure as long as the assumptions are maintained. Even
if the second assumption is violated, NeighborhoodWatch can provide many of its
security properties.
Using a relatively small trusted resource to secure a scalable infrastructure
is an important theme in distributed systems that makes several designs practical.
For instance, in cryptography, a public key infrastructure (PKI) can be established
by a single trusted keypair. Maheshwari et al. [59] present a system, TDB, which
uses a small amounted of trusted storage to build a trusted database on untrusted
hosts. NeighborhoodWatch employs a similar concept, in which few trusted hosts
enforce the correctness of a DHT consisting of many untrusted hosts. The ratio of
trusted hosts to untrusted hosts is only limited by the bandwidth and processing
power of the trusted hosts. The end result is a potential increase, by several orders
of magnitude, in the number of hosts responsible for content (in this case, blacklist)
distribution.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the se-
curity model for NeighborhoodWatch. The design of NeighborhoodWatch is given
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in Section 4.3. An analysis of NeighborhoodWatch appears in Section 4.4, and an
evaluation in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents related work, and Section 4.7 con-
cludes.
4.2 Security Model and Assumptions
Previous designs of secure DHTs [24, 33] are able to guarantee security when a 1
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fraction of nodes are corrupt. NeighborhoodWatch adopt a similar model, in that
it allows for some fraction f of the nodes to be malicious, but does not place hard
bounds on f . Instead, NeighborhoodWatch assumes that for every sequence of k+1
consecutive nodes in the flat ID space of the DHT, at least one is alive and honest,
where k is a system parameter. This is the fundamental assumption. The insight
is that if nodes cannot choose where they are placed in the DHT (an assumption
justified momentarily), malicious nodes would have to corrupt a large fraction of the
N nodes in the DHT in order to obtain a long consecutive sequence of corrupted
nodes. By storing sequences of nodes in routing tables, honest nodes are guaranteed
to know of at least one other honest node that is “near” a given point in the DHT.
For a given value of f , a corresponding k can be chosen so that the fundamental
assumption holds with high probability. Section 4.4.1 analyzes how likely it is that
the fundamental assumption holds for given values of f , k, and N .
As the fraction of malicious nodes in the DHT increases, the likelihood that
the fundamental assumption holds decreases. If, however, malicious nodes could be
discovered and removed from the DHT, then the number of malicious nodes would
be kept at a manageable level. In order to remove nodes from the DHT, Neigh-
borhoodWatch assumes the existence of an on-line trusted authority, potentially
distributed, that periodically issues signed certificates to nodes. These certificates
are called neighborhood certificates, or nCerts, for reasons which are explained in
Section 4.3. nCerts have a relatively short expiration time compared to the average
lifetime of a node. Nodes need a current, valid nCert in order to participate in the
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system. In order to remove a malicious node, the authority simply refuses to sign a
fresh nCert for that node.
Maintaining security is then a matter of detecting malicious nodes. Neighbor-
hoodWatch introduces several mechanisms by which misbehavior can be detected
and proven. When a node is known (or strongly suspected) to be malicious, it is
expelled from the system. This ensures the correctness and efficiency of operations
on the DHT, by either enforcing that malicious nodes behave according to protocol,
or by increasing the likelihood that the fundamental assumption holds.
NeighborhoodWatch assumes that the adversary cannot place a corrupt node
anywhere it wishes in the DHT. This condition is enforced by requiring that nodes
obtain a signed public key before they are admitted into the DHT. This certificate
is distinct from a neighborhood certificate. Nodes use these certificates to sign re-
sponses to certain DHT messages. In addition, a node’s ID is taken to be the hash
of its public key. This prevents nodes from choosing their location in the DHT.
By making certificates expensive to acquire, as do Castro et al. [24], Neighborhood-
Watch combats the Sybil attack [31].
Public key certificates serve another purpose as well: when a node’s key cer-
tificate expires, it must obtain a fresh one. As a consequence, its ID will change,
and the node will be relocated to a new portion of the DHT. Although this is a
potentially expensive operation, it also limits the lifetime of a sequence of k + 1
corrupt nodes, as eventually they will be redistributed.
Additionally, NeighborhoodWatch requires all nodes to have loose clock syn-
chronization. If a node’s clock differs from the system clock, it may impair its
own ability to participate effectively in DHT operations, but it will not harm the
operation of other nodes.
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4.3 The NeighborhoodWatch DHT
This section presents the design of the NeighborhoodWatch DHT. The DHT sup-
ports three operations, all of which are reliable when the fundamental assumption
holds:
1. lookup(id), which takes an ID and returns a reference (nCert) to the node
responsible for storing items with the given ID
2. publish(id, item), which stores data item item in the DHT under ID id at the
node responsible for id as well as its k successors
3. retrieve(id), which returns either a data item published under the given ID
or a statement, signed by the node responsible for the ID, that no item was
published with that key.
NeighborhoodWatch is based on Chord [75], which routes queries through a
network of N nodes with only O(logN) messages while requiring each node to store
only O(logN) links to other nodes. These links are called a node’s finger table. The
ID space of Chord is the integers between 0 and 2m−1 from some integer m. Chord
orders IDs onto a ring modulo 2m. A node with ID x stores fingers to nodes with
ID x + 2i mod 2m for integers 0 ≤ i < m. The successor of n is the node whose
ID is immediately greater than n’s ID modulo 2m. Likewise, the predecessor of n is
the node whose ID is immediately less than n’s.
While NeighborhoodWatch will still operate correctly in most cases when the
fundamental assumption is violated, security is not guaranteed. Malicious nodes
can undetectably hide published items, prevent new nodes from joining, and cause
routing failures. This motivates the reliance on a trusted authority: when malicious
nodes misbehave, their behavior can be proven; upon witnessing proof of misbe-
havior, the trusted authority can remove malicious nodes from the DHT. Neighbor-
hoodWatch is designed so that any attempt by a node to lie about whether or not an
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item was published will implicate that node as faulty, and it will be expunged from
the system. Therefore, a corrupt node’s only course of action is to be maliciously
non-responsive.
4.3.1 Overview
Unlike S-Chord, which partitions nodes into disjoint neighborhoods, Neighborhood-
Watch assigns a neighborhood to each node. This neighborhood consists of the node
itself, its k successors, and k predecessors. A single node will therefore appear in
2k + 1 neighborhoods. NeighborhoodWatch requires 2k + 1 nodes to bootstrap.
NeighborhoodWatch employs an on-line trusted authority (the TAP) to sign
certificates attesting to the constituents of neighborhoods. The TAP has a globally-
known public key, TAPpk, and corresponding private key TAPsk. The TAP may be
replicated, and the state shared between TAP replicas is limited to a private key, a
list of malicious nodes, and a list of complaints of non-responsive nodes.
The TAP creates, signs (using a secure digital signature algorithm) and dis-
tributes neighborhood certificates, or nCerts, to each node. Nodes renew their
nCerts on a regular basis by contacting the TAP. Similarly, joining nodes receive
an initial nCert from the TAP. nCerts list the current membership of a neighbor-
hood, accounting for any recent changes in membership that may have occurred.
Using signed nCerts, NeighborhoodWatch is able to verify the set of nodes that are
responsible for storing an item with ID x.
Nodes maintain and update their finger tables as in Chord. For each of n’s
successors, predecessors, and finger table entries, node n stores a full nCert (instead
of only the node ID and IP address as in Chord). When queried as part of a lookup
operation, nodes return nCerts rather than information about a single node.
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4.3.2 Neighborhood Certificates
A node n has ID n.id, IP address n.ip, port n.port, public key n.pk (along with
a signed certificate from the CA), and private key n.sk. Let the info of node n
be defined as n̂ = {n.id, n.ip, n.port, n.pk}. The predecessor of n is p(n), the i’th
predecessor of p(n) is pi(n), and likewise n’s immediate successors are s(n), s2(n),
etc. The range of n is the integer interval (p(n).id, n.id]. Node n is said to be the
owner(x) for any ID x in the range of n.
Malicious nodes may try to subvert lookups by lying about their range. By
including p(n) in nCertn, NeighborhoodWatch allows any node to determine the
range of n given (a fresh copy of) nCertn. As new nCerts are issued periodically, it
is possible for a node to hold several nCerts at once. When queried, a malicious node
might present an old nCert in an attempt to hide a newly-joined node. Therefore
NeighborhoodWatch includes the entire neighborhood of n in nCertn to serve as
witnesses to the freshness of nCertn. Anyone can determine the accuracy of nCertn
by querying each member of the neighborhood and comparing the returned nCerts.
If at least one honest neighbor exists, its nCert will reveal any hidden nodes and
implicate malicious ones.
Epochs
nCerts cannot be explicitly revoked—once a certificate is distributed, it cannot be
“called back”, since using certificate revocation lists requires a publish and lookup
infrastructure very similar to the one we are trying to build. Therefore, to prevent
malicious nodes from persisting in the DHT, nCerts must expire periodically. To
facilitate this, NeighborhoodWatch divides time into sequentially-numbered epochs.
Certificate expiration is implemented by including a timestamp, indicating the last
epoch in which a key is valid, in the certificate.
Time is split into two kinds of epochs, join and renew, which alternate. New
nodes may join only in a join epoch; existing nodes may renew their nCerts only in
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a renew epoch. Nodes must renew their certificates once during each renew epoch to
remain in the DHT for subsequent epochs. The length of each is a system parameter,
though typical values would be on the order of tens of minutes. The epoch length is
a trade-off between the frequency of overhead incurred by the recertification process
and the length of time that a proven malicious node can remain in the DHT, since a
node can only be expelled by the TAP refusing its renew request. Epochs and epoch
lengths in NeighborhoodWatch need not correspond with those of DNA.
The current epoch is denoted by an integer which monotonically increases over
time. nCerts issued in a join epoch ej are valid through epoch ej + 1, i.e., the next
renew epoch. nCerts issued in renew epoch er are valid through epoch er + 2, i.e.,
the next renew epoch. A node who fails to renew its nCert before it expires has
effectively left the system, as other nodes simply ignore expired nCerts.
The reason for separating the periods in which a node can join from the periods
where nodes renew their nCerts is to prevent the following scenario: an honest node
n requests that a TAP replica renew nCertn. While this is in progress, a new
node j joins, perhaps through a different TAP replica, and an nCertn containing
j is issued to n. Afterward, the initial renew operation completes, and n receives
a new nCert without j. This would produce inconsistencies among the nodes in
n’s neighborhood, and could potentially lead to n being implicated as malicious.
By separating join and renew epochs, only nodes who are affected by a joining
node receive new certificates in a join epoch, and neighborhoods are stable (barring
removal of unresponsive nodes) throughout a renew epoch.
nCert Format
Let SignK (msg) = (msg, σK(msg)) denote the application of a secure digital signa-
ture algorithm to msg, where σK(msg) is the secure digital signature of msg with
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key K. The format of nCertn is:
n̂ = {n.id, n.ip, n.port, n.pk}
nodes = p̂k(n), ..., p̂(n), n̂, ŝ(n), ..., ŝk(n)
nCertn = SignTAP.sk (nodes, e)
where e is the last epoch in which nCertn is valid.
4.3.3 Routing
NeighborhoodWatch uses iterative routing, meaning that a querier q searching for
owner(id) will contact each hop on the path to owner(id), rather than passing the
query off for another node to route. This allows q to recover from routing failures.
By using iterative routing, q can ensure that each step of the routing protocol makes
progress towards owner(id).
To execute lookup(id), a querier q that is a DHT node examines its finger
table to find the nCert of the closest known predecessor of id; call this node p. If
q is not a DHT node, it requests the nCert of any DHT node it knows about; in
this case, that node is called p. In either case, q requests that p provide the nCert
of its closest known predecessor of id. Let the nCert that p returns be nCertnext.
q examines nCertnext and determines if it is valid. Several criteria must be met for
nCertnext to be valid: clearly, it must be signed by the TAP and it must not have
expired. Also, next.id must be at least halfway between p and id, which will be the
case if p’s finger table is correct. If next does not allow q to progress at least half of
the distance to id, which may be the case if next’s finger table has not stabilized,
then q has the option of either querying a different node in any nCert it has or
continuing with a sub-optimal hop. If nCertnext is valid, q replaces p with next and
repeats the process, stopping when it receives a valid nCertowner(x).
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Figure 4.1: The join process in the NeighborhoodWatch DHT. Here k = 3.
of the other nodes listed in nCertp. If any of these nodes is correct, q is able to make
progress towards id while querying at most 2k + 1 nodes. Each successful query
halves the remaining distance between p and id, resulting in at most (2k + 1) logN
messages per query.
A malicious node m that was previously owner(id), but has since relinquished
that range to a newly joined node j, may present an old but valid nCertm which
shows m as owner(id) instead of j. Note that this can only occur during the epoch
that j joins or the following recertify epoch; after that time, the nCertm showing m
as owner(id) will be expired. In this case, m cannot suppress the keys for which j
is now responsible, as will be shown in Section 4.3.7.
4.3.4 Join and Renew
To renew its nCert, a node n presents nCertn to an TAP replica. The TAP obtains
the nCert of each node in nCertn to check the validity of nCertn (i.e., to make
sure n is not presenting an old-but-unexpired nCert that does not contain a newly-
joined node). If nCertn matches the view of n’s neighborhood that the other nCerts
describe, the TAP issues a fresh nCert to n, containing the same neighborhood of
nodes, but with an expiration time of the next renew epoch.
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The process of joining the DHT is similar to that of renewing, but more nodes
need to be queried since more nCerts need to be issued. When a node n wishes
to join a NeighborhoodWatch instance, it finds nCertowner(n.id) and presents it to a
TAP replica. First the TAP ensures that n has a valid private key certificate from
the CA. Then the TAP uses the nCert to retrieve the nCerts of the k successors and
k predecessors of owner(n.id). The TAP then requests other nCerts as necessary
to obtain a full view of the neighborhoods of each node in nCertowner(n.id), so as
to verify the neighborhoods of each node that will receive a new nCert when n
joins. The TAP then creates new nCerts for n and each of the 2k + 1 nodes in
nCertowner(n.id) (owner(n.id) becomes s(n)), setting the expiration epoch for each
to the next (renew) epoch e, and sends each new nCert to the associated node. The
join process is shown in Figure 4.1.
Once n has joined the DHT, it fills in its finger tables by querying its neighbors
for the appropriate nCerts. It also stores the nCerts of all nodes in its neighborhood.
When a node n receives a new nCert, the TAP verifies n’s neighborhood.
The TAP contacts each node in nCertn. If a contacted node provides a conflicting
certificate, it is malicious; if it provides nothing, it is unresponsive. Such nodes are
not included in the new nCertn and are replaced by the appropriate neighbor. To
prevent inconsistencies in issued certificates, the TAP replicas must coordinate to
maintain a shared list of malicious and unresponsive nodes and refuse to insert these
nodes into any granted nCert.
4.3.5 Publishing
NeighborhoodWatch provides a publish(id, item) operation, which stores item in
the DHT under id. Let n = owner(id). When a node p wishes to publish item
to the DHT with key id, it first finds nCertn. Recall that the nodes in nCertn
include n, s(n), s2(n), ..., sk(n). Let these nodes be the publish nodes of nCertn. p
will contact each of the publish nodes and request that the node store item. This
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models the replication procedure in Chord, where the k nodes succeeding id store
copies of item.
Let d be a publish node that p contacts. If d decides to store the item, it
returns a signed receipt that it has stored the item. The format of a receipt is:
Rid,d = Signd.sk (id,Hash(item), d.id, e)
where e is the current epoch. This receipt is used to implicate d if it maliciously
refuses to return the item when requested to do so.
If d does not respond, then p considers d to be unresponsive and informs the
TAP. The consequences of this action are detailed further in Section 4.3.8.
Stored items are self-certifying [28], meaning that given the pair (id, item),
there exists a way to verify that the object published under ID id is in fact item.
One technique for self-certifying items is to set id = hash(item), for some collision-
resistant hash function. Another way to make items self-certifying is for the pub-
lisher to sign them, assuming anyone retrieving the item can locate the publisher’s
public key. By using self-certifying items, malicious nodes are prevented from re-
turning “fake” items in response to a retrieve request.
4.3.6 Receipt Storage and Retrieval
When a node p publishes a data item to the DHT, it receives (up to) k+ 1 receipts
from the nodes that store the item. In order to use receipts to expose nodes that
refuse to return published items, the receipts must be made available to anyone
that might observe a dishonest response to a retrieve request. One option is for p to
store the receipts for items it publishes and give copies to whomever requests such
a receipt. However, this introduces two problems: first, if p goes offline or crashes,
the receipts of all items p published become unavailable. Second, when looking for
an item published in an ID, a node must know who published that item in order to
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find the receipt. This is not feasible in the general case where the querier may not
know (or care) who published the item it seeks.
NeighborhoodWatch incorporates a mechanism by which receipts are stored
in the DHT itself. Of course, receipts must be stored at IDs independent of the
item being stored, so that with high probability a corrupted neighborhood does not
store all the receipts for items published to that neighborhood. NeighborhoodWatch
must also avoid the problem of storage explosion: the publish of a single item could
result in the storage of k + 1 receipts; if receipts of those publish operations result
in receipts stored in the DHT, another (k + 1)2 items would need to be stored, and
so on. NeighborhoodWatch imposes a limit on the receipt factor, RF , that dictates
how many levels of receipts are published to the DHT. In this chapter, RF = 1,
that is, receipts are stored in the DHT, but receipts-of-receipts are not stored.
When a publisher p receives a receipt Rid,d from d for an item published under
ID id, p publishes the receipt under the ID R.id = Hash(id||d.id) using the normal
publish protocol. Rid,d is then stored on the k+ 1 nodes following R.id in the DHT.
p receives receipts from these nodes to verify that the publish is successful, but does
not publish these receipts. A node requesting an item with ID item.id from d can
check if d has created a receipt R because that node knows both item.id and d.id,
and can thus determine R.id.
Assume d is malicious and returns negative responses to retrieve requests for
item i. For d to remain undiscovered, not only must the k + 1 nodes responsible
for storing i be corrupt, but all k + 1 copies of receipts for i must be unavailable.
For this last condition to be true, corrupt neighborhoods of k + 1 nodes must exist





is extremely small even for large values of p and small values of k.
108
4.3.7 Retrieving
Like the publish(id, item) operation, a node r executing retrieve(id) also begins
by using the lookup() operation to find nCertowner(id). r chooses a publish node d
from nCertowner(id) and requests item from d by sending id. If d responds with item
(which r can verify because items are self-certifying), retrieve(id) returns item and
terminates. If d responds saying that no such item exists, it may be the case that
item was never published, or it may be that d is trying to subvert r’s request. To
prevent subversion, all negative responses are signed by the responding node. r
stores d’s response and requests item from another publish node, until either item
is found or all publish nodes have returned a negative response.
If a node d that r contacts responded with a signed statement that it does
not have item, yet one of d’s neighbors did possess item, then r searches for Rid,d.
If it is able to find such a receipt, it presents the receipt and the signed negative
response to the TAP, who expels d from the DHT. Even if all nodes issue a negative
response, if r suspects that item was in fact published under id, then it may still
search for receipts. Collusion-resistant receipt storage is discussed in Section 4.3.6,
and the process of expelling nodes is discussed in Section 4.3.8.
A malicious node thus risks exposing itself if it issues a receipt when it intends
to not return items, returns a negative response when an item was published to it,
or returns an item that was not published. A malicious node can avoid exposure
only by not responding to any requests.
4.3.8 Removing malicious and unresponsive nodes
Previously in this section, we have shown that any attempt by a malicious node to
“lie” to an honest node, whether it be by refusing to return an item it stores or
returning an unpublished item, will cause the node to be expelled from the DHT
(as a result of the TAP not issuing a fresh nCert to the node). Thus it is in the best
interest of malicious nodes to be maliciously unresponsive, that is, to communicate
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with the TAP to ensure that it receives fresh nCerts, yet not respond to any messages
from peers. Here, we show how the system can evict such unresponsive nodes. This
property comes at the cost of storing state at the TAP. Specifically, the TAP records
the list of nodes that have “complained” about a given DHT node, as well as a list
of expelled nodes to prevent them from joining.
Whenever a node d fails to respond to a message from node n, n sends a
statement to the TAP to that effect. If the number of nodes that complain about
d crosses some threshold, the TAP then determines whether d is being maliciously
unresponsive. The TAP does this by finding random nodes in the DHT and asking
them to submit requests to d. These nodes report to the TAP whether or not d
responded. The TAP must do this so that d does not detect that it is being probed.
Therefore the requests should be distributed over time and come from a randomly
selected set of nodes.
The TAP requests m DHT nodes to make a request to d and observes the
results. Let θalive and θdead, θdead < θalive, be two parameters that the TAP uses in
determining whether d should be expelled:
• If more than θalive×m nodes report d as alive, the TAP takes no further action.
• If fewer than θdead ×m nodes report d as alive, the TAP expels d.
• If number of “alive” responses is between θdead ×m and θalive ×m, the TAP
re-runs the test at a later time.
θalive can be set fairly high, as even if d is not malicious but still fails to respond
to many requests, it should be removed from the DHT for better performance. θalive
should be selected so that the probability of selecting θalive × m malicious nodes,
when an f -fraction of the DHT is malicious, is low. This process is similar in spirit

































Figure 4.2: The number of corrupt neighborhoods as a function of the probability
that a node is bad. Here, N = 300.
4.4 Analysis
This section analyzes two aspects of NeighborhoodWatch: how likely the fundamen-
tal assumption (that each sequence of k+ 1 nodes contains at least one node which
is honest and alive) will hold as a function of the probability that a random node
is malicious, and the cost of storing an item and its receipts in the DHT. These
components, along with the certification process (evaluated in Section 4.5), are the
ways in which NeighborhoodWatch differs most from traditional DHTs.
4.4.1 Validity of fundamental assumption
If the fundamental assumption is violated, then NeighborhoodWatch cannot guar-
antee that a retrieve(id) operation will succeed, even if an item has been published
to the DHT under id. Note that lookup(id) operations will be successful as long as
there is no sequence of 2k + 1 nodes that are all malicious.
For a system with N nodes, there are N sequences of k+ 1 nodes. Let a node
be bad with probability f . Each sequence individually violates the assumption with
probability fk+1. However, the sequences are not independent of each other; the
expected number of bad sequence is not N × fk+1 (though this is a reasonable
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approximation for small f).
To examine the likelihood that the fundamental assumption holds, we simu-
lated an instance of the DHT and counted the number of sequences of length k + 1
that violate the assumption as a function of N (the number of nodes), k (the number
of successors stored in a certificate), and f (the probability that a randomly-chosen
node is malicious). Figure 4.2 shows the results of this simulation. Note that the
greater the value of N , the higher chance that there is a corrupt sequence. However,
even when f = 0.5, the number of expected bad sequences is small (below 1 when
k = 8). This gives an improvement over Castro et al.’s system [24] and S-Chord [33],
which are only secure when f < 0.25.
4.4.2 Cost of storing items in DHT
In order to store a B-byte item in NeighborhoodWatch, k + 1 copies of the item
are stored. Thus, B(k + 1) bytes are required for storing copies of the item. In
addition, k+1 receipts are stored in the DHT. Each receipt consists of two IDs, one
hash, one timestamp (4 bytes), and one signature. Assuming that IDs and hashes
are 20 bytes (the length of a SHA-1 hash) and that signatures are 40 bytes, receipts
consume 104 bytes.
Each publish results in k+1 receipts that are stored in the DHT. Each receipt
is stored by k+ 1 nodes. Thus storing an item in the DHT incurs an additional cost
of 104 ∗ (k + 1)2 bytes to store receipts, for a total cost of (k + 1)(B + 104(k + 1))
bytes required to reliably store a B-byte item.
4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We developed and deployed an implementation of NeighborhoodWatch on approx-
imately 70 PlanetLab [15] nodes. The implementation is coded in 2400 lines of
Ruby. For digital signatures, we used the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm














Figure 4.3: Recertification times vs k. The certificate size is 2k + 1. Vertical bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
per written in SWIG. The ECDSA keys in our implementation are 160 bits long,
resulting in signatures that are 320 bits long.
PlanetLab nodes were selected to create a large diversity of geographic node
locations, latencies, and response times. After deploying NeighborhoodWatch, we
then collected statistics of our secure DHT in operation, to better understand the
response times required by the routine mechanisms involved in building and main-
taining our secure DHT.
In Figure 4.3, we show the average time in seconds for a recertification op-
eration to complete. The average recertification time depends on the length of a
timeout. When the TAP requests node certificates from nodes, it will wait for up
to timeout seconds before requesting the node’s nCert again; if the node does not
respond to a second request, the TAP considers the node dead and replaces it with
another. If timeout is too low, churn is unnecessarily introduced, whereas if timeout
is too high, unresponsive nodes will have a greater effect on the average recertifica-
tion time. When running experiments on PlanetLab, we set timeout to 5 seconds.
113
4.6 Related Work
Distributed hash tables (DHTs) were introduced as a method of organizing peer-to-
peer nodes to provide decentralized storage. The intent of the original DHT proto-
cols (such as Chord [75], CAN [69], and Pastry [70]) was to minimize both lookup
time and the amount of routing state stored at each node. For instance, Chord
requires nodes to store links to O(logN) other nodes and queries take O(logN)
messages for a DHT with N total nodes.
Sit and Morris [73] describe several ways in which adversarial nodes may at-
tempt to subvert a DHT. Malicious nodes might attempt to route requests to other
incorrect nodes, provide incorrect routing updates, prevent new nodes from joining
the system, and refuse to store or return items.
Castro et al. propose a system in which secure routing can be maintained
even when up to 1
4
of the nodes are malicious. Their system counters the Sybil
attack [31], in which a single malicious node joins the DHT in multiple locations,
by requiring each node to have a certificate that binds its ID to the node’s public
key. These certificates are provided by an off-line certificate authority, who limits
the number of certificates issued to a single entity. When a node detects that one
of its queries for owner(x) has resulted in a node that is unlikely to be owner(x), it
floods its request along multiple paths, potentially requiring a number of messages
that is polynomial in the number of nodes.
The concept of grouping consecutive nodes into neighborhoods has been a fea-
ture of several secure DHT designs. Fiat, Saia, and Young propose S-Chord, which
is also resilient to a 1
4
fraction of malicious nodes. S-Chord partitions consecutive
nodes into swarms, which act as the basic functional unit of the DHT. Lookups in
S-Chord take O(log2N) messages (compared to O(logN) in NeighborhoodWatch)
and each node stores O(log2N) links (compared to O(logN)). Myrmic [77] is a
secure DHT that makes similar system assumptions as NeighborhoodWatch, and
produce a similar solution. However, Myrmic does not consider securing the pub-
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lish operation and has no mechanism for removing malicious nodes from the DHT
when they are discovered. Morselli [62] proposes a method of ensuring that each
neighborhood has a 2
3
-majority of honest nodes and then uses Byzantine agreement
in each neighborhood to ensure correct behavior of each neighborhood. Bhattachar-
jee et al. [20] present a lookup primitive which can be verified through the use of
threshold cryptography.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented the NeighborhoodWatch DHT, which is secure against
a large fraction of malicious nodes. The system depends on a centralized (though
replicated) trusted authority which contacts each node on a regular basis, as well
as the assumption that sequences of consecutive corrupt nodes are not arbitrarily
long. NeighborhoodWatch consists of a small set of trusted hosts that manage a
large set of untrusted hosts, thereby allowing security guarantees to scale by orders
of magnitude. By using an innovative receipt-storing scheme and digital signatures,
NeighborhoodWatch is able to detect and prove malicious behavior; a corrupt node’s
only course of action is to be maliciously non-responsive. The centralized authority




VanGuard: Adding Accountability to Capabilities
This chapter presents VanGuard, a system that combines DNA with capability archi-
tectures. VanGuard provides the best of both worlds: senders are held accountable
and receivers can block senders, as in DNA, yet most packets do not require the use
of asymmetric-key cryptography, reducing the overhead of verifying a capability-
carrying packet to that of existing capability architectures.
5.1 Capabilities
Capabilities are a well-studied approach to mitigating the threat of DoS attacks [81,
82, 64, 5, 79]. Capability architectures allow receivers to inform routers that a
certain flow is desired, with the expectation that routers will prioritize desired flows
over potentially undesired flows. Capabilities themselves are light-weight, taking up
little space in a packet and are efficiently verifiable by routers.
Capability systems introduce two new categories of traffic: capability-endowed
privileged packets, and unprivileged request packets. Packet with valid capabilities
take priority at routers, so that traffic desired by the destination takes priority
over attack traffic. In order to obtain capabilities, a sender must first send an
unprivileged capability request to the destination. Routers insert capabilities (or,
in some cases, pre-capabilities) into request packets. Routers compute capability
values from information in the packet and local to the router, such as the source
and destination addresses, incoming and outgoing interfaces, the current time, or
a secret known only to the router. If it so desires, the destination returns the
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capabilities to the sender. In some cases, such as in TVA [82], the destination must
first transform the pre-capability into a capability by computing the hash of the
pre-capability, a number N of bytes that the capability allows the sender to send,
and a lifetime T of the capability.
The source sends a privileged packet by including the returned capabilities in
the packet. Each (capability-aware) router along the path computes the capability
that it would have inserted into the packet and compares this to the (appropriate)
capability present in the packet. If the values match, the router forwards the packet;
otherwise, it demotes the packet to un-privileged before forwarding, so that it will
be preferentially dropped if it is queued a congested router.
Capabilities work well to protect privileged channels, but additional mecha-
nisms must be used to help legitimate senders obtain capabilities. Argyraki and
Cheriton argue that the mechanism used to protect the request channel can also
be used to protect the privileged channel [9]. This is not entirely accurate, as the
authors of Portcullis point out when they “strongly disagree” with the claim [64].
Their insight is that only a single capability request needs to succeed in order to
bootstrap an arbitrarily large flow. However, the point remains: the request chan-
nel is vulnerable and needs to be protected. Previous capability architectures limit
the capability request channel to 5% of the bandwidth on any link and resort to
per-source [81] or per-path [82] fair-queuing, which requires a spoofing prevention
mechanism in the first case and a packet marking system (such as Pi [78]) combined
with hierarchical fair-queuing in the second. Portcullis [64] protects the capability
request channel by requiring senders to solve a computational puzzle in order to
send a request, but requires routers to prioritize requests by puzzle difficulty and an
infrastructure for distributing puzzle seeds. None of these approaches allow desti-
nations to block a sender from making capability requests; doing so would prevent
a malicious sender from affecting legitimate traffic flooding a link with unwanted
requests
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Existing capability systems face another limitation. Because they do not use
asymmetric cryptography, they are efficient compared to. However, this also limits
the application of capabilities. Capabilities are not bound to packets or to senders,
meaning they can be observed by on-path devices. Such a device can then use the
capability to impersonate the sender who was actually granted the capability.
This chapter presents VanGuard, which extends capability architectures to
incorporate accountability. The goal of VanGuard is to provide the strong account-
ability of DNA, including the ability of destinations to block senders, with the effi-
ciency of capabilities. Unlike previous work, which aims to limit the rate at which a
sender can request capabilities, VanGuard uses DNA to allow destinations to block
specific senders from issuing requests entirely. Destinations protect the capability
request channel by blocking malicious senders from sending requests, which we show
is more effective than fair-queuing on a bandwidth-limited channel. Another way
in which VanGuard differs from previous work is that VanGuard treats capabilities
as secret values. Senders do not include capabilities in privileged packets. Instead,
capabilities serve as the secret input to a keyed MAC of the packet contents. The
appropriate routers can derive the capability on demand to verify that the sender
has received a valid capability. This prevents on-path observers from stealing capa-
bilities.
5.2 VanGuard Overview
VanGuard is an accountable capability architecture. It is based on TVA [82], though
its mechanisms can be applied to other capability architectures as well. This sec-
tion gives an overview of how VanGuard operates and how it differs from TVA.
VanGuard assumes a full deployment of DNA and TVA and shows how the two
would inter-operate to provide sender accountability such that, once the sender ob-
tains capabilities, the per-packet overhead is equal to that of TVA.
Like TVA, VanGuard introduces two new classes of traffic: unprivileged capa-
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bility requests and regular, privileged packets. Routers give preference to privileged
packets and will always drop unprivileged traffic before privileged traffic. In order
to send privileged packets, a source needs capabilities, which it obtains by sending
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(d) The destination creates, encrypts and return the capabilities in a re-
quest packet
Figure 5.1: The VanGuard capability request process
To send a capability request in VanGuard, a sender must create a fully ac-
countable packet by obtaining a token from a local LRep and signing the packet with
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its private key, in accordance with the DNA send protocol.
Along the way, each VanGuard router Ri stamps a pre-capability, pre-capi,
into the request packet. A pre-capability is a hash of the packet’s source address,
destination address, the local time, and a secret known only to the router.
Once a capability request arrives at the destination, it applies local policy to
determine how to respond. If the destination wants to allow the source to send priv-
ileged traffic, it transforms each pre-capability into a capability by hashing pre-capi
with the number of bytes (N) and time (T ) for which the capability is to be valid.
It then returns the list of capabilities, along with N and T , to the source. Because
the destination does not have capabilities to send to the source, it must return the
capabilities in an accountable request packet of its own.
On the other hand, if the destination is overwhelmed, it has two options. It
can ignore the request (or return a TCP RST without capabilities via an accountable
request packet) to the source, so that it can retry its request later. If the source
is persistently sending capability requests, the destination may block the source.
As the capability request is an accountable DNA packet, the destination creates a
DNA block request and sends it to the source’s LRep. Allowing destinations to block
sources from sending unwanted capability requests is more effective at preventing
“denial of capability” attacks [9] than rate-limiting, as it can prevent malicious
requests from ever interfering with legitimate requests.
Unlike TVA, VanGuard keeps receiver-generated capabilities secret. This is
to prevent on-path routers from observing capabilities, which would allow them to
send privileged traffic themselves. Before sending capabilities back to the sender,
the receiver encrypts them using a key provided by the sender.
Once a sender obtains capabilities, it can send privileged packets. To send
a privileged packet, the source creates a packet-capability for each capability it
received. A packet-capability is a hash of the capability and the invariant fields of
the packet, including the payload. packet-capabilities are tied to individual packets,
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not just source-destination pairs as in TVA. Given a packet and a valid packet-
capability, it is infeasible to determine the capability used to create the packet-
capability. Privileged packets are unsigned: VanGuard relies on the underlying
capability architecture to protect the network.
When a router receives a privileged packet, it verifies the corresponding packet-
capability. Verifying a packet-capability requires computing three hashes. The
router computes the pre-capability using the information from the packet and its
secret. It then computes the (secret) capability in the same way as the destination:
by hashing the pre-capability with N and T (which are included in the capability
header in the packet). The router finally computes the packet-capability by hashing
the capability with the invariant fields of the packet. If this matches the value in the
packet, the router forwards the packet, otherwise it demotes or drops the packet.
Despite not having to sign privileged packets, the sender is still accountable
for such packets. If it abuses the network, the destination can block the sender.
Capabilities are tied to a source-destination IP address pair and cannot be stolen by
third parties to send privileged packets. Thus capabilities unambiguously identify
the sender. By caching the sender’s LRep from its capability request, the receiver
can send a block request to the LRep at any time.
To protect requests from overwhelming privileged traffic, TVA limits requests
to 5% of the capacity each link. In VanGuard, this is not necessary, as receivers can
block senders that flood the network with capability requests.
The combination of DNA and capabilities provides an accountability architec-
ture with the same benefits of DNA (primarily, a destination can block a sender re-
gardless of network point of attachment) and the small overhead of capability-based
architectures (only request packets require signatures and multiple keys). VanGuard
flows are bootstrapped using accountable packets, then continued using more effi-
cient capabilities.
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5.3 Challenges of making capabilities accountable
VanGuard augments capability architectures with DNA, allowing destinations to
block traffic from unwanted senders. This effectively protects the capability request
channel, solving one of the main problems with capability architectures. However,
in order to ensure that the privileged channel is accountable as well, VanGuard
must solve two additional problems. First, capabilities are efficient partly because
they do not require asymmetric cryptography, but the strong accountability of DNA
does. How can capabilities provide accountability without signatures? Second,
malicious routers (or hosts near the sender or receiver) can observe capabilities in
packets. Because capabilities are not strongly bound to senders, nothing prevents
these malicious devices from sending packets with stolen capabilities.
5.3.1 Holding senders accountable with capabilities
DNA is able to hold senders accountable because every packet contains information
sufficient to unambiguously identify the sender and to block the sender’s packets
at the source. VanGuard capabilities must provide this same information. This re-
quires changes to the structure of capabilities and how they are transmitted. First,
to prevent anyone from impersonating the sender, VanGuard makes it impossible to
steal a sender’s capabilities, as described in Section 5.3.2. Second, when a receiver
returns capabilities in response to an accountable request packet, it caches the infor-
mation needed to block a sender for the duration of the flow. If the receiver wishes
to block a sender that is using capabilities to send privileged traffic, it examines its
cache to find the sender’s blinding key and the LRep that authorized the sender. It
then creates a block request for that LRep. The block takes effect as soon as the
LRep receives the request and installs a temporary filter at the sender’s first-hop
router. The LRep simultaneously publishes the block in the SBS, so that the sender
will not be able to obtain further tokens to request capabilities from the destination.
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Alternatively, capabilities could be bound to the blinding key and LRep as well,
but this would require additional space in the packet in order to provide sufficient
information for routers to verify the capability.
5.3.2 Preventing capability theft
In existing capability proposals, capabilities are only weakly bound to a sending
principal. Any entity that observed a capability could use it to send traffic of its
own, provided it was located on or near the path from sender to destination. Sec-
tion 3.7.2.3 demonstrates this effect by simulating an attack in which a compromised
router steals capabilities to impersonate legitimate senders.
Because it is easy to transform capabilities into packet-capabilities, and pre-
capabilities into capabilities, VanGuard must ensure that neither capabilities nor
pre-capabilities can be stolen by an on-path attacker. To prevent capability theft,
senders do not directly include returned capabilities in packets. A capability is
treated as a secret value, known only to the sender, the destination, and the router
that can verify it (a router RB located on the path between another router RA and
the destination can in fact observe pre-capabilities in request packets, but this will
not allow it to create a capability to send traffic to the destination, as described
in Section 5.5). The sender uses each capability to create a packet-capability, a
hash of the secret capability and the packet contents, to include in packets. A
router can verify the packet-capability created from the pre-capability it stamped
into the request packet by reconstructing the intermediate capability, but is not able
to determine the value of any other capabilities from inspecting the packet. Anyone
that observes a packet-capability cannot use it to send packets of its own.
To prevent eavesdroppers from observing capabilities as they are returned to
the sender, the sender encrypts a symmetric session key in its capability request,
using the destination’s public key obtained via DNS (Section 5.4.5). The destination
encrypts the capabilities with this key to preserve their secrecy. By preventing
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capability theft, VanGuard allows capabilities, instead of public-key signatures, to
prove ownership of packets.
5.4 VanGuard Architecture
This section describes the VanGuard architecture in detail.
5.4.1 Assumptions
Underlying capability architecture
VanGuard is an extension to generic capability architectures. For ease of expo-
sition, this chapter assumes the underlying architecture is TVA and presents its
contributions as modifications to the TVA protocol.
VanGuard can adopt any mechanisms used by the underlying capability ar-
chitecture. For instance, TVA incorporates measures to allow receivers to express
fine-grained policies on capabilities. Specifically, when a receiver returns a capability
to the sender, it restricts the capability to be valid for sending only N bytes in the
next T seconds. Routers enforce these conditions, at the cost of storing bounded,
temporary state. TVA also includes provisions for allowing senders to renew capa-
bilities with privileged packets (avoided the need to send another request packet in
order to continue sending packets), handling mid-flow route changes, and caching
capabilities to save space in packets. As such, VanGuard does not address these
concerns explicitly and relies on existing mechanisms for this functionality.
Like TVA, VanGuard assumes a globally known hash function H that can be
computed at line speed. One-way compression functions based on AES are a good
candidate, as specialized cores can perform AES encryption at up to 40 Gbit/s [39].
Deployment
Any subset of routers may implement VanGuard. Security increases with the size of













































Figure 5.2: Capability request packet
















N and T 2
Figure 5.3: Privileged packet format
and byte count
sender is using forged capabilities. The probability of a path consisting of only faulty
routers that do not perform checks also decreases. However, the more VanGuard
routers there are on the path from sender to destination, the greater the overhead
of privileged packets. Only one correct router is needed to demote a packet with
an incorrect capability. Therefore, we assume capabilities are checked only when
a packet crosses a trust boundary, i.e., enters into a new network. This limits the
number of capabilities in the packet to the number of networks or ASes the packet
traverses, which, for most packets, is less than six [57].
5.4.2 Packet types
There are two types of VanGuard packets: unprivileged, but fully-accountable, ca-






















































Figure 5.4: Capability response packet with returned capabilities and capability
request for the reverse path
also exist, but it receives the lowest priority at routers. All VanGuard contain a
capability header and a DNA header. These headers are shim headers between IP
and the transport protocol. Because routers can modify packets by inserting or
updating capabilities, the DNA sender’s signature of the packet contents must not
cover the capability header. Thus, the capability header precedes the DNA header.
Capability requests are fully accountable and carry a full DNA header. The
packet format is shown in Figure 5.2. Capability response packets are also account-
able (as they are requests for capabilities in the other direction) and thus have a full
DNA header and two capability headers (one to request pre-capabilities and one to
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return the encrypted capabilities). Their format is shown in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.3
shows the format of a privileged packet.
5.4.3 Capability types
There are three types of packet markings in VanGuard. Pre-capabilities, which are
stamped into request packets by routers, and capabilities, which the destination cre-
ates by hashing pre-capabilities and returning them to the sender, function almost
identically in VanGuard as they do in TVA. VanGuard uses a second transforma-
tion, this time by the sender, to turn capabilities into packet-capabilities. In TVA,
capabilities have two roles: they give the sender the ability to send privileged pack-
ets and they give routers the ability to verify that a packet is privileged. VanGuard
uses different types of marking for each role: capabilities to bestow permission to
the sender and packet-capabilities to allow routers to verify permission. This dis-
tinction is necessary to prevent unauthorized senders from being able to create valid
packet-capabilities.
To maintain sender accountability, VanGuard must ensure that a sender can
only create a packet-capability if it has received a capability from the destination.
Because it is easy to transform a capability into a packet-capability, satisfying this
requirement has two components: devices other than the sender and receiver must
not be able to observe a capability in transit and capabilities must be hard to forge.
VanGuard ensures the first component by using end-to-end encryption. The sec-
ond component also breaks down into two sub-components: no device (other than
routers in the destination’s network) can observe all of the pre-capabilities in transit
and pre-capabilities must themselves be hard to forge. The nature of packet forward-
ing trivially satisfies the first requirement, and VanGuard uses existing methods of
creating pre-capabilities to ensure the second.
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5.4.4 Capability formats
Pre-capabilities must be unforgeable. That is, a router R will accept a packet-
capability only if it was created with a pre-capability stamped by a router in R’s
network. To accomplish this, VanGuard uses pre-capabilities similar to those in
TVA. A VanGuard pre-capability is a hash of the sender’s public key, the destination
IP address, a local timestamp, and a secret known only to routers in the same
network. The pre-capability for network i is thus
pre-capi = ti||H(Spk, Dip, t, secreti)
where ti is the time in network i. All packet marking fields are the same size as in
TVA: an eight-bit timestamp and the last 56 bits of the output of H, creating a
64-bit value.
When a destination receives a request packet with a list of pre-capabilities, it
has several options (discussed in Section 5.4.7). If it chooses to return capabilities
to the sender, it transforms the pre-capabilities into capabilities. VanGuard is not
particular as to how this transformation happens. Assuming VanGuard is used with
TVA, the destination will create a list of capabilities that allows the sender to send
N bytes over T seconds by hashing each pre-capability with N and T :
capi = ti||H(N, T, pre-capi)
In TVA, senders include capabilities in privileged packets, and the capabilities
do not change during their lifetime. This enables capability theft. In contrast,
VanGuard packet-capabilities depend on the returned capability, but are unique
to every packet. To prevent others from stealing and using packet-capabilities,
VanGuard binds the value of a packet-capability to the contents of a packet, so that
they are valid only for that packet. Anyone that observes a packet-capability cannot
use it to create packet-capabilities of their own. Of course, nothing can prevent the
observer from sending an exact duplicate of the packet. For this, VanGuard uses
Bloom filters to detect such duplicates 3.5.
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A sender creates a packet-capability by hashing a capability with the contents
of the non-invariant fields of the packet, i.e., the entire IP packet except for the
TTL, QoS, and checksum:
post-capi = ti||H(capi, pkt)
5.4.5 Requesting capabilities
Request packets are unprivileged, but accountable. They have two components: a
capability header and a DNA header (Figure 5.2).
Sending a request packet requires knowing three pieces of information about
the destination: its IP address, its list of preferred TAPs, and a public key. The
public key is necessary to establish a shared symmetric key between the source and
destination. The sender obtains this information through DNS. (Senders make DNS
requests using accountable packets. A DNS server does not need to publish a public
key, as it does not return capabilities to any sender.) Because DNA already modifies
DNS records to include the list of TAPs a destination will accept, VanGuard assumes
that records also store a public key. A host h generates a public keypair (hV Gpk , h
V G
sk ),
separate from any DNA key, and publishes hV Gpk in its DNS record. To prevent h
V G
pk
from being tampered with en-route, h’s administrator uses its speaks-for key to
certify the key; this certificate is also stored in h’s DNS record.
To send a request packet, a sender S first follows the DNA protocol to create
an accountable packet. First, S commits to a blinding key. It then requests a token
to talk to the destination, D, from its LRep. The LRep determines if D has blocked
S by examining its local cache and the SBS. This is when blocks by a destination
are enforced: if D has blocked S, the LRep will not return a token, preventing S’s
packets from leaving its network. Otherwise, the LRep returns a token, T0, to S.
S inserts its payload into the packet (if creating a TCP connection, the TCP SYN
is piggybacked into the capability request and the payload is the TCP header) and
signs it with its blinding key. S can now populate the fields of an accountable packet
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according to Figure 5.2.
S now fills out the capability header. It leaves space for routers to stamp
pre-capabilities (the default is six; if this is insufficient, a downstream router will
increase the space in the packet). S also generates a random symmetric key K.
The destination uses this key to encrypt the capabilities it returns to the sender, so
that they cannot be observed in transit. S encrypts K with DV Gpk and includes it in
the capability request. S then sends the packet, and its first-hop router verifies the
signature and T0before forwarding it.
5.4.6 Creating pre-capabilities
When a request packet crosses an AS boundary into ASi, the receiving router
checks the previous AS’s token (as described in Section 3.3.6). If the token is valid,
the router stamps the pre-capability for ASi into the packet. This pre-capability,
pre-capi is equal to ti||H(Spk, Dip, t, secreti), where ti is the time at ASi and secreti
is a secret known only to routers in ASi. VanGuard assumes loose clock synchro-
nization among routers in the same AS, which is already assumed by DNA. The
secret value periodically changes so that capabilities expire.
If the token is invalid, the router drops the packet. Unaccountable capability
requests must not be delivered to the destination. In this respect, VanGuard differs
from TVA, which will forward requests with best-effort service.
5.4.7 Returning capabilities
When the destination D receives a request packet, it decides whether or not to grant
capabilities to the sender. If not, it can ignore the request, or return a capability
request (as it has no capabilities to send privileged packets) with empty capabil-
ities and a TCP RST as the payload. Alternatively, if the sender is flooding the
destination with capability requests, the destination creates a block request, has it
signed with the administrator’s speaks-for key, and sends it to the LRep named in
130
the request packet. This prevents the sender from sending any further packets to
D.
If the destination decides to grant capabilities, it first creates capabilities from
the pre-capabilities, decrypts the secret key in the request packet, encrypts the
capabilities with this key, and sends the capabilities in a request packet of its own
(so that it can obtain capabilities to send to the source).
To turn these into capabilities, D first chooses how many bytes (N) to allow
the sender to send and an interval in which to do so (T ). For example, a capability
may grant the sender the ability to send 100 Kbytes in 10 seconds. For each pre-
capability pre-capi in the request packet, D sets capi to be ti||H(pre-capi, N, T ).
Next, D usesDV Gsk to decrypt the symmetric keyK. D encrypts each capability
with K to prevent eavesdroppers from observing it in transit. D stores K, so that
it can decrypt the capabilities that S returns to it. D creates a capability request
packet and inserts each EncK (capi) into the packet. D makes the packet accountable
and sends it to S. This packet acquires pre-capabilities en route to S, which S
returns.
D also caches the value of S’s LRep, indexed by Spk, so that D can still block
S when it sends unsigned, privileged packets.
5.4.8 Sending privileged packets
Once S obtains (encrypted) capabilities from D, it can send privileged packets. It
first decrypts the capabilities using the shared secret key K it previously generated.
To send a packet P , S creates a packet-capability for each AS ASi along the path
to D, using capi. The packet-capability is a hash of the capability and the invariant
parts of the packet contents, including the payload and DNA header, but not the
capability header. Because privileged packets are not signed and do not require
tokens, the only value in the DNA header is Spk (see Figure 5.3). S computes
post-capi as ti||H(capi, P ′) where P ′ is P with the IP TTL, QoS, and checksum
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fields replaced with zeroes.
5.4.9 Verifying capabilities
When a router R in AS ASi receives a privileged packet, it validates the packet-
capability for that AS, post-capi. It finds post-capi by treating the packet-capability
pointer as an index into the list of packet-capabilities. R validates the packet-
capability by first computing the pre-capability it would have inserted into the
packet by hashing D’s IP address, S’s public key from the packet, the timestamp
t from the packet-capability, and its own secret. It then hashes this pre-capability
with N and T to produce the capability created by S. Finally, it hashes this value
with the invariant parts of the packet. If this value matches the packet-capability,
the the router determines the packet to be valid.
The router also performs whatever additional checks are required by the un-
derlying capability architecture. In the case of TVA, this includes verifying that
the packet-capability has not expired (ti is relatively fresh) and that the sender has
not sent more then N bytes in the past T seconds. This requires storing a bounded
amount of state for each sender. For a packet of B bytes, R creates a byte counter
and a timer with a TTL of BT/N seconds. The TTL decrements every second and
increases (along with the byte count) with every packet from S. If S sends less
than N bytes in T seconds, then the TTL will never increase beyond NT/N = T
seconds and will eventually reach zero. In this case, the state is reclaimed. If the
byte counter reaches N , R drops subsequent privileged packets from S until the
TTL expires.
If the packet passes all checks, then the router increments the packet-capability
index and forwards the packet. If a check fails, VanGuard again defaults to the
underlying capability architecture as to how to handle the packet. Typically, the































Table 5.1: Summary of differences between TVA and VanGuard.
5.4.10 Blocking a privileged sender
To block a sender S, D needs S’s blinding key and the IP address of LRepS. Both
of these fields are present in request packets, so blocking S based on a request is
straightforward: D creates a block request and has the network administrator sign
it with its speaks-for key and forward it to LRepS. LRepS follows the DNA blocking
protocol and returns a receipt to D’s administrator. LRepS places a filter at S’s
first-hop router, blocking traffic to D.
Once S has capabilities, however, it no longer includes the DNA header in its
packets. When D issues capabilities to S it caches S’s blinding key and LRepS with
S’s address as they key. D can the blinding key and address in order to create a
block. S can reclaim this state when S’s capabilities expire.
5.4.11 Summary of differences between TVA and VanGuard
We now review the differences between TVA and VanGuard. The most fundamental
difference is that in TVA there is no notion of sender identity other than network
location. Only the path identifiers that routers insert into capability requests allow
133
the destination to distinguish between requests from different senders. On the other
hand, senders in VanGuard are uniquely identified by a public key. Malicious senders
cannot cause long-term collateral damage to other senders: block requests affect
only the guilty party, whereas in TVA, the attacker could continually force a nearby
honest sender to share the same queues in downstream routers.
To prevent unprivileged capability requests from overwhelming privileged traf-
fic, TVA limits requests to 5% of the bandwidth on any link. In VanGuard, requests
and privileged packets share the same bandwidth. VanGuard relies on destinations
to block the sources of packet floods.
As a result of using blocking to protect links, VanGuard does not need to use a
scheduling policy. In TVA, routers hierarchically fair-queue request packets based on
path identifiers. This prevents malicious senders from denying capabilities to honest
senders by consuming the entirety of the request channel bandwidth. To prevent
a malicious destination from granting capabilities to malicious senders, allowing
them to congest a link that the malicious destination shares with other hosts, TVA
uses per-destination fair-queuing on the privileged channel. While VanGuard could
implement per-destination or per-flow queuing, we consider this attack to be outside
of our threat model. There is no way to distinguish between the malicious behavior
described above and fair use of the shared link, and we do not want to deny legitimate
users their share of the network.
TVA and VanGuard differ in their architectural assumptions. VanGuard relies
on DNA, which requires the deployment of additional infrastructure: a TAP, an SBS,
LReps in networks, and modifying routers to support signature verifications and
token operations. However, this architecture is not trusted. TVA, however, trusts
all routers to not steal capabilities from privileged traffic: a malicious router can
flood a destination using any capability it observes. On the other hand, by encrypted




Figure 5.5: Router R2 can observe pre-capabilities stamped by R1 but not by R3.
This comparison is summarized in Table 5.1.
5.5 Attacks
Capability theft
In order for unsigned packets to be accountable, no one but an authorized sender be
able to create a valid packet-capability. One way capability theft can occur is if an
on-path router observes a pre-capability. It can then use it to create capabilities for
its own packets. While this is possible in VanGuard, it does not allow the router to
send privileged packets to any destination. To see why, consider Figure 5.5. R2 can
observe the pre-capability that R1 stamps into a request packet from S to D. If R2 is
malicious, it could turn that pre-capability into a packet-capability that would allow
any sender to send a privileged packet through R1 to D. However, R2 cannot see
the pre-capabilities that R3 inserts into the request packet. Without this knowledge,
any forged packet will be dropped (or, at best, demoted to legacy traffic) by R3. So
long as there is at least one honest router downstream of an on-path attacker, this
attack will fail. VanGuard assumes that at least one router in D’s network correctly
stamps and verifies capabilities, so that spoofed packets will be dropped before they
reach D. If routers in D’s network do not operate correctly, then there is little that
VanGuard can do to protect D.
The greater concern is when a router observes the full list of capabilities when
they are returned to the sender. In this scenario, an on-path adversary does obtain
the capabilities necessary to send spoofed traffic to D. TVA is vulnerable to this
attack, as shown in Section 3.7.2.3. To prevent this attack, D encrypts capabilities
before they are returned.
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5.6 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of VanGuard, we developed a simulation of a large-scale
deployment of VanGuard using ns-2.
The biggest difference between VanGuard and TVA is in how they treat capa-
bility requests. In TVA, routers fair-queue requests using a series of path identifiers
stamped in the packet. When a capability request crosses an AS trust boundary, the
ingress router tags the request with a value that is unique among all ingress routers;
this tag identifies the upstream AS. Routers hierarchically fair-queue requests based
on path identifiers, which approximates per-source queuing. Even if a sender spoofs
their source address and prepends fake path IDs, the path identifiers inserted by
routers will be consistent across the sender’s packets.
In contrast, VanGuard requires that capability requests be signed by a certified
key and allows destinations to block requests from unwanted senders. Unsigned
packets without capabilities are dropped by the network. This section compares
the two methods of preventing unwanted capability requests from overwhelming
legitimate requests.
Simulations of TVA use code provided by the authors [1]. Simulations of Van-
Guard use the DNA code from Section 3.7.2 to implement the blocking functionality
and the above TVA code to obtain capabilities.
Topology
One of the goals of our simulations is to determine how quickly TVA senders can
obtain a capability in the presence of attackers. TVA routers fair-queue capability
requests based on path identifiers. Using a dumbbell topology, as in Chapter 3,
would not accurately model how TVA’s fair-queuing would perform on a topology
closer to that of the Internet (the capability request channel was not under attack in
the evaluation of TVA in Chapter 3, so the results are not topology-dependent). In-






Figure 5.6: Simulation topology
to the root of the tree by the bottleneck link. Each upstream router represents a
network and connects to two upstream devices: either routers or senders. Each
sender is eight hops away from the destination.
In the simulations of VanGuard, the LRep is connected to each sender’s first-
hop router and serves both senders attached to that router.
Parameters
In each experiment there are 20 honest senders transmitting files. Honest senders
attempt to transfer ten files of 20 Kbytes each to the destination using TCP.
Attackers flood the network with capability requests at a rate of 1000 per sec-
ond. We vary the number of attackers between 0 and 100. Senders and attackers are
placed in random locations. A first-hop router may serve two honest, two malicious,
or a one honest and one malicious senders. Nodes attached to the same first-hop
router and share TVA path IDs.
The bandwidth of all links except the bottleneck is 100 Mbit/s. The bottleneck
link is limited to 1 Mbit/s. The latency on each link is 10 ms.
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5.6.1 Experiments
We evaluated two aspects of each system: the time it takes for file transfers to
complete and the time it takes for a sender to obtain a capability.
5.6.1.1 File transfer time
VanGuard
We first evaluate how well VanGuard combats bandwidth flooding attacks.
Because VanGuard does not use a dedicated channel for capability requests,
requests from malicious senders compete with ongoing file transfers. This delays
those transfers, as shown in Figure 5.7, until the senders are blocked. Once this
occurs, file transfer time returns to pre-attack levels.
TVA
We then evaluate the performance of TVA on this topology. As both honest senders
and attackers may share the same path ID (as they would in Internet-like topologies),
we expect that requests from both will share the same queues, which will hamper
senders that request capabilities after the attack begins.
Figure 5.8 confirms this hypothesis. Once honest senders finally obtain a ca-
pability, their transfer times decrease, although they do not return to the baseline,
suggesting that senders sharing a first-hop router still have difficulty obtaining to-
kens.
Examining Figures 5.7 and Figures 5.8 closely to observe which transfers are
affected reveals an insight into the nature of the difference between TVA and Van-
Guard. With VanGuard, the affected transfers began before the attack (or before
the attackers were blocked): the attack traffic affects in-progress transfers. However,
with TVA, the affected (aborted) transfers began after the attack, when senders re-





























































































































Transfer start time (s)
(f) 100 attackers
Figure 5.7: This figure shows how VanGuard performs under increasingly powerful
request flooding attacks. The y-axis is the ratio of the time required to transfer a
20 Kbyte to the victim compared to the time of the first transfer. The attack starts
at 10 seconds, indicated by the vertical line.
5.6.1.2 Time to obtain capabilities
Our next experiment focuses just on the ability of honest senders to obtain capa-
bilities. This experiment focuses closer on the main difference between VanGuard
and TVA, namely how each protects capability requests. Using the data from the
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Transfer start time (s)
Successful transfers
Aborted transfers
(f) 100 attackers. 20 transfers were
aborted.
Figure 5.8: This figure shows how TVA performs under increasingly powerful request
flooding attacks. The y-axis is the ratio of the time required to transfer a 20 Kbyte
to the victim compared to the time of the first transfer. The attack starts at 10
seconds, indicated by the vertical line.
tecture.
The results, presented in Figure 5.9, show that senders are able to obtain a
capability faster in VanGuard than in TVA, and that the difference between the two




















































































































Figure 5.9: CDFs of the delay between sending a capability request and obtaining
a capability VanGuard and TVA.
delay imposed on VanGuard packets by signature verification.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents VanGuard which combines DNA with capabilities to create
an accountable capability architecture.
Previous capability architectures include capabilities in the clear in packets.
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Routers and other devices that observe capabilities can use the same capabilities
to send privileged traffic. VanGuard solves this problem by introducing packet-
capabilities, which are bound to individual packets. An adversary that eavesdrops
a packet-capability can use the packet-capability to send only duplicates of the
observed packet.
VanGuard outperforms both TVA and DNA. By allowing destinations to block
malicious senders from sending capability requests, VanGuard protects legitimate
requests better than TVA, which fair-queuing requests on a bandwidth-limited chan-
nel. The cost of sending packets in VanGuard is less than that of DNA, because
VanGuard requires signatures only on request packets.
VanGuard can be thought of as a combination of both capabilities and filtering
architectures like AITF [8] and StopIt [52]. Based on their comparisons of both types
of DoS prevention approaches, the authors of StopIt conclude that filters outperform
capabilities in terms of effectiveness, until the magnitude of the attack is so great
that the destination cannot place filters at the source. By combining filters, a fail-





In this chapter, I summarize the contributions of this thesis and propose areas of
future work in network accountability.
6.1 Contributions
In this dissertation I support the following thesis: the Internet architecture can
be extended to allow receivers to block traffic from unwanted senders, even in the
presence of malicious devices in the forwarding path.
My approach to demonstrating this thesis is to incorporate accountability into
the network. An accountable network architecture binds sender identities to packets
and supports a set of actions based on those identities. The action I consider in my
thesis is blocking traffic at the source, upon request of the receiver.
The first contribution in this thesis is the DNA accountable Internet architec-
ture, in which every on-path component is held accountable for its actions. Malicious
devices are eventually found and evicted from the network, limiting their impact.
Determining if a packet should be blocked, based on the sender, requires identifying
the principal that sent it. Properly identifying the sender requires two conditions:
the packet is bound to a principal’s identity, and this identity belongs to the sending
principal.
DNA uses public-key cryptography for both tasks, as this is the only way we
know of to provide the strong guarantees that DNA requires. Senders are identified
by an asymmetric keypair. Senders sign outgoing packets with the private key.
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Requiring signatures on packets not only allows others to identify the source of
the packet, but also prevents innocent principals from being framed for malicious
actions.
In order to block traffic from unwanted senders, the attribute which identifies
senders (in this case, their keypair) must be long-lasting. Blocking a sender is
ineffective if the sender can use a new, unblocked identity. To prevent principals
from minting identities, DNA employs a centralized authority that certifies these
identities. This is the only trusted component of DNA.
One of the goals of DNA is to ensure that unwanted traffic is blocked at the
source, before it affects the network. To satisfy this, DNA stores block requests in a
globally available repository, so that devices in the sender’s network can determine
if the sender has been blocked by its intended destination. DNA uses the Neighbor-
hoodWatch distributed hash table, the second contribution of this thesis, to store
block requests; NeighborhoodWatch is a scalable, distributed data store. It makes
use of the trusted authority of DNA and is resilient to malicious activity by its con-
stituent nodes, so long as the malicious nodes are unable to occupy a sufficiently
long sequence of consecutive node IDs.
NeighborhoodWatch is based on Chord [75], which defines an efficient lookup
operation that serves as the basis for storing and retrieving items. In a network with
N nodes, a lookup takes a maximum of O(log(N)) steps to complete. A lookup in
NeighborhoodWatch is, at most, a small constant factor slower than in Chord.
The third contribution of this thesis is VanGuard, an accountable capability
architecture built on top of DNA. VanGuard addresses the weaknesses of prior ca-
pability architectures by allowing receivers to block senders from sending unwanted
capability requests, obviating the need to use fair-queuing over unreliable identifiers
to protect the capability request channel. VanGuard performs better than DNA
alone because capability-bearing packets need not be signed, as the capability is an
indication that the destination desires traffic from the sender and has cached the
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information necessary to block the sender if it so desires. This is an improvement
over DNA’s waivers, which neither allow a waivered sender to be blocked nor provide
the other benefits of capabilities such as fine-grained rate limiting [82].
These three pieces show an Internet architecture that identifies the senders of
packets, allows destinations to block traffic from unwanted senders near the source
even in the presence of malicious devices, and how to improve efficiency by using
capabilities instead of signatures in established connections. Together, they validate
my thesis.
6.2 Limitations and future work
One way to extend the work in this thesis is to to identify and remedy limitations of
DNA, NeighborhoodWatch, and VanGuard. I identify several limitations below and
suggest possible fixes. I also discuss two additional areas of future work: designing
accountability architectures under alternate trust models and uses of accountability
in networks beyond blocking unwanted senders.
6.2.1 Limitations
DNA
The major limitation of DNA is the cost of deployment. It requires significant
changes to the Internet’s architecture: the establishment of one or more TAPs,
certifying the keys of all senders, dedicating nodes to participate in the Neighbor-
hoodWatch SBS, deploying LReps in each AS, and modifying routers to support
signature verifications and token operations. The upside to these changes is that
they are mostly additions to the current Internet, as opposed to AIP [3], which
requires changes to routing protocols, host addresses, and host hardware. Mitigat-
ing or removing any of DNA’s deployment costs would produce a promising path
towards deployment.
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A second limitation of DNA a cost of a different type: the use of per-packet
asymmetric cryptography. While this allows DNA to hold senders accountable for
their packets, it is currently computationally infeasible to verify signatures at line
speeds. DNA amortizes this cost by verifying signatures near the ends of the network,
rather than in the middle. Of the three signatures in DNA packets, two (the signature
of the LRep’s key by the TAP and the signature of the sender’s blinding key by
the LRep) appear in multiple packets, allowing the first-hop router to cache valid
signatures. VanGuard further reduces the cost of signatures. However, this does
not eliminate the cost of requiring signatures on packets. It may be unrealistic to
expect low-power devices such as mobile phones to sign each outgoing packet, and
for first-hop routers to verify signatures on hundreds of thousands of packets per
second. How can these costs be reduced so that signing packets does not affect
transmission times? Can signatures be replaced with a different, more efficient
mechanism, without sacrificing the ability to bind a sender to its packets?
A related limitation is the size of the DNA packet header. Including public
keys and signatures in the packet header consumes a large amount of space, even
compared to the 40-byte IPv6 header. As previously mentioned, two of the three
signatures can be cached and replaced with smaller values. Can the need for these
signatures be eliminated entirely?
NeighborhoodWatch
In order to function properly, the NeighborhoodWatch DHT must ensure that an
adversary cannot control a sequence of k consecutive nodes in the identifier space,
where k is the replication factor. NeighborhoodWatch places nodes randomly and
evicts malicious nodes, which increase the likelihood that this condition holds but
does not guarantee it. Is there a way to guarantee that this condition holds, without
bounding the number of malicious nodes in the network?
Another limitation is the requirement that all nodes periodically contact the
TAP. This contravenes the distributed nature of a DHT: if the TAP fails, so may the
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DHT. Can the role of the TAP be fully decentralized? That is, can nodes generate
neighborhood certificates in a reliable, distributed manner? Applying techniques
from Morselli’s dissertation [62] may yield progress towards a fully-decentralized,
secure DHT.
VanGuard
Because it builds on DNA, VanGuard shares many of the same limitations, partic-
ularly the costs of deployment. VanGuard requires further changes to routers and
end hosts, but does not require changes to additional devices than a deployment of
DNA would.
In DNA, any device could verify is a packet was accountable or not. This is
not true with capabilities. Because VanGuard uses only capabilities to protect the
privileged channel, ASes may transit invalid traffic by, for instance, failing to drop
or demote packets with incorrect packet-capabilities.
Of course, DNA and VanGuard do not permit the simplest DoS attack by
a router: dropping packets destined to the victim. Both rely on correct routing
and DNS operation in order to provide connectivity. In Section 6.2.3 I discuss how
DNA can be used to secure routing protocols, and the deployment of DNSSEC [40]
suggests that secure DNS is a reasonable assumption.
6.2.2 Alternate trust assumptions
Trusting in-network devices
One direction for future work is to explore how a relaxation of DNA’s trust as-
sumptions can make an accountability architecture easier to deploy. By relaxing
the requirement that no devices involved in packet transmission be trusted, for in-
stance, we could assume a limited deployment of trusted devices, on the order of
several per network. Intuitively, this is a more reasonable assumption than requiring
trusted hardware in every end host (as in AIP [3]) or trusting on-path routers (as
in TVA [81]).
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This assumption suggests an alternative, simpler design of an Internet archi-
tecture that allows destinations to block senders. As in VanGuard, there are two
classes of traffic: accountable connection requests and packets in established con-
nections. The trusted devices, or T-boxes, form an overlay which routes connection
requests from the sender to the T-box near the destination. T-boxes ensure that
only accountable requests enter the overlay and store the block requests created by
hosts in their network.
Links in the trusted overlay are protected with cryptography. Two neighbor-
ing, accountable networks exchange a symmetric key that they use to authenticate
traffic between the T-boxes in their networks; traffic addressed to a T-box that does
not carry a MAC created with the correct key is dropped. Because the overlay trans-
mits only accountable traffic, there is no need to trace traffic back to its source—i.e.,
there is no need for DNA-style, hop-by-hop tokens in packets.
To establish a connection with a destination D, a sender S finds the trusted
device, TD, in D’s network via DNS, creates an accountable request to connect to D,
and sends the request to its local trusted device, TS. The request is then forwarded
through the T-box overlay, network by network, until it reaches TD. TD examines
its local state to see if D has blocked S. If not, TD returns a token to S that allows
(unsigned) traffic from S to enter D’s network.
Storing block requests on a device near the destination obviates the need for
globally available, secure storage for block requests. It also reduces connection
establishment latency, as there is no need to query the block storage. This efficiency
improvement comes at the cost of allowing requests from blocked senders to traverse
the overlay, only to be denied by the destination’s T-box.
Packets in established connections need not be accountable, but they must
carry a token generated by a T-box. Only the T-box that is responsible for storing
block requests created by a destination D will grant a token to establish a connection
to D. Therefore, a token does not need to indicate which specific T-box created it,
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only that it was created by a T-box. It is an open question whether this relaxation
affords a more efficient solution that using digital signatures.
Removing global trust
DNA has a single trusted component: the TAP, which certifies principals’ identity
keys. This trust can be distributed across different, competing TAP services. Is
it possible to distribute this trust further? As a point of comparison, senders in
AIP [3] generate their own keys, and networks are responsible for ensuring users do
not generate “too many” keys. There is no need for a central authority to certify
keys, though each network must be trusted to limit the number of keys a user creates.
In the T-box design described above, the TAP is not necessary: T-boxes can
authenticate local users and certify their keys. What other assumptions lead to
an accountable architecture that does not rely on a centralized trusted authority?
Could such an architecture be more resilient to attacks than DNA? Finding the
answers to these questions may lead to an accountability architecture that does not
rely on a set of authorities that dictate what is and is not a valid principal.
6.2.3 Using accountability for security
An accountable network is a building block that has many security-related uses.
This thesis shows two such uses: blocking unwanted senders and securing capability
systems. Here, I discusses several more uses that would serve as areas of future
research.
An obvious use of accountability is for network auditing. Because accountable
packets can be mapped to their sender, it is easy to determine who is responsible
for network events. This has applications ranging from improving the accuracy of
intrusion detection systems to preventing unauthorized users, such as worms, from
exploiting vulnerabilities.
Similarly, accountability can be used to dismantle botnets. Currently, bots
are hard to identify, because they often attack with spoofed source addresses. How-
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ever, the compromised hosts themselves are not malicious; their owners are simply
unaware that they are participating in a botnet. Identifying the true source of at-
tacks and holding the sending host accountable (temporarily disconnecting it, for
instance) encourages users to properly maintain their machines.
Additionally, accountability can help shut down the botnet itself. Botnets
are often managed via a command and control (C&C) server [29]. By intercepting
traffic from the C&C server, perhaps with a honeypot [67], network operators can
identify and quarantine the source of commands. Similar events have occurred in
the past, such as the shutdown of the Atrivo network [11], though they are rare;
accountability will facilitate this process.
The final example I discuss is how accountability can be used to create a
secure inter-domain routing protocol. Route hijacking, when an AS announces a
prefix that it does not own [14], is a common occurrence in the Internet. There have
been several high-profile instances, most notably Pakistan’s hijack of YouTube [61].
To prevent these attacks, routers must accept only valid prefix announcements. A
router must know two facts to determine if an announcement is valid: the identity
of the sender, and if the sender is authorized to make the announcement. In an
accountable Internet, it is easy to answer the first question. To answer the second,
the routing protocol can use a slight modification of DNA’s speaks-for keys. In DNA,
the TAP certifies speaks-for keys for administrators of each prefix. To extend the
role of speaks-for keys to secure routing, the TAP can also include the AS name in
the certificate. This allows the administrator (or a BGP-speaking router) to prove
that they are the owner of the announced prefix.
6.3 Parting thoughts
I conclude my dissertation with one impression of the work contained within. What
strikes me most about the work I have presented here is how many areas is draws
from. DNA relies on the design of strong but efficient cryptographic protocols.
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NeighborhoodWatch is a contribution to secure distributed system design. Van-
Guard is based on work in filtering and capability architectures. In order to deter-
mine how quickly routers could perform certain computations, we examined speci-
fications of dedicated hardware. We used measurement data, collected both at our
university and from a global network security community, to guide some of our de-
sign choices. We motivated the conference publication of NeighborhoodWatch [17]
by showing how it could be used to fight spam; this required examining current
practices in sending and combating spam.
When I started this work, I did not expect that creating systems that prevented
denial of service attacks would require such broad knowledge and expose me to so
many areas. I take it as a positive sign that results from one area of networking
research can easily lend themselves to another. It is also interesting to me to see
how, as research in certain areas matures (DHTs, for instance), it is adopted into
work in other areas (mitigating DoS attacks).
On the other hand, one could argue that drawing from such a wide variety of
areas is the symptom of a negative aspect of my work: its complexity. Simplicity is
often cited as a design goal, that simple systems are easier to implement and reason
about. While this may be true, I think that at some point, “simple” systems will face
limitations on what they can accomplish, at least in regards to protecting resources
on the Internet. Evidence suggests that this time is rapidly approaching: botnets
are growing ever larger, due to host insecurity [7], subtle attacks on DNS accelerated
the adoption of DNSSEC [44], and current routing systems are vulnerable to prefix
hijacking. As the Internet grows, so must the complexity of the systems that run
it. In order to be resilient to current and future threats, the Internet community
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